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Abstract
In this thesis we study peer-based communities which are online communities whose
services are provided by their participant agents. In order to improve the services an agent
enjoys in these communities, we need to improve the services other agents offer. Towards
this goal, we propose a novel solution which allows communities to share the experience
of their members with other communities. The experience of a community with an agent
is captured in the evaluation rating of the agent within the community, which can either
represent the trustworthiness or the reputation of the agent. We argue that exchanging
this information is the right way to improve the services the agent offers since it: i) exploits
the information that each community accumulates to allow other communities to decide
whether to accept the agent while it also puts pressure on the agent to behave well, since it is
aware that any misbehaviour will be spread to the communities it might wish to join in the
future, ii) can prevent the agent from overstretching itself among many communities, since
this may lead the agent to provide very limited services to each of these communities due to
its limited resources, and thus its trustworthiness and reputation might be compromised.
We study mechanisms that can be used to facilitate the exchange of trust or reputation
information between communities. We make two key contributions. First, we propose a
graph-based model which allows a particular community to determine which other com-
munities to ask information from. We leverage consistency of past information and provide
an equilibrium analysis showing that communities are best-off when they truthfully report
the requested information, and describe how payments should be made to support the
equilibrium. Our second contribution is a promise-based trust model where agents are
judged based on the contributions they promise and deliver to the community. We outline
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In the last decade the variety and the number of the services users can access through
the Internet have significantly increased. We have reached the point where users can enjoy
services that include searching to locate specialized and personalized information, obtaining
recommendations, participating in online auctions where users can act both as sellers and
bidders, exchanging information, and participating in discussion forums where users can
be both questioners and answerers and many more.
Due to the Internet’s global nature, millions of users are able to access these services.
Since several of them are offered by users themselves, the total number of the services
available is rapidly increasing. This enormous amount of information and services is leading
people to seek more efficient ways to access them. One way that appears to be dominating
is the organization of communities of like-minded individuals who share common goals and
interests. By doing so, users try to restrict the services and information they consider,
before they decide which ones they will access.
In this thesis we focus on the class of communities in which the services offered are
based significantly on peer contributions. We will refer to them as peer-based communi-
ties. Examples of these communities include, but are not limited to, electronic auctions
(e.g. ebay), P2P file sharing networks, recommendation systems, online forums, wikis and
many more. One critical observation is that the performance and the popularity of such
communities depend both on the number of their members and on the quantity and on
the quality of the contribution that each member provides. It is therefore important for
communities to make careful decisions when accepting a new member. Furthermore, it is
likewise beneficial to encourage users to be good contributors, in their communities.
Since we consider electronic communities, each user is represented by an intelligent
agent (i.e., software that aims to perform tasks on the behalf of users to meet their prefer-
ences), and thus for the rest of the thesis we will simply refer to the agents that represent
1
the users. An intelligent agent is essentially a piece of software that can act on the behalf
of a user.
The ideal situation for a community is when it consists of honest agents that contribute
information and services relevant to the interests of other participant agents and to the
interests of the community. For example, in an electronic auction community, the desirable
situation would be when sellers provide goods at a quality and price that buyers would
be interested in purchasing. However, the ideal situation is far from reality. A number of
different categories of agents can act maliciously, either deliberately or unintentionally. In
particular, these categories are:
• free riders which are agents that take advantage of the services provided but never
contribute1,
• whitewashers which are agents that keep changing their identity in order to contin-
uously get the benefits of newcomers by resetting their history,
• malicious agents which are agents that aim to sabotage the community,
• selfish agents which are agents that aim to temporarily gain as much as possible
without having any concern that this might decrease both the performance of the
system and its long-term benefits,
• careless agents which are agents that unintentionally overload the environment with
unnecessary or bad quality services or information.
The communities we consider in this thesis are multiagent systems and thus they consist
of multiple agents that interact with each other. In these communities there are two main
ways to motivate agents to behave in a desirable manner. The first one is based on the
assumption that the agents can see their long term benefits. More specifically, the agents
can reason that if all the agents in the system contribute good quality of information then
in the future they will all be able to utilize better services. However, given that agents
represent users and thus act based on the users’ strategies, a scenario in which all the
agents would be able to see the long term benefits they might acquire can be considered
unrealistic. In order to deal with this problem, a second way is through the development of
an incentive-based model that essentially determines the benefits an agent receives based
on its behaviour. In particular, from our perspective, the idea of using incentives is to
“motivate” agents to act in a desirable manner by “threatening” to directly or indirectly
limit their access to the system’s privileges. Usually, the desirable manner refers to honest
behaviour. For example, honest revelation of information, honest feedback etc.
1The existence of free riders results in a problem that is commonly known as the tragedy of the commons
[21].
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In this thesis we consider a novel approach of providing incentives to agents to be good
participants. This approach is based on the observation that people and even animals tend
to behave better when they feel that their behaviour is being monitored. This is commonly
known as the Hawthorne Effect [18]. Similar to this, we consider an approach where agents
know that their behaviour inside a community will be observed and will be shared with the
communities they might be interested in joining in the future. Since agents can migrate
between, or be members of, multiple communities, how an agent behaves in one community
is of interest to others. This is particularly true in situations where communities can decide
whether or not to allow a particular agent to join. When an agent attempts to join a new
community, it should be possible for this community to acquire information about the
agent’s past history, as part of its reasoning about the potential value of the agent. In
cases where communities have limited ability to accept new members, those agents that
appear to be more reliable and a better match will be more likely to be accepted into the
community. At the same time, agents will realize that their previous evaluation is going
to be considered whenever they choose to join new communities. As a result, they may
be inclined to participate well and in a trustworthy manner, no matter which community
they inhabit.
Summarizing, we argue that having communities communicate regarding the behaviour
of their agents will have the following important effects:
• good agents are identified, so that they can enjoy benefits right away,
• the average contribution of agents in the community may increase, since agents will
be motivated to contribute; otherwise, this will have a negative impact on their
evaluation,
• the services and information provided will be more useful, since the communities will
end up having agents that better match their profile.
By allowing communities to exchange their experiences about their agents they can: i)
exploit the information that each community accumulates while at the same time com-
munities put pressure on agents by informing them that any misbehaviour will be spread
to the communities they might wish to join in the future, and ii) prevent agents from
overstretching themselves among many communities, since this may lead them to provide
very limited services to each of these communities due to their limited resources.
Exchanging evaluation ratings cannot be effective without the existence of an accurate
model for evaluating the behaviour of the agents in communities. The framework we pro-
pose is as follows. Within each community, an agent earns a certain evaluation rating,
based on the value of its participation within the community and the quality of its interac-
tions with other members. Consequently, the way the behaviour of each agent is modeled
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is crucial. The evaluation of an agent can be either the reputation of the agent or the
trustworthiness of the agent.
Although, trust and reputation have been used by a number of researchers interchange-
ably [25, 77] in this thesis, we argue that trust should be distinguished from reputation
and we focus on providing a novel trust model for evaluating an agent since trust is a
more objective and comprehensive metric of the behaviour of an agent. In particular, by
trust we refer to the degree an agent honored its promise and by reputation we refer to
the degree of satisfaction (i.e., contribution to the maximization of their utility) the agent
brought to the other agents with which it has interacted. Although trust and reputation
can be related to each other, one does not necessarily imply the other. For example, an
agent might have a high reputation but can be proved untrustworthy in an interaction with
another agent.
Another limitation with using reputation ratings for the case of communities is that the
values provided are highly related to the particular needs of the community. For example, a
desirable agent might have low reputation inside a community because although it is willing
to contribute, there is no current interest in the services it offers or simply the services it
offers do not much with the needs of the community. On the other hand a malicious agent
can temporarily create a good reputation and then become deceptive in the future, once
it has been accepted in another community. For the aforementioned reasons, in this thesis
by evaluation rating we will refer to trustworthiness rating.
Summarizing, the problems we address in this thesis are the following:
1. Exchange of information between communities:
(a) Advisor Selection Problem: Select the set of communities to exchange informa-
tion.
(b) Payment Decision Problem: Determine the compensation a community should
receive with respect to the quality of the information it provided.
2. Trust Modeling Problem: Modeling of trust in peer-based communities.
1.1 Exchange of Information Between Communities
Several researchers have proposed the exchange of ratings of agents between peers in social
networks in the context of modeling the reputation and trustworthiness of agents [31, 46,
76, 91, 92]. This is especially useful in settings such as e-marketplaces, where a buying
agent might have little experience with a selling agent and may choose to ask other buyers
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for advice. In our work, we examine a similar but distinct problem: how to promote honest
exchange of information about the evaluation of agents, between communities.
Communities are primarily self-interested and thus they have strong incentives to play
strategically and occasionally misreport the evaluation of their agents. For example, a
community CA could be reluctant to provide a truthful evaluation for one of its very good
agents to another community CB. This is due to the fact that if the community CB accepts
the agent then CA might have to share the resources that the agent contributes with CB.
Given that the agent’s resources can be limited, this can result in a decrease of the agent’s
contribution to CA. Furthermore, a community might lie about an agent with a poor
contribution in an effort to get rid of them.
We would like to note that in our model, we consider that the honest communities
can accurately reason about the behaviour of their agents and that their agents do not
change their behaviour from one community to another. In addition we consider that
a community which does not (strategically or not) or cannot reason about the value of
its agents is dishonest. In other words by honest we refer to a community that provides
valuable information while by dishonest we refer to a community that provides information
of no significant value. This is because each community is self-interested and thus it would
like to collaborate with communities that provide information that it can use. Even if
a community CA was truthful about an agent, and the agent proved to honestly behave
differently, the information that CA provided is not valuable to the recipient community,
and thus it is rational for the recipient community to decrease the probability of asking
that community in the future. Similar to this is the case where the inaccurate information
was due to the lack of a good evaluation model. If a community is honest but uses an
inaccurate evaluation model to reason about its agents then, again, the information that
it provides to other communities might not be helpful.
Our aim is to design a framework that enables communities to truthfully share infor-
mation about their agents. The key idea of our research is to promote truthfulness both
amongst agents and communities. Agents should be inclined to be good citizens within
their communities because their reputation will be shared; communities need to be in-
clined to honestly share the reputation ratings of their agents in order to be able to benefit
from the information provided by the other communities in the system. For this reason
we propose a two phase incentive mechanism. In the first phase our approach determines
the set of communities that will exchange information. In particular, it determines which
communities the recipient community will consult in order to acquire information for an
agent. We refer to these communities as the advisor communities. In the second phase we
propose a payment function that determines the compensation each advisor should receive
based on the quality of the report it provided.2
2The quality of a report is discussed in details in Chapter 5.
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Selecting Communities to Consult
For addressing the problem of selecting which communities to consult we propose the
use of a graph-based heuristic which exploits the consistency among the advice of candidate
advisors and reduces the number of communities that are queried each time a community
seeks information about a prospective agent. Reducing the number of communities that are
queried is very important since each time a community requests information from another
community it has to provide some resources while also it can provide strong incentives to
the communities to provide truthful reports. However, the selection should be determined
carefully in order for all the communities to be inclined to provide truthful reports.
We argue that exploiting consistency among good advisors will further promote honest
behaviour since fewer communities will be consulted and thus resources will be restricted to
only the most reliable sources. This will create a more competitive environment between
the advisor communities, which will be inclined to be truthful in order to increase the
probability of being asked in the future. Moreover by using a heuristic that exploits
consistency we can prevent the communities from playing strategically when deciding when
to tell the truth and when to lie. Note that simply selecting the communities with the
highest probability of telling the truth is not always sufficient, since it might be the case
that although a community CA can have a probability of telling the truth a little bit below
the probability of another community CB, the community CA might be a better choice than
CB. One reason that CA might be better is if the transactions based on which the latter
probability is determined are more recent than the ones that determine the probability
that CB is telling the truth.
Determining Payments
The goal of our payment function is to determine the compensation each community
should receive based on the quality of the report it provided in a context where the ex-
changed good is information and, in particular, evaluation ratings. The two main issues
we are interested in addressing are:
1. how a community can be motivated to truthfully report its ratings and
2. how we can value an evaluation rating an advisor community provides in order to
compensate the community with a fair payment.
As will be seen, we value the rating a community provided through a function that we
refer to as the Importance Function. We will refer to this function as the i-Function and
to its value as the i-Score. We set the i-Function to be maximized only when the rating
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is a truthful rating (for 1.) and introduce a set of properties it should follow in order to
promote honesty and fairness (for 2.), thus, providing an effective proposal for the exchange
of evaluation information between communities. The compensation each community will
receive is monotonically increasing with respect to the i-Score it was assigned to the rating
it provided.
A novel and key distinction that we make is between what we refer to as a good or a poor
contributor. These are labels that correspond to the interpretation of a rating since different
communities might use different evaluation models. More specifically, the information that
is shared consists of both an evaluation rating that can either be a trust or reputation rating
and a type (good or poor) which essentially is the interpretation of the latter rating. The
community receiving the ratings from each community explicitly evaluates the accuracy
and helpfulness of the information the advisor communities provided. As will be shown,
information that leads to the correct decision about accepting or rejecting an agent leads
to a higher i-Score (and thus to more lucrative payments) to the advisors, thus promoting
both honest reporting and fair payments.
1.2 Modeling Trust
Similar to Josang [28] and Wang and Vassileva [81] in our work we consider trust and
reputation as two distinct terms. We first introduce an arrangement where agents are
required to declare a promise for their contribution to a community. We then leverage that
promise as part of the trust modeling as follows. By trust we refer to the degree an agent
honored its promise.
In this thesis, we focus on developing a novel trust model for settings in which important
decisions are made based on the promised contributions of the participants. In particular,
we present this as the basis on which a community can judge the trustworthiness of its
agents. We note that our model is intended for communities where an agent’s value is
dependent in part on the extent to which it contributes its fair share to the community
(hence the focus on an agent’s promise). We consider trust as the degree an agent honored
its promises and we propose a trust model that has the following properties: i) promotes a
desirable behaviour which is the truthful revelation of the agents’ anticipated contributions
and at the same time contributes to the community, and ii) is able to cope with some
inaccurate promises due to lack of information. We show that these properties ensure that
an agent maximizes its trust score by both delivering what it promised and by promising
what it can deliver and we provide functions which embody these principles. Finally, we
discuss how our model can be adapted to settings where, due to changing circumstances,
an agent may be unsure when they make a promise that they will be able to deliver as
desired and we provide an empirical evaluation.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
In Chapter 2 we provide an overview of current approaches that address problems similar
to ours or that have provided useful tools for our proposed solution. In Chapter 3 we
present the overall model and the formal definition of the three problems we address:
the Advisor Selection Problem, the Payment Decision Problem and the Trust Modeling
Problem. In Chapter 4, we provide our suggested solution for the Advisor Selection Problem
and we show that exploiting consistency between advice provides a significantly effective
tool in incentive mechanism design. In Chapter 5 we present our proposed solution for the
Payment Decision Problem by extending a well known family of functions called Scoring
Rules [67]. In Chapter 6 we present our solution for the Trust Modeling Problem by
considering the degree to which an agent honored its promises. In Chapter 7 we discuss
how our solutions differ from current proposed approaches and why they provide important
contributions to the areas of information sharing and trust modeling. In Chapter 8 we
outline our key contributions, the current open problems, and possible directions for their
solution.
1.4 Thesis’ Statement
The number and the population of electronic communities in which the services offered de-
pend on the contributions of their members is rapidly increasing. It is therefore important
to prevent, within these communities, the existence of malicious participants and those
which make poor contributions.
In this thesis we show that by providing the communities with a mechanism that
allows them to truthfully exchange information with other communities with respect to
the trustworthiness of their participants, the communities
• can deal with malicious participants,
• encourage poor contributors to increase their contribution, and
• provide incentives to good contributors to maintain or further improve their services.
The truthful participation of the communities in the mechanism and the adaptation of an
accurate model that evaluates the trustworthiness of each participant are crucial for the
success of the mechanism.
In particular, we propose:
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• a two phase mechanism that promotes truthfulness by exploiting the consistency of
the information different communities provide, and
• the modeling of the trustworthiness of the participants in a community based on the




Several subareas within the area of Multiagent Systems in Artificial Intelligence serve as
the background for our problem and within these areas, certain models developed by other
researchers were particularly useful to examine. More specifically, these areas include Trust
& Reputation and Incentive Mechanisms (a subarea of Mechanism Design). Furthermore,
the area of Statistics and in particular Scoring Rules and the area of Graph Theory have
provided us with valuable tools to develop our solutions. Below we give a brief summary
of each relevant topic area, along with a description of some approaches within those areas
that either provide interesting solutions or that we found particularly important.
2.1 Trust and Reputation
Several multiagent systems researchers have proposed frameworks for modeling the trust-
worthiness and the reputation of agents, towards effective selection of systems that include
evaluating potential sellers in e-marketplaces [77, 76], monitoring the nodes in sensor net-
works [47], relaying messages [41], handling pollution with inauthentic files in peer to peer
networks [34], task allocation [72], coalition formation [66, 71], electronic supply chains
[70] and many more.
A valuable survey on trust for multiagent systems was presented in 2004 by Ram-
churn et al. [54]. In particular, the authors presented the state-of-the-art trust models
along with an analysis of their strengths and weaknesses and suggested an interesting list
of future research directions. In 2007, Josang et al. [29] presented a survey on trust
and reputation for online service provision. The authors analyzed trust and reputation
systems and their differences, while they also described in which cases these two systems
overlap. In particular, they discussed the different types of reputation systems, the differ-
ent architectures, and also the variety of ways that both trust and reputation have been
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interpreted by researchers. Furthermore, they provided a very interesting observation that
helps to explain why most commercial systems use very simplistic approaches, which is:
from a business perspective having a reputation system that it is not robust can be desirable
if it generally gives a positive bias. In other words, giving the clients the feeling that they
can have some kind of information about the behaviour (reputation or trustworthiness)
of the service provider makes them feel more confident regarding the reliability and the
trustworthiness of the whole system.
There are a number of different ways to measure reputation and trust from the simplest
ones like models based on summations or on average ratings [1, 2], to more sophisticated
and popular probabilistic approaches [10, 25, 59, 58, 64, 76], to discrete models (e.g. in
amazon.com [1]) buyers can rate the book reviews as helpful or not helpful), and finally
to flow models, like Google’s [49] approach, which measures the reputation of pages based
mainly on the number of links that other pages might have to them, or models based on
social networks [53]. In the next paragraphs we present several systems that describe each
of the above models.
Very simple systems for measuring the reputation of an agent are the ones that ebay
[2, 62], an auction based e-marketplace, and Amazon.com [1], a book recommendation and
marketplace, use. More specifically, ebay uses a summation model in which at the end
of each transaction both the seller and the buyer can rate each other. The rating scale
they can use is 1 for a satisfying transaction, 0 for neutral and −1 for indicating a low
quality transaction. The reputation of each participant is counted by summing the number









In order to avoid ballot box stuffing e-bay charges a minimum fee to any seller interested
in selling a good.1 Even though the above idea can lead to reducing the number of buyers
who try to deceive the system by completing fake transactions, the ballot stuffing problem
cannot be fully eliminated. A malicious agent can still deceive the system by spending
money setting up fake transactions for very low priced items in order to build up its
reputation with the anticipation that later on it can set up a fake auction about a very
high priced item. This is due to the fact that ebay considers that the importance of the
ratings for a transaction are independent from the value of the item that was sold. This
means that a seller that sells products in the range of few dollars, with 10 positive ratings
and 0 negative ratings will have the same reputation as a seller who sells goods in the
range of several thousands dollars and has exactly the same ratings. Intuitively, someone
could argue that it is more likely that the second seller is more reliable than the first one.
1Ballot box stuffing is the situation that occurs when agents can vote positively multiple times without
these corresponding to real transactions [14, 15].
11
A more loose approach has been adopted by Amazon.com [1, 29]. In Amazon.com,
users can add a review for a book and/or a rating for the book in the scale of 1 to 5. Other
users can read these reviews and rate them as helpful or not helpful. Amazon.com uses the
number of helpful votes each reviewer has received in order to determine the ranking of
the reviewers. In an effort to prevent ballot box stuffing Amazon.com considers a number
of other parameters, which it does not reveal in order to prevent malicious users from ma-
nipulating the ranking mechanism. Amazon.com also allows one review vote per registered
cookie. Unfortunately, as it is also stated in [29], Amazon.com’s efforts are not sufficient for
resolving the problem of ballot box stuffing, since resetting a cookie or changing computers
can allow a user to provide multiple votes for a particular book or review. Apparently,
badmouthing can also occur since it is impossible to detect whether a user provided honest
feedback regarding a book/review or if he/she is just acting maliciously.
In 2002, Josang and Ismail suggested the Beta Reputation System [25]. This work
introduces a new mechanism for computing the reputation of an entity based on the history
of its behaviour and has been used as a stepping stone for other approaches. This is for
the context where one agent asks other agents for reputation ratings, which can be either
positive or negative. The mechanism is heavily based on the beta probability function,
which is a function that can be used for binary events. In particular, the authors consider
the gamma function Γ:
f(p|α, β) = Γ(α + β)
γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1
with the following restrictions: p 6= 0 if α < 1, and p 6= 1 if β < 1. As the authors
note using the above function appears to have minimal significance. The important aspect





In the reputation system, α represents the number of positive feedbacks and β represents
the number of negative feedbacks. More specifically, in order to reason regarding the




r + s+ 2
which actually comes by replacing the α and β in (2.1) with r+ 1 and s+ 1 respectively. r
denotes the number of positive feedbacks that the entity received and s denotes the number
of negative feedbacks. In order to extend the mechanism to accommodate cases where the
significance of the feedback is based on the trustworthiness of the agent that provides it,
the authors incorporate a discounting factor.
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A more concrete effort was made to consider the problems that emerge when an agent
changes its behaviour. Predicting the agent’s behaviour based on its history is a very
difficult task since it must successfully detect and handle cases in which the agent may
have changed its behaviour. In order to accommodate such situations, the authors propose
a way to calculate the number of positive and negative feedbacks based on the sequence of
each rating. In particular, they consider a number of agents that provided a sequence Q
containing n feedback tuples (rQT,i, s
Q
T,i). In order to calculate the total number of positive
and negative feedbacks, rQT,λ, and s
Q














T,i is newer than s
Q
T,i+1, ∀1 ≤ i < n.
When λ = 1 then all the feedback is equally significant, and when λ = 0 the authors will
consider only the last feedback.
Finally, the authors consider the problem of requesting users to provide feedback as
a pair. Users will be more willing to just provide a single value than to provide a pair.
For this reason they define a normalization weight w which is equal to the sum of r and
s, w=r+s, and request that the users provide this value instead of values for both r
and s. Concluding, the beta reputation system presented in [25] encapsulates interesting
mathematical concepts of use in evaluating reputation ratings provided by other agents,
while in addition has inspired a number of researchers in developing mainly reputation
models.
Also in 2002, Sen and Sajja [72] proposed a boolean reputation-based trust model
to address the problem of agents (user agents) selecting agents (processor agents) to pro-
cess tasks. The authors provide a reinforcement learning based technique to estimate the
performance of a processor agent based on its past interactions. When a user agent re-
quests information regarding a processor agent from a set of agents S, it receives a boolean
answer from each agent. The latter answer can take the values either high performance
or low performance. In order for a user agent i to decide whether a processor agent j
is a high performer or low performer it computes an estimation etij. If e
t
ij < 0.5 agent i
reasons that agent j is a low-performer and high-performer otherwise. A reinforcement
learning technique is used to calculate the estimation etij based on whether the agent i got
to interact with agent j or agent i observed the interaction of j with another user agent.
In particular, if i has interacted with j we have:
etij = (1− ai)et−1ij + airt−1 (2.2)
while if i has observed agent j:
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etij = (1− a0)et−1ij + a0rt−1 (2.3)
where ai and a0 are the interaction and observation specific learning rates, respectively,
and rt−1 is the performance received or observed in time t− 1.
If the majority indicates that a processor agent provides high performance services the
agent is added in the preferred list, while otherwise it is added in the uncertainty list.
If the preferred list is empty then a processor agent will be randomly selected from the
uncertainty list, while otherwise it will be selected randomly from the preferred list. The
next question the authors address is: What is the minimum number q of agents that should
be queried? The minimum number of agents to query is defined as the minimum value of













) ≥ g (2.4)
where P is the number of processor agents, l is the number of liars (where l ≤ N
2
), N
is the number of user agents, and g is the minimum desired probability of selecting a
high-performer processor agent. The summation represents the probability that at least a
majority of the q selected agents are non-liars. The authors present a set of experiments
that demonstrate the robustness of their proposed model with respect to the varying of
the number of liars that might exist.
In 2003, Kamvar et al. [34] suggested a solution for the problem of the pollution
of a P2P network with inauthentic files, which results in reducing the performance and
reliability of the network. Their main assumption rests on the existence of a significant
number of pre-trusted peers. The authors presented a distributed algorithm based on
Eigenvectors according to which each peer calculates the global trust for each other peer
in the network based on the local trust values that it stores. The latter trust value is
derived from its interactions with other peers. This follows the same philosophy that
ebay uses with the difference that the computation of the global trust takes place in a
distributed manner. More specifically, it considers the number of satisfactory, sat(i, j) and
unsatisfactory, unsat(i, j), transactions a peer i had with peer j:
si,j = sat(i, j)− unsat(i, j)











If we consider C to be the matrix [cij] and ~ti to be the vector containing the values tik, then
the equation (2.5) can be written as ~ti=C
T ~ci. In order to have a complete view the peer
i has to ask the friends of its friends and so on up to depth n. At this point the authors
argue that if n is large enough then the trust vectors that each peer i calculated for all
the other peers will converge, and more specifically they will converge to the left principal
eigenvector of C.2
The above algorithm puts more weight on the opinion of peers that the peer trusts,
while it considers a probabilistic approach for giving chances to newcomers that have not
yet gained a reputation. Even though the authors provide some interesting observations,
it is still not clear to what extent their mechanism is scalable and distributed. In addition,
information related to the size of the inauthentic files a peer downloads was not taken into
consideration (e.g. downloading a big unauthentic file can be more annoying than down-
loading a small one, since in the first case the agent has to spend more resources). Finally,
the authors point out the problem of the existence of malicious collectives (coalitions) while
they put some effort into considering the problem of free riders and whitewashers.
In 2004, Tran and Cohen [77] presented a reinforcement learning based mechanism for
updating the reputation of selling agents in e-marketplaces. In particular, the mechanism
allows both the selling agents to adjust the price and the quality of their goods and also
allows the buyers to adjust their purchasing decisions based on the reputation of the sellers.
The reputation of a seller is based on the direct experience of the buyer with the particular
seller. A seller s can be either characterized by a buyer b as reputable or disreputable
or neither reputable or disreputable. The category in which a seller belongs is computed
based on its reputation. More specifically, the authors propose that each buyer considers
two thresholds, θ and Θ, where θ and Θ are the buyer’s reputation and disreputation
thresholds respectively. These thresholds are defined by each buyer to depict the level of
tolerance the buyer has with respect to the seller’s reputation. For example, a buyer b0 can
characterize a seller that has reputation equal to 0.6 as reputable while in contrast another
buyer b1 might characterize the same seller as neither reputable or disreputable. Each time
a transaction is completed the reputation of the selling agent is updated according to the
expected value of a good (a function of quality and price). The better the value of the
good the buyer received with respect to the value it requested, the more the reputation of
the seller will be increased.
2For a detailed technical analysis please refer to [34].
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In general a buyer is interested in doing business with the sellers that are reputable
rather than with the sellers that are disreputable or neither reputable or disreputable. The
key point is that the buyer will not necessarily select the most reputable agent. In fact
the selection is based on a function f which essentially depicts the trustworthiness of the
seller. In particular, consider a buyer b who is interested in purchasing a good g at a price
p. This buyer will choose the seller s∗ that maximizes a function f such that:
s∗ = arg max
s∈Ssr
f b(g, p, s)
where f reflects the expected value of the good and is updated each time a transaction
between the seller and the buyer has been completed. More specifically:
f b(g, p, s∗) = f b(g, p, s∗) + α ∗ (f b(g, p, s∗)− υb(g, p, s∗))
where α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is a learning rate and υb(g, p, s∗) represents the true product value of
the good, determined by the buyer upon observing the good, after purchase.
After each transaction the reputation of a seller is also updated. Very briefly, the
reputation, rb(s∗), of a seller s∗ will be updated based on whether it provided a good
whose quality was satisfactory or not, with respect to the price the buyer paid. In case the
buyer is satisfied then the following formula is used:
rb(s∗) =
{
rb(s∗) + µ(1− rb(s∗)) if rb(s∗) ≥ 0
rb(s∗) + µ(1 + rb(s∗)) if rb(s∗) < 0
where µ is a positive and is called cooperative factor. Unlike ebay [2], where the price of
the merchandize does not influence the importance of a rating, in this approach the factor
µ considers the value of the good. A detailed description on how to compute µ and the
formula for updating the reputation in case the buyer was not satisfied with the quality of
the good can be found in [77].
Moreover, in order to allow newcomer sellers to start business, the authors consider that
each buyer with a small probability chooses to “explore” the marketplace by selecting a
seller that has reputation below the reputation threshold Θ. Even though this will increase
the chance that a buyer will seek to purchase items from a newcomer, is not clear if this
increment will be significant enough to decrease the inactive time that a trustworthy seller
has to spend before accumulating reputation that will allow it to be competitive. For
example, consider a seller that is interested in selling tickets for tomorrow’s basketball
game, if i) it has to wait for more than a day to accumulate reputation that will make it
competitive with respect to the other agents that sell basketball tickets or ii) if this seller
was not lucky enough to be chosen through the random selection procedure, then it will
not be able to sell the tickets.
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This is exactly the problem our approach aims to eliminate through the exploitation of
an agent’s good behaviour in previous communities. Very briefly, if the seller s0 had built
a good reputation and was a trustworthy agent in the communities it belonged to so far,
then it would be desirable for this agent to utilize this good behaviour in the community
that uses a mechanism similar to the one presented in [77]. Concluding, the key idea of the
proposed approach is that the reputation of an agent should not only consider the number
of contributions the agent made to a community but also the value/quality of the items
that he/she contributed.
In 2004, Yu et al. [87] addressed the problem of measuring trust through reputation in
large scale peer to peer systems when direct experience is not sufficient. If the combination
of direct experience (if any) and peer information (if necessary) exceeds a threshold the
peer is considered trustworthy. Given that peer to peer networks tend to be large, the use of
a centralized approach can be significantly inefficient. In order to overcome this problem,
the authors propose a distributed reputation system that aims to detect malicious and
unreliable peers. Similarly to the Beta Reputation System [25], a peer Pi which is trying
to discover the trustworthiness of another peer Pj can either use its own opinion that is
derived from its personal experience of interacting in the past with Pj or a combination of
personal experience and the reputation of the peer Pj provided by other peers.
Unlike other proposed approaches, which mainly consider binary ratings (e.g.“satisfied”
or “not satisfied”), the authors consider that the ratings should encapsulate the quality of
the provided service. For this reason, they consider that the value of a rating is inside the
interval [0,1].
A peer Pi can either use a simple averaging method or it can use an exponential method
to measure the reputation of a peer Pj based on its personal interactions.





ij/h h 6= 0
0 h = 0
where h denotes the number of the last interactions the peer Pi considers, and s
k
ij,
0 ≤ skij ≤ 1, is the rating that peer Pi assigned to peer Pj at their k-th last interaction.
• The Exponential method3:
R(Pi, Pj) =
{
γ[shij + ...+ (1− γ)hs1ij] h 6= 0
0 h = 0
3Note: We are not sure whether this formula, as presented in [87], is correct.
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where γ, 0 < γ < 1, represents a weight that determines the influence of ratings with
respect to time. The bigger the value of γ the faster the past ratings are forgotten.
If the peer Pi is not confident regarding its personal experience with peer Pj, it will
seek information from other peers that had personal interactions with the peer Pj. Then
the aggregated rating for peer Pj is calculated as follows:
T (Pi, Pj) =
{
ηR(Pi, Pj) + (1− η)Υ L 6= 0
0.5 L = 0
where η = h/H, L is the number of witnesses found by peer Pi, and
Υ =
{ ∑L
k=1wk ·R(Wk, Pj) L 6= 0
0.5 L = 0
where R(Wk, Pj) is witness Wk’s local rating for peer Pj, and wk is the weight of the
credibility of witness Wk. By the term “witnesses” the authors refer to the peers from
which the peer Pi will request their opinion regarding the peer Pj. If T (Pi, Pj) is above a
threshold ωi the peer Pi will interact with Pj; otherwise, Pi will mark peer Pj as unreliable.
The question that arises at this point is: How does the peer Pi decide which peers to
consider as witnesses? In order to answer this question the authors considered the following
approach: the peer Pi will ask a number of the peers in its neighborhood if they know the
peer Pj. In case they do, they will send their personal rating for peer Pj to peer Pi; in case
they do not know, they will check if the maximum TTL or query depth has been reached.
If not, they will forward the question to a number of their trustworthy neighbors, and so
on.
Furthermore, the authors proposed a way of eliminating the influence of noisy ratings
(e.g. exaggerated positive or negative ratings) that witness peers might provide. The basic
idea is to give more weight to witnesses that provide more accurate information regarding
other peers and to penalize (i.e., decrease their weight) peers that provided inaccurate
information. In particular, considering a peer Pi that provided a rating s for a service that
was served by peer Pj, the weights of the witnesses that provided information to peer Pi
about Pj will be updated as follows:
wk = (1− (1− β)|R(Wk, Pj)− s|) ∗ wk
In 2006, Teacy et al. [76] presented both a trust model and a reputation model for
the case of binary events. The authors present TRAVOS, a model that essentially extends
the one presented by Josang and Ismail [25], to cope with the existence of inaccurate
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ratings. First, a trust model based on the direct experience a truster atr with a trustee ate







where m1:tatr,ate is the number of positive interactions and n
1:t
atr,ate is the number of negative
interactions from time 1 to time t, where t is the time of the assessment. Essentially, tatr,ate
represents the expected belief of the truster on the trustee.
Clearly, the accuracy of the above value is related to the number of past interactions
the truster has with the trustee. The more interactions it has had, the more accurate tatr,ate
will be. In order to determine the confidence of the truster with respect to the value tatr,ate
a confidence metric γatr,ate is defined. The confidence factor γatr,ate is computed based on
the proportion of the probability distribution f that lies in [tatr,ate − ε, tatr,ate + ε] where ε







where α = m1:tatr,ate + 1 and β = n
1:t
atr,ate + 1.
When there is complete lack of direct experience or the confidence factor is low, the
authors provide a model that measures the reputation of the agent. The model they propose
is similar to one for measuring trust. In the case of reputation, the positive (mtaop,ate) and
negative (ntaop,ate) are defined based on the interactions that each of the raters had with the
trustee. By rater we refer to the agent that provides information to the truster. Clearly,
the accuracy of the results is influenced from both the truthfulness of each rater and the
behaviour of the trustee to each rater. In order to address the above problem, the authors
filter the information the raters provided. This is achieved by exploiting the extent that E ′,
which is calculated based on only the experience of the rater with the particular trustee,
deviates from E0, which is calculated based on the interactions that other raters had with
























If both E ′ and E0 lie in the same interval (known as bin) the interaction is considered to be
successful; otherwise it is considered to have failed. Based on the successful and the failed
interactions the probability of the accuracy of the reported opinion is calculated. This




mop + nop + 2
The above procedure can deal with inaccurate ratings when measuring the reputabil-
ity of an agent since it does not allow big deviations to influence the reputation rating.
Although this brings a certain level of stability in the model, in a number of cases it may
allow self-interested agents to play strategically.
In 2006, Regan et al. [59] proposed a Bayesian based approach for interpreting
the sellers’ evaluations in e-marketplaces called BLADE (Bayesian Learning to Adapt to
Deception in E -marketplaces). As the authors argue, their model is a generalization of
the BRS [25] and TRAVOS [76] with the following two improvements: i) goes beyond
a single reputation value and models a set of seller properties, and ii) allows the buyer
to re-interpret any ratings that are not a direct mapping of the seller properties. More
specifically, the authors consider an e-marketplace where buyers can ask the advice of other
agents (advisors) regarding the reputation and trustworthiness of sellers. Since each advisor
has its own way of evaluating a seller, simply knowing the value of a rating cannot provide
accurate information regarding the seller. For example, an advisor can be in general very
lenient while at the same time another advisor might be very strict. Consequently, a rating
with a value equal to 0.6 might have totally different interpretations depending on who
was the advisor that provided it. Furthermore, there are also cases in which an advisor
might deliberately provide inaccurate information about a seller while in addition both
sellers and advisors might change their behaviour over time.
In order to deal with the above problems the authors propose a probabilistic reasoning
technique which aims to learn the way advisors evaluate sellers, deals with the problem
of misleading evaluations and finally is flexible enough to adapt to the changes in the
behaviour of both sellers and advisors. More specifically, the proposed mechanism is based
on the use of a Bayesian Network which exploits the set of features that each seller exhibits
and the evaluation of each advisor. The conclusion of this work is that the uncertainty
of the adequacy of the information an agent has regarding the reputation of the other
agents can significantly influence the “correctness” of its decisions, while the accuracy of
an agent’s ratings is dependent on his/her personal style of evaluation.
Although reputation is an important factor for measuring the trustworthiness of an
agent or a user [61], it does not always encapsulate significant information for identifying
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trustworthy parties. An interesting analysis that provides insights of the other components
that can be used in a trust management system is presented by Pourshahid and Tran in
2007 [52]. Furthermore, the proposed approach illustrates that the special characteristics
of each environment constitute a crucial factor for determining the components that should
be taken into consideration (e.g. time might be crucial for an environment that provides
hockey tickets; the exact condition of collective books is crucial while in other cases as long
as the book is in a decent state and the buyer did not have to pay too much then she might
be satisfied) and demonstrates the fact that people have different methods of measuring
trust. Moreover, the authors agreed with the belief that many researchers express that
trust is a combination of logical, emotional and physiological factors that contribute either
directly or indirectly to the decision making process.
2.2 Mechanism Design: Incentive Mechanisms
Assigning a reputation or trust rating that depicts the behaviour of an agent can certainly
motivate agents to improve their interactions, however it cannot eliminate strategic be-
haviour. In order to address this problem the area of Incentive Mechanisms has emerged.
The main idea is to set the rules by which agents will interact, in order to maximize some
global utility through the operation of individually rational agents. For the case of incen-
tive mechanisms we seek rules that provide incentives for agents to have truthful behaviour
in contexts where we cannot enforce the agents to follow specific strategies.
Incentive mechanisms have gained great interest in the last decade and have been
proposed for a wide area of applications. These applications range from information/data
sharing to message relaying. Two domains in which the use of incentive mechanisms
has become very popular are peer to peer networks [?, 43, 39, 41, 93] and electronic
marketplaces [33, 59, 77, 92]. These are examples of communities where the participating
agents are expected to participate well in order to be well accepted within the community.
Regarding the incentive mechanisms for peer to peer networks, in 2001, Golle et al.
[20] provided a mechanism based on a micro-payment method. The authors considered that
each peer is represented by an agent and that all agents which participate are economically
rational. The aim of each agent was to maximize their expected utility based on: i) its
beliefs about the actions that other agents will take, and ii) on its knowledge regarding the
way that their payoffs are calculated. The main idea is based on the principle of charge
the agents for every download and reward them for every upload. In particular, each agent
i has a utility function Ui:
Ui = [f
AD
i (AD) + f
NV
i (NV ) + f
AL
i (AL)]− [fDSi (DS) + fBWi (BW )]− FT (2.6)
where AD represents the amount downloaded, NV the network variety, DS the disk space
used, BW the bandwidth used, AL the altruism (in case the agent derives utility from the
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satisfaction of contributing to the network), and FT represents the financial transfer (i.e.,
the amount of money the agent has to pay for using the network or the amount of money
it might get paid for contributing to the network).
As we can see from equation 2.6 the utility function of an agent can increase by: i)
the number of files it downloads, ii) the number of different options it has for downloading
a particular file, and iii) the satisfaction that agents sometimes derive by contributing to
the network. On the other hand, the utility function of an agent can decrease due to the
cost of allocating disk space for files to be shared and to the cost of sharing the uploading
bandwidth. The financial transfer FT factor is something that the agents might end up
paying for using the network, or conversely for which they may end up getting paid in case
they have contributed files to the network. Furthermore, the authors state an interesting
observation that rare files should be treated differently from files that are more frequent
in order to avoid discouraging agents to introduce new files. This is because if a node i
decides to share a copy of a popular file, the likelihood of finding peers which are interested
in downloading it is greater than if the node i adds a new file. In addition, the authors
provide a very interesting analysis of their experiments, which shows that Napster suffers
from the problem of free riders. As in [42], the proposed mechanism treats all the agents
that enter the system equally. In our approach we are interested in considering systems
and communities where the quality of each contribution is also taken into consideration.
In 2004, Ma et al. [42, 43] proposed the use of an incentive-based mechanism to deter-
mine the proper transfer bandwidth allocation for a peer that requests a file, based on its
connection type, its utility function and its contribution. Unlike the mechanism proposed
by Golle et al. [20], where the utility directly decreases each time the agent consumes the
resources of the P2P network, in [42, 43] the utility is only influenced indirectly by the
decrement of the download bandwidth the next time the agent requests a file. In particular,
the utility function is:




+ 1) if xi ≤ di
log(2) if xi > di
(2.7)
where xi represents the bandwidth allocated to node i, and is the maximal download
bandwidth of node i. In order to calculate the bandwidth that will be allocated to node i







xj(t) ≤ ui. (2.9)
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where ui is the utility of node i.
The authors’ goal is to maximize the social welfare of a P2P network by making efficient
use of P2P network resources, and to provide both fairness (e.g. distribute the load of the
request from a few nodes to every node that participates) and incentives to contribute to all
nodes in the community. In cases where the aggregated value of the download bandwidth is
less than the aggregated value of the upload bandwidth, each agent will be simply assigned
download bandwidth equal to its upload bandwidth. Similar to the approach presented by
Golle et al. [20], this approach also does not consider the quality of contributions.
In 2003, Yu et al. [85] focused on the problem of relaying messages or providing
information in a multiagent peer to peer network. In particular, when an agent, which
represents a node, is interested in acquiring information from another node that is also
represented by an agent, it sends a request to the agents of the neighbor nodes. For
example, when an agent B receives a request for a service sent by a node A it can either
answer it or if it is unable to provide the requested service, it can forward the request to
other nodes. The problem that arises at this point is twofold:
• Why should a node provide a service to an unknown node?
• Why should a node provide a referral to an unknown node?
The first question refers to the case where agent B does have for example the file that
agent A requested and the second question refers to the case where agent B cannot provide
the requested service but has information regarding other nodes that might be more helpful.
In order to address the above problem, the authors introduced a micro-payment method
that rewards agents who either provide a service to another node or provide referrals to
agents that might have the latter service. In particular, if the agent B had the service that
agent A requested, then in order to provide it to agent A it must get a reward α. This
reward will be deducted by the total currency that agent A has. Thus:
TA = TA − β
TB = TB + β
where TA is A’s balance, TB is B’s balance and β is the cost or reward for answering the
query.
In case the agent B could not provide the requested service but it provided a referral
to an agent C that might have it, then A would have to pay to B an amount equal to α
and an amount equal to β to C as well. Thus:
TA = TA − β − α
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TB = TB + α
TC = TC + β
where TC is C’s balance, and α is the cost or reward for providing one or more referrals.
At this point we need to mention that each agent is assigned an initial budget equal to
T . In order for an agent to be able to pay to search and acquire a particular service, it
needs to have enough of a balance to cover the cost. Consequently, each agent is motivated
to contribute either by offering services or by providing referrals, since this will increase
its balance. Obviously, this approach treats all the services and all the referrals that are
offered equally. This might not be always desirable since the quality of services might
vary significantly while agents might provide inaccurate referrals. In order to alleviate this
problem, the authors extended the above model by providing a more complicated dynamic
pricing approach.
In 2005, Cheng and Vassileva [11] presented a peer to peer incentive based system for
sharing articles in online e-learning communities. The authors addressed the problem that
emerges when the users persist in overloading the system with low quality contributions, by
presenting a system called Comtella. Their goal was to motivate the users to pay attention
to the quality of information they choose to share in Comtella. The proposed mechanism
highly rewards the acts of sharing a new topic and smoothly declines the reward as the
number of contributed links in the community approaches a certain desired number. In
addition, users can sponsor some of their links. In order to measure the quality of each
contribution, the users are requested to evaluate the contributions of other users. The
quality of a contribution is calculated as the summation of the ratings it received. Each
time a user provides a rating for an article, he/she is awarded a certain number of c-points
based on his/her reputation of giving high-quality postings. The c-points are essentially
a type of virtual currency that the authors introduced. The user can use this currency
to sponsor their links in order to increase their visibility in the search engine. The search
engine has incorporated a mechanism that ranks the relevant (to the request) answers
based on the numbers of c-points allocated by the contributors. The higher the position
in the search list, the more likely the article is to be read. This is important, since the
membership allocation of each user is associated with the ratings the user has acquired
for providing articles. The different levels of memberships are associated with different
rewards and privileges. The interesting point with this work is that the model not only
considers the contribution of each agent, but also considers the quality of the contributions.
The idea of incorporating reputation into an incentive based community has been ex-
amined by other researchers. In fact, several approaches have been proposed in a wide
area of applications. For instance, Buchegger and Le Boudec [8] proposed a reputation
based approach that indirectly motivates the nodes in a mobile ad-hoc network to behave
properly (i.e., to route and forward packages of other nodes), as well as assisting them
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to detect nodes that appear to be very prone to failures. More specifically, the authors
consider that nodes can be classified as misbehaving and as normal. The general idea is to
isolate nodes that are classified as misbehaving by denying to provide them with routing
information or to forward their packages.
In particular, the system works as follows: each node i keeps a record with the behaviour
of each node it has cooperated with. In order to calculate to which group to classify a
node, it considers the beta distribution function with parameters (α,β):
α := uα + s
β := uβ + (1− s)
where s = 1 when the node misbehaved (e.g. dropped a package, significantly delayed
a package etc) and 0 otherwise, while u is a discount factor that defines to what extent
past experience should influence the future decisions. A node is classified as misbehaving
when the beta function returns a value greater than a threshold, and is classified as normal
otherwise. In addition, in cases where a node did not cooperate with a node in the past,
it can utilize second hand information [8]. The proposed system uses reputation to detect
potential malicious nodes and then it applies monitoring techniques for checking to what
extent the reputation reflects the current reality regarding the participant node’s behaviour.
In 2007, a similar problem was addressed by Li et al. [41]. More specifically, Li et al.
addressed the problem of denying message relay in unstructured peer to peer networks.
The proposed approach exploits a micropayment method in order to provide incentives
to peers to forward or answer to messages sent by other peers. The querying peer (the
requestor) sends a query message to some of its neighbors along with a promised reward.
When a peer receives a message, it checks whether it can answer the message or not. If not,
it may relay the message to its neighbors with a promised reward and so on. This procedure
continues until a maximum number of hops or a node (known as “provider”) is reached that
can provide the requested information. If a provider is reached the information is reported
backwards along the relay path and each node receives the reward it was promised. Clearly,
a node will only receive a reward if it lies on a path between the requestor and a provider.
Each node has incentives to relay a message, since this is the only way it can receive a
reward, in cases where it cannot answer the query that the message contains. The authors
validated their results through experimental evaluation and proved that their proposed
approach brings to the system a utility higher than tradition approaches like breadth-first
search or random walks. Furthermore, the authors provided a deeper analysis of their
method and presented an approximation of the utility for the case of symmetric networks.
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2.3 Scoring Rules & Graph-based Approaches in In-
formation Evaluation
The areas of Statistics and Graph Theory have provided us with valuable tools to de-
velop our solutions. In this section we first provide a detailed overview of scoring rules,
a statistical tool that has been proposed to score predictions, a number of interesting ap-
proaches that are built on this concept, and then we present some work done in the area
of information exchange that enables interactions with the use of graphs.
2.3.1 Scoring Rules
Scoring rules were proposed in 1971 by Savage [67] and have become very popular in
information elicitation. In particular, the use of scoring rules focuses on evaluating a
prediction in order to determine the rewards the predicator should receive. One of the
most popular applications of scoring rules is the domain of forecast prediction. More
specifically, given a prediction q that an event A will happen, a score S(q, p) is computed.
The parameter p is 1 if the event A happens and 0 otherwise. In general, in case there is
a set O of possible events and Q is the probability distribution over O, the scoring rule is
defined as S : O × Q 7→ R. For instance, consider that a forecaster is asked to provide a
prediction whether it will rain tomorrow and she predicts that with probability q it will
rain. In this case O = {rain, not rain}, Q(rain) = q and Q(not rain) = 1 − q. The
expected reward the predictor will receive is defined as:
u(q, p) = p · S(q, 1)− (1− p) · S(q, 0)
where S(q, 1) is the score if it rains, S(q, 0) is the score received if it does not rain and p
is 1 if it rains and 0 otherwise. Three of the most well known scoring rules are:
1. Quadratic (or Brier)
S(q, p) = 1− (p− q)2
2. Logarithmic






where p is equal to 1 if the event happens (i.e., if it rains) and to 0 otherwise (i.e., if it
does not rain).
In our work, we are interested in strictly proper scoring rules. Strictly properness
is a key property. The strictly proper scoring rules are scoring rules that are uniquely
maximized when the reported prediction is equal to the real prediction (i.e., only when
p = q, where p is the observed probability and q the reported). This property is important
since it can provide appropriate incentives to enforce a truthful behaviour. Note, that the
quadratic, the logarithmic, and the spherical scoring rules are all strictly proper.
Zohar and Rosenschein [92] propose the use of scoring rules for designing a payment
mechanism for the context of information elicitation. The expected utility of an agent




pw,x · uw,x − c
where c is the cost for acquiring the information, x is the real value of the variable, w is
the value the agent reports and pw,x is the probability that the agent will report a value
equal to w when the real value is x. The three constraints the payment mechanism should
satisfy are:
1. Truth telling. Every agent should have the incentive to reveal its true value x (i.e.,
the reward that it will receive by providing the true information should be higher
than the reward it will receive by providing an untruthful information). Formally:
∀x, x′ such that for x 6= x′ ∑
w
pw,x · (uw,x − uw,x′) > 0
2. Individual Rationality. An agent should have a positive expected utility (i.e., the
reward that it will receive by providing information should be higher than the cost
for acquiring the information). ∑
w
pw,x · uw,x > c
3. Investment. The value of information should be greater than the cost (i.e., any
guess x′ the agents makes (without actually computing the real value of x) should
be less profitable than paying to discover the real value of the variable).∑
w∈W





Zohar and Rosenschein [92] take advantage of scoring rules in defining the value function
uw,e. In particular, the proposed uw,e is a linear transformation of a scoring rule:
4
uw,e = α · S(Pr(w|x), w) + βw
where S can be any of the following scoring rules:5
1. Quadratic (or Brier)












The probability px is the reported probability that the event will take the value x. The
authors show that by carefully selecting the values of α and β their mechanism satisfies
both individual rationality and investment constraints.
At this point we would like to stress that the above three families of scoring rules
are not equivalent. For instance, the spherical and the quadratic scoring rules are both
symmetric. A scoring rule is considered to be symmetric if the score remains the same when
the probabilities that are assigned to the correct answers are permuted without changing
their values. Thus, settings where symmetry is important restrict us from applying the
logarithmic scoring rule.
In particular, they show that in order for the investment constraint to be satisfied it is
sufficient to select an α such that the following inequality holds for every x′:
α > max[
c∑
w,x pw,x(S(Pr(w|x), w))− S(Pr(w|x′), w))
]
while for the individual rationality the following constraint is sufficient:




4The affine transformation of a strictly proper scoring rule is also strictly proper.
5Note that this is a more generalized definition of the Quadratic, Logarithmic and Spherical Scoring
Rules, as the different values the variable w can have an event can be more than two.
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Furthermore, they introduce the concept of robust mechanisms to address the problem of
belief variation among different sellers, and they provide algorithms which can learn the
robustness level of a given payment scheme.
In 2005, Miller and Resnick [46] addressed the problem of feedback elicitation when
an independent and objective outcome is not available. The authors presented a scoring
rule based mechanism inspired by methods that define the score of a peer by comparing the
similarity of the rating it provided with the ratings that other peers provided. The authors
stressed that the previous methods are prone to malicious behaviour. In particular, let s
be a seller that has strategically built a good reputation. If a buyer b that was deceived
by s knows that the reputation of the seller is high it might be reluctant to report his real
experience with s given that this will differ from the experiences of other buyers and thus
might choose to provide a rating similar to what other buyers provide. This will cause the
reputation of the seller to remain high giving the ability to s to deceive more buyers in the
future.
In order to address this problem, Miller and Resnick suggested a method in which a
rater is not scored based on the deviation of the ratings but based on the likelihood assigned
to the rater’s possible rating and the rater’s actual rating. More specifically, each rater i
receives a signal si based on the type t of the product for which it announces a rating ri.
The score a rater j will receive can be defined using one of the following strictly proper
scoring rules:
1. Quadratic (or Brier)










where g(sjh|ri) is the probability that the rater j will receive signal h given that rater i an-
nounced ri. Thus, essentially they transfer the problem of honest reporting in determining
the possible ratings the raters provide.
In 2007, Jurca and Faltings [33] proposed a collusion-resistant incentive compatible
feedback payment mechanism. The authors considered an electronic-market setting where
rational agents who act as buyers experience the same product. The quality of a prod-
uct defines its type θ and remains fixed. Each buyer submits a feedback. Each time a
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feedback is submitted the buyer receives a payoff which is determined by the reports other
agents submitted and the probability distribution over the real quality of the product. The
expected payoff for an agent i is:







where oi is the true observation, a−i is the strategy profile of the rest of the agents, τ(ai(o+
i), x) is the amount paid by i given that the number of positive reports is equal to x and
can be determined based on scoring rules [46], π[n|a−i] is ai’s belief about the distribution
of the reference reports, and Pr[n|oi] is the probability that exactly n positive reports were





where Θ is the set of all possible types, Pr[n|θ] is given by the binomial distribution, and
Pr[θ|oi] can be computed from Bayes’ Law. Essentially, the authors consider that each
buyer will reason about whether she liked the product she purchased based on a probability
distribution on the possible types of the product.
In 2008, Papakonstantinou et al. [50] proposed a method for addressing the prob-
lem of probabilistic estimates elicitation for forecast prediction in settings where the cost
function is unknown. They presented a two phase mechanism that incorporates a pay-
ment approach based on scoring rules. During the first phase, each agent ai is requested
to submit its expected cost function ĉi(·) (for eliciting the probabilistic estimates) with a
required minimum precision θ0. The forecast is assigned to the agent am that provided the
lowest cost for the given precision θ0. Formally:
ĉm(θ0) = mink∈{1,...,N}ĉk(θ0)
During the second stage the scoring rule is announced. The agent am produces an estimate
x with a precision θ and reports x̂ and θ̂ and after the actual outcome is observed the
payment of the agent a∗ is computed. In particular:
P (x0;x, θ) = α · S(x0;x, θ) + β










Figure 2.1: Example of the Bayesian Network used in [22]
but based on the second-lowest reported cost function. The authors proved that both
the stages are incentive compatible, while the mechanism is individual rational and they
argued that their proposed mechanism provides strong incentives to make an estimate with
a precision at least equal to θ0.
2.3.2 Graph-based Approaches in Information Evaluation
Graph theory has been widely used in describing social networks as well as interactions of
agents. A number of approaches for determining the popularity of a node in a graph have
been proposed.
In 2009, Hendrix et al. [22] proposed a Bayesian-based mechanism that exploits
previous advice in order to evaluate the truthfulness of information providers. An example
of a Bayesian network that describes the information provided by two agents a1 and a2 over
a painting is depicted in Figure 2.1. For clarity reasons we will refer to this interaction as
the interaction a. The nodes v1 and v2 represent two paintings assigned for appraisal. The
nodes Xa1 and X
a
2 represent the two estimates from the information providers. The nodes
Z11 and Z
1







2 represents equivalent nodes for another interaction b. The nodes σ1
and σ2 represent the capabilities of the agents and their values are unknown. Given that
the network presented in Fig. (2.1) is a Bayesian network, the edge between two nodes
indicates that the source node is the direct cause of the target node. For example, the
estimate Xa1 depends on both the error in agent’s a2 estimation Z
a
2 and the true value v
2
of the painting. The size of the network expands linearly to the number of provider types,
while there will be nodes ((X i1, ..., X
i
1), V
i) for each interaction i. The Bayesian network is
used to calculate the capabilities σi of each agent ai. Furthermore, the authors suggest a
Bayesian model for determining the strategy of untruthful information providers as well as
a Bayesian network for determining the appraisal of a good based on the provided reports.
The main use of the latter Bayesian network is to determine the weight of the report that
each of the information providers provided. The authors performed a set of experiments
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and demonstrate that their model outperforms all the other models in the AAMAS 2008
Agent Reputation and T rust (known as ART ) testbed competition. The ART testbed is
a competition where the agents need to appraise the value of paintings from different areas
and might range from 1, 000 to 100, 000.
In 2009, Peng et al. [51] proposed a graph based method for the analysis of the
interactions among agents in multiagent systems. More specifically, the authors are inter-
ested in presenting a method that can provide a clear picture of the interactions among
the agents through the recognition of possible communication patterns of events. Note
that simply depicting the interactions of each agent results in a very complicated graph
the processing of which may require computationally expensive algorithms. The proposed
approach demonstrates that carefully defining a graph for representing interactions can
overcome a significant level of complexity issues without critically compromising the qual-
ity of the results. The authors consider a graph in which the nodes represent events that
are triggered by various agents. The edges represent messages that are sent during the
execution of an event. Each node has a label that depicts the name and the activity that
executed the corresponding event. The information of each event is captured on the la-
bel of the edge that represents it. Each event is triggered by exactly one message. The
main contribution is that they show that by defining in this way the graph that depicts
the interactions between events and messages, the graph that occurs is essentially a forest
of trees. From the time complexity perspective this is very important since there are a
number of algorithms that can be efficiently applied to trees to capture common patterns.
In our case we use a graph to depict the consistency of information providers that dis-
seminate information regarding the behaviour of their agents in a way that both identifies




In this chapter we provide the notation that we will be using, the overall architecture of
our proposed approach and a more formal definition of the three problems we address in
this thesis. Before we proceed, we restate the overall problem towards which the solution
of the latter three problems contributes.
The overall problem we aim to address is as follows: How can we discourage the existence
of malicious agents and agents who make poor contributions in peer-based communities
but also encourage the participants of these communities to further improve their contribu-
tions? 1
3.1 The Model
Let Ci denote community i and let aj denote agent j. Each community Ci:
• offers a set of services Si (e.g. purchasing items, downloading media files etc),
• has a budget Bi that it can use to purchase information about agents from other
communities, and
• maintains a history Hi of its past interactions with other communities (Fig 3.1).
We assume that if aj is a member of community Ci then Ci can observe and judge the
quality of agent aj. In particular, we assume that community Ci maintains an evaluation
model for all member agents, and is able to assign an evaluation rating rij to agent aj,
1Recall, by peer-based communities, we refer to communities in which a significant portion of the
services they offer are based on the contributions of their users.
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where rij is some real number in the interval [α, β], 0 ≤ α < β. The evaluation rating can
be either a reputation rating or a trust rating. Recall, by trust we refer to the degree an
agent honored its promise and by reputation we refer to the degree of satisfaction (i.e.,
contribution to the maximization of their utility) the agent brought to the other agents
with which it has interacted.
Since communities may use different evaluation models, or may interpret ratings dif-
ferently, they are also requested to provide the type, θij of the agent aj when exchanging
information about an agent with another community. We assume that θij ∈ {good, poor},
and that this is the interpretation that community Ci makes concerning its rating r
i
j for
agent aj. In particular, an agent can be either a good contributor or poor contributor.
Finally, by M(aj) we denote the set of communities that the agent aj has participated in.
We will refer to these communities as the advisor communities and to Ci as the recipient
community. When the recipient community Ci receives a request from a prospective agent
aj, it communicates with the set M(aj) of advisors communities and requests information
about aj’s past behaviour in exchange for a payment.
In particular, in our setting, each agent aj can:
• participate in more than one community at a time,
• join a new community,
• withdraw from a community in which it already participates.
Each community Ci can:
• allow an agent to join with certain privileges,
• deny entrance to an agent,
• provide information about its agents to other communities and receive a payment
from each of these communities,
• request information about prospective agents from other communities and provide
them with a payment.
3.2 The Architecture
A key element of our mechanism is that a community Ci that is interested in acquiring
information about an agent aj does not necessarily have to ask every community in M(aj).
In fact, it should select a subset m(aj), m(aj) ⊆ M(aj), and ask the communities in
m(aj). The information each community Ck ∈ m(aj) has to provide consists of two parts:
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Figure 3.1: Example of communities
the evaluation rating rkj and the type θ
k
j of the agent aj. As we will see later, essentially the
type θkj represents the interpretation of the rating r
k
j , since different communities might use
different evaluation models. For example a rating 0.6 in one community might represent
an agent which is a good contributor while in another community it might represent an
agent which is a poor contributor. In exchange for information, community Ck receives
a payment. This payment depends on how valuable the recipient community finds the
information Ck provided.
The importance of the information that each community provides is measured by a
function I(x, r̂, y), I(x, r̂, y) : [0, 1] × [0, 1] × {good, poor} 7→ R, which we will refer to as
the i-Function and to its value as the i-Score. The i-Function I(x, r̂, y) considers both:
• the degree to which an evaluation rating x deviates from the evaluation rating r̂
which is determined by the recipient community after experiencing the agent, and
• the direction towards which the rating x influences the recipient’s decision (i.e., to
accept or reject an agent).
For each tuple (rkj , θ
k
j ) that a community Ck provides it receives an i-Score I(r
k
j , r̂, θ
k
j ),
where rkj and θ
k
j are the evaluation rating and the type of the agent in the community Ck,
respectively. Based on the latter i-Score, we determine the payment of the community Ck.
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In particular, we consider a payment function P (I(rkj , r̂, θ
k
j )), P : R+ 7→ R, where r̂ is the
evaluation rating of the agent by the recipient community. As we will explain in detail in
Chapter 5, only the communities in m(aj) which characterized the agent with a type equal
to θ̂ (i.e., the type that the recipient community assigned to the agent) will get paid.2
Only after this decision is made do the communities in m(aj) get paid for the infor-
mation that they provided. Since the payment each advisor community will receive is
based on the rating the recipient community provides, the recipient community can try to
manipulate it by reporting an untruthful rating. In order to prevent the latter from hap-
pening we consider the existence of a trusted entity E which maintains a Selling Board and
through which the payment exchange takes place. Each community Ci ∈ C maintains on
E ′s selling board a tuple (rij, θ
i




j are the evaluation
rating and type of agent aj in Ci, respectively. Note that the information regarding the
type of an agent is vital. This is due to the fact that communities may be using different
evaluation models and thus a rating r′ in one community may describe a poor contributor
while in another a good contributor. In general, a community will decide to accept a good
agent and reject a bad one (i.e., a poor contributor).
If a community Ci tries to manipulate the distribution of the payments (i.e., provide
higher payments to particular communities and lower to other communities) by posting
on E’s selling board a rating different from the one it experiences, then each time another
community Cj buys this information it will receive an inaccurate rating, and thus both
the payment and the probability that Cj will ask Ci again in the future will decrease.
Given that the number of the communities and the identity of the communities that will
experience the latter inaccurate information is unknown, Ci may put itself at a significant
disadvantage.
In more detail, the overall architecture is as follows: let Ci be a community that wishes
to acquire information regarding an agent aj from a set of communities m(aj) where
m(aj) ⊆ M(aj). The community Ci sends a request to the entity E and authorizes it
to deduct an amount equal to w from its budget Bi, where w < Bi. Upon receiving the
request, E replies with the requested evaluations of the agent. After E sends the informa-
tion, the arrangement of the amount that each community in m(aj) should receive takes
place.
The amount w will be distributed based on the i-Score that each advisor community
Ck ∈ m(aj) receives based on the information it provided. If the recipient community Ci
accepts the agent aj, it will wait for a time period T and then will post its evaluation rating
2If community Ck decides to reject agent aj , then the payment procedure is a little more complicated
since the community never gets the opportunity to directly observe and evaluate agent aj . In this case
the type of the agent is set to poor and its rating r̂ is determined based on the reported values of the
information providers. A detailed description on how exactly the payment takes place is presented in
Chapter 5.
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r̂ and type θ̂ about agent aj on E’s selling board. Based on the reported value, the i-Score,
I(rkj , r̂), each advisor community receives will be calculated. Based on the i-Scores the
entity E will distribute the above amount to the communities that classified the agent aj
with the same type as the one used by the recipient community to classify the agent (i.e.,
good or poor). Note that each community can update the evaluation of its agents after the
expiration of a time period T set by the trusted entity E. If community Ci decides to reject
agent aj, then the payment procedure is a little more complicated since the community
never gets the opportunity to directly observe and evaluate agent aj. Instead, community
Ci sets the type of agent aj to be θ
i
j = poor, and computes r̂ to be the average evaluation
rating of all communities in m(aj) that also assigned type θ
k
j = poor.
Each community can choose either to post the evaluation ratings of its agents based
on its belief about what the recipient communities will experience or to simply post the
evaluation rating it experiences with the hope that potential recipients will have a similar
experience. We argue that each of the above choices is acceptable since a recipient com-
munity is interested only in acquiring information that can help it make a correct decision
regardless of the motivation of the provider.
Summarizing, a community Ci that is interested in acquiring information about aj:
3
1. Ci acquires the set M(aj) (Fig. 3.2)
2. Ci determines the set m(aj) based on past experience with the communities in M(aj)
(Fig. 3.3).




j ) from each community Ck in m(aj) (Fig. 3.4).
4. Ci decides whether to accept the agent aj or not
• if aj is accepted, Ci evaluates aj and posts the tuple (rij, θij) on E’s selling board
(Fig. 3.5).
5. Ci determines the payment each community Ck will receive (Fig. 3.6).
3.3 The Problems
In the above procedure we assume that the set m(aj), the i-Function I(x, r̂), and the
evaluation ratings rkj are all known. The way that these three parameters are determined
constitutes the three problems we address in this thesis. In this section we provide a formal
definition of each of these three problems and we state our main assumptions.
3The black boxes in figures 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6 indicate the problems we address.
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Figure 3.2: Selecting advisor set M(aj)
Figure 3.3: Selecting advisor subset m(aj)
Figure 3.4: Acquiring evaluation tuples
Figure 3.5: Evaluating agent aj
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Figure 3.6: Payment Decision
Problem 1. Advisor Selection: Consider a set of self-interested communities C that report
private information and a number k. Design a mechanism to determine a subset V , where
V ⊆ C and |V | = k, such that the communities in V have strong incentives to provide
truthful reports.4
A novel approach for determining the set V that satisfies the above two requirements
is presented in Chapter 4. The key idea of the proposed solution lies in the exploitation
of the consistency of the advice the communities in V have provided to Ci in the past.
This is because an advisor community can learn the probability other communities can
lie and thus it can reason in which cases it can afford to lie. However, if the selection
also takes into consideration the extent an advisor community is consistent with other
truthful communities then the uncertainty about the reports these community provide
creates strong incentives for honest reporting.
At this point we need to remind the reader that we consider that an advisor community
is honest when the evaluation rating it provided appears to be similar with the rating that
the recipient community experiences. Briefly, by honest we refer to a community that
provides correct information while by dishonest we refer to a community that provides
incorrect information.
Problem 2. Payment Decision: Let (ri, θi) be the evaluation tuple provided by a community
Ci, where ri ∈ [α, β] and θi ∈ {0, 1}. Given a set of tuples D = {(r1, θ1)..., (rn, θn)} and a
rating (r̂, θ̂), where r̂ ∈ [α, β], θ̂ ∈ {0, 1} and α ≥ 0, determine the payment P (rk, r̂) that
each community Ci in S should receive, with respect to the accuracy and effectiveness of
the tuple (ri, θi) it provided.
Towards the solution of this problem we first focus on evaluating the accuracy and the
helpfulness of the tuples in D through a scoring function that we call i-Function. In partic-
4By similar history we refer to the case where the probability that each community will provide a
truthful report lies in a range in which the highest value does not provide significantly more important
information than the lowest value.
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ular, in Chapter 5, we suggest a novel approach for how to derive an appropriate i-Function
I(ri, r̂) that evaluates the provided tuple (ri, θi) by both considering the rating ri and the
type θi (i.e., the interpretation of the rating). Briefly, let r̂ be the rating a community
experiences after accepting an agent a. If the rating that an advisor community reported
deviates from r̂ and influences the recipient community towards making the wrong decision
(i.e., to decline a good contributor or to accept a poor contributor), the advisor commu-
nity should receive a lower payment than if it had reported a rating of equal deviation but
which was influencing towards the right decision (i.e., accept a good contributor or decline
a poor contributor). For example, consider r̂ = 0.7 and the agent proved to be good. If
two advisor communities had reported that the agent is good and its ratings are 0.6 and
0.8, respectively, then the second advisor should receive a higher payment than the first.
The reason is that the first rating is more likely to be the result of a deceptive behaviour
than the second one.
Problem 3. Trust Modeling: Let Ci be a community that requests an agent aj to commit
contributing a set of services Si. Determine aj’s trustworthiness based on the extent it
honored its commitment.
Our suggested solution for the Trust Modeling Problem is presented in Chapter 6. The
main contribution of our approach is the presentation of the minimum requirements for a
promised-based trust model for settings in which crucial collective decisions are made based
on the contributions that each participant declares (i.e., planning, coalition formation,
etc.). In particular, we target settings in which the exact knowledge of the contribution is
important.
Last, we would like to state our main assumptions. In particular, we assume that
• each community is interested in acquiring information from at least a subset of the
communities which participate in the mechanism,
• each community evaluates its agents by using both
– a continuous rating, which it converts to a commonly agreed upon range [α, β],
and
– a binary rating that indicates whether the continuous rating corresponds to an
agent which is either a good contributor or a poor contributor,
• each community trusts and recognizes the authority of the trusted entity E,
• each agent can be uniquely identified.
We argue that all of the above assumptions are realistic. In addition we would like to note
that the practical implementation (for example, of the trusted entity E) is beyond the
scope of this thesis [75].
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Chapter 4
The Advisor Selection Problem
In this chapter we address the problem of exchanging evaluation ratings between commu-
nities. These ratings can either depict the trustworthiness or the reputation of the entity
they refer to. More specifically, we consider a repeated setting and we propose the use
of a graph-based heuristic which exploits the consistency among the advice of candidate
advisors. Our approach reduces the number of communities that are queried each time a
community seeks information about a prospective agent in such a way that all the advisor
communities are inclined to provide truthful reports. This reduction is important since
each time a community requests information from another community it has to provide
some resources. Thus, by limiting the number of advisors the community contacts we limit
the resources it will have to spend. We argue that exploiting consistency among good
advisors will further promote honest behaviour since the exchange of the resources will get
restricted among the most reliable sources. This will create a more competitive environ-
ment between the advisor communities which will be inclined to be truthful in order to
maintain or increase the probability of being asked in the future.
4.1 The Model
Let C be the set of all communities and A the set of all the agents that participate in
the communities of C. We assume that if an agent aj is a member of community Ci then
Ci can observe and judge the quality of agent aj. In particular, we assume that each
community Ci maintains an evaluation model which it uses to assign an evaluation rating
rij to agent aj, where r
i
j ∈ {Good, Poor}. A rating equal to Good represents an agent which
has good behaviour inside the community Ci (e.g. a good contributor in providing files,
a good seller), while a rating equal to Poor represents an agent that has poor behaviour
(e.g. malicious behaviour, contribution of low quality files etc.).
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Each time an agent aj wishes to join a community Ci, Ci contacts the communities in
which aj is currently, or was previously, a member, and requests information regarding aj’s
behaviour. We denote the set of these communities as S(aj) and we refer to the community
Ci as the recipient community and the communities in S(aj) as the advisor communities.
Currently, we assume that the set S(aj) is provided by the agent aj. In exchange
for information, each advisor community receives a payment from community Ci. This
payment depends on how useful or important community Ci finds the information provided
by the advisor. The expected utility EU(Ci) of a community Ci with respect to the
information exchange mechanism is defined as:
EU(Ci) = V alue(i)− Cost(i) (4.1)
where
V alue(i) = Pmntiprovide · Priprovide and Cost(i) = Pmntirequest · Prirequest (4.2)
By Priprovide we denote the probability the community Ci will provide information about
its agents to other communities and by Pmntiprovide we refer to the expected payment the
community Ci will receive from these communities. By Pr
i
request we denote the probabil-
ity an agent a∗ with previous history will request to enter the community Ci, and thus
the community Ci will be interested to request information about this agent, while by
Pmntirequest we denote the expected payment the community Ci will have to provide to
request information for a∗.
Each community Ci is interested in maximizing its utility EU(Ci). This can be achieved
by maximizing the probability Priprovide and the payment Pmnt
i
provide and by minimizing
the payment Pmntirequest. The community Ci does not have a direct control over the
probability Prirequest since it cannot control whether other agents will be interested to join it.
More specifically, the community Ci does not have control over the upper bound of Pr
i
request.
However, it is to Ci’s best interest to maintain a higher upper bound for Pr
i
request since
this will give Ci more flexibility when accumulating information for prospective agents.
In this chapter, we provide a mechanism that maximizes both the probability Priprovide
and the payment Pmntiprovide Ci receives, while it also minimizes the payment Pmnt
i
request
the community Ci has to provide when it requests information about an agent. We mini-
mize the payment Pmntirequest by proposing an approach that considers the selection of a
subset L of candidate advisors without compromising the quality of information Ci receives
while at the same time our method allows the communities to maximize the probability
Priprovide when they have an honest behaviour. The payment Pmnt
i
request will be also max-
imized if the complimentary payment method that is used with our mechanism maximizes
the rewards when an honest reporting is given.
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Figure 4.1: Example of a) Consistency Graph Gi and b) Consistency Subgraph with
Pr+(V ) and Pr+(E) over their vertices and edges
v P+(v) P−(v) W (v)
va 0.8 0.5 15
vb 0.65 0.75 17
vc 0.83 0.8 20
vd 0.81 0.6 31
ve 0.72 0.6 24
vf 0.84 0.5 30
vg 0.85 0.8 18
vh 0.65 0.7 3
vi 0.5 0.5 15
Table 4.1: Gc’s weights over vertices
The main idea for the selection of set L of advisor communities lies on the exploitation of
the consistency among communities, which provide good quality information. Our heuristic
is flexible enough to consider both the number of advisors a community is consistent with
and also the quality of the consistency. Briefly, we consider two or more communities to
be consistent when they provide similar information.
We acknowledge that the full utility of a participant community may depend on many
features not modeled by the exchange utility EU(Ci), such as the gain for not sharing
information. Our focus in this work is on communities which have decided that the utility
gained by exchanging information is higher than the utility they would have gained by not
participating in the exchange mechanism.
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e P+(e) P−(e) W (e)
(va, vb) 0.6 0.55 20
(va, ve) 0.85 0.9 15
(va, vf ) 0.9 0.8 17
(va, vg) 0.8 0.5 15
(vb, vc) 0.7 0.7 19
(vb, vd) 0.75 0.5 16
(vb, ve) 0.8 0.6 12
(vc, vd) 0.85 0.8 14
(vc, ve) 0.5 0.6 13
(vd, vh) 0.8 0.55 16
(vd, vi) 0.7 0.9 22
(ve, vf ) 0.85 0.5 17
(ve, vg) 0.55 0.45 9
(ve, vh) 0.85 0.6 18
(ve, vi) 0.65 0.8 18
(vf , vh) 0.8 0.54 19
Table 4.2: Gc’s weights over edges
4.2 The Advisor Selection Algorithm
4.2.1 Definitions
In order to exploit the consistency among the information the advisor communities offer
we consider a graph-based heuristic. Each community Ci constructs a graph Gi which
maintains partial information regarding the consistency among the information that other
communities have provided to Ci in the past. In particular, we refer to the graph Gi =
(V,E) as the Consistency Graph of the community Ci. Each vertex vk in V represents
an advisor community Ck from which the community Ci has requested information in the
past and is described by a tuple (Pr+(vk), P r
−(vk), W (vk)) (Table 4.1), where Pr
+(vk)
represents the probability an agent a will be a Good Contributor in Ci given that Ck
characterized it as a Good Contributor, Pr−(vk) represents the probability an agent a
will be a Poor contributor in Ci given that Ck characterized it as a Poor contributor,
and W (vk) represents the total number of times the community Ck was asked by Ci. An
example of a Consistency Graph is depicted in Figure 4.1(a). For instance, the community
which owns the graph in Figure 4.1(a) has received information in the past from the
communities {Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, Ce, Cf , Cg, Ch, Cm}. Note that, essentially, the probability
P (v) over a vertex vk depicts the degree of the consistency between the community that
owns the consistency graph and the community the vertex vk represents (i.e., Ck).
The existence of an edge e ∈ E, e = (vj, vk), indicates that in the past the community Ci
has requested information from the communities Cj and Ck regarding at least an agent a.
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Each edge e ∈ E is described by a tuple (Pr+(e), P r−(e),W (e)) (Table 4.2), where Pr+(e)
represents the probability the communities Cj and Ck will provide consistent information
regarding a Good contributor, Pr−(e) represents the probability the communities Cj and Ck
will provide consistent information regarding a Poor contributor, and W (e) represents the
degree that the amount of information that is available based on past reports is sufficient
to reason about the consistency of the reports of the communities Cj and Ck. The weight
W (e) can be determined based on the number of times the community Ci has requested
information from both the communities Cj and Ck about a common agent.
For example, the edge e′ = (va, vb) in the Consistency Graph in Figure 4.1(a) indicates
that the communities Ca and Cb were asked in the past to provide information about
an agent a, and with probability Pr+(e′) = 0.6 and Pr−(e′) = 0.55 provide consistent
information regarding Good contributors and Poor contributors, respectively. The latter
probabilities are based on past experience and get updated each time an interaction, that
involves the communities the vertices and/or the edges are associated with, takes place.
At this point we should clarify what we mean by two or more communities being
consistent. We say that two communities have provided consistent information if they
have both agreed on the classification of an agent (i.e., that it is either Good or Poor), and
that this classification also agrees with the judgement of the recipient community.
As we will see shortly, we use the consistency graph to identify the set of communities
that each community C ′ ∈ S(aj) appears to be consistent with in providing information
and which also appear to be consistent with each other. Then we select the community
with the strongest set, and finally from this set we select the best community.1 The latter
community is the first advisor community to ask. Then we remove it from the consistency
graph and we repeat the procedure until we reach the number of the advisors the recipient
community is interested in asking. The number of the latter communities is determined
by the recipient community.
In the rest of the section we provide some necessary definitions that we use in the
selection procedure. First we remind some fundamental definitions from Graph Theory
[12] and Game Theory [40] and then we present our definitions.
Definition 1. Given a graph G = (V,E) the number of vertices |V | is called the order of
the graph and the number of the edges |E| is called the size of the graph.
Definition 2. A path from a vertex u to a vertex u′ in a graph G = (V,E) is a sequence
〈u0, u1, ..., uk〉 such that u = u0 and u′ = uk and (ui−1, ui) ∈ E for i = 1, ..., k. If all
vertices in the path are distinct the path is called a simple path.
1Our definition of strongest set and best community will become clear in section 4.2.
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The number of edges in the path is called the length of the path. For example, in Fig-
ure 4.1(a) one of the paths between the nodes va and vi is {va, ve, vi} and its length is
2.
Definition 3. A clique in an undirected graph G = (V,E) is a subset V ′ ⊆ V of vertices,
each pair of which is connected by an edge in E.
For example, in Figure 4.1(a) the nodes va, vb, ve and vf form a clique. The clique of the
largest possible size in a given graph is called maximum clique.
Definition 4. We say that a graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) is a subgraph of G = (V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V and
E ′ ⊆ E. Given a set V ′ ⊆ V , the subgraph of G induced by V ′ is the graph G′ = (V ′, E ′)
where E ′ = {(u, v) ∈ E : ∀(u, v) ∈ E}
Definition 5. Two graphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) are isomorphic if there exists a
bijection f : V → V ′ such that (u, v) ∈ E if and only if (f(u), f(v)) ∈ E ′.
For example, in Figure 4.1(b) the induced subgraph of the nodes va, vb, and vf is isomorphic
to the induced subgraph of the nodes vb, vc, and vd.
One very important concept of game theory that we will be using is the Bayes Nash
Equilibrium. Before we formally define what a Bayes Nash Equilibrium is, we present some
necessary definitions.
Definition 6. A strategy profile s = (s1, ..., s|A|) is a vector that specifies the strategy si
for each agent i in A.
Definition 7. Let A = (A1, ..., An) be the set of actions for each agent, Θ = θ1 × ...× θn
where θi is the type space of each agent where the type of an agent determines its prefer-
ences, si(θi) the strategy of each agent Ai that specifies what action (or what distribution




−i|θi) ≥ EU(s′i, s∗−i|θi) ∀s′i 6= s∗i (4.3)
where EU(s∗i , s
∗
−i|θi) is the expected utility of the agent Ai given its strategy si, its type θi
and the strategies in s−i played by the agents in A− {Ai}.
In the rest of the section we provide our proposed definitions. The first definition aims
to compare a graph G(V,E) with another graph G′(V ′, E ′) of equal or smaller order.
Definition 8. Given two graphs G(V,E) and G′(V ′, E ′), and Pr(V ), Pr(V ′), Pr(E) and
Pr(E ′) probability distributions over V , V ′, E and E ′, respectively, the graph G(V,E)
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Figure 4.2: (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods for (ε, µ) = (0.02, 0)
(ε, µ)-dominates the graph G′(V ′, E ′) if there is at least one induced subgraph Gsb(Vsb, Esb)
of G(V,E) isomorphic to G′(V ′, E ′) that satisfies the following two conditions:
mean(Pr(Vsb)) + ε ≥ mean(Pr(V ′)) (4.4)
and
mean(Pr(Esb)) + µ ≥ mean(Pr(E ′)) (4.5)
where ε, µ ∈ R+. In case (ε, µ) = (0, 0) we will say that G(V,E) strongly-dominates the
graph G′(V ′, E ′).
This definition determines whether the information a graph G′(V ′, E ′) encodes is equal
to, or richer than, the information a graph G(V,E) of equal or larger order.
Proposition 1. A graph strongly dominates all of its induced subgraphs.
Proof. A graph G(V,E) strongly dominates a graph Q(VQ, EQ) if it has a subgraph




This is true since given that Q is an induced subgraph of G, we can simply select for G′
the graph Q itself.
Definition 9. Given a clique Q(VQ, EQ) of a graph G(V,E), the set of external edges of the
clique Q(VQ, EQ) is the set of all edges e = (v, w) in E such that v ∈ VQ and w ∈ V − VQ.
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Figure 4.3: Extended Neighborhood Graphs
Definition 10. Let G(V,E) be a graph with Pr(V ) and Pr(E) probability distributions
over the set of its vertices V and the set of its edges E, respectively, and let S be the set
of the maximal cliques that the vertex v ∈ V participates in. The (ε, µ)-Neighborhood of v
is the clique in S that:
• (ε, µ)-dominates all the other cliques of smaller order that the vertex v participates
in, and
• strongly dominates all the other cliques of equal order.
In the case where there is more than one clique that satisfies the above requirement, the
(ε, µ)-Neighborhood(v) is the clique with the largest set of external edges.
We define the (ε, µ)-Neighborhood of a node v based on both the maximal cliques but also
on the (ε, µ)-domination criterion because we are interested in finding the clique in which
v participates in that combines both the order and the quality of the information the
clique encodes. As we will see in Section 4.2.4 the (ε, µ)-Neighborhood(vi) graph consists of
communities that provide consistent information with the community Ci and at the same
time provide consistent information with each other. We argue that asking one community
in this graph provides approximately the same value of information as asking any other
community in it. An example of (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods is depicted in Figure 4.2. These
(ε, µ)-Neighborhoods are constructed based on the Consistency Subgraph in Figure 4.1(b)
for (ε, µ) = (0, 0.02).
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The next step is to select one of the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods. While we could merely select
the graph with largest order in the (ε, µ)-Neighborhood, we note that this would ignore
some interesting features of the definition of these neighborhoods. For instance, note that
while the neighborhoods of va, ve and vf in Figure 4.2 are the largest, the nodes va and
vb are also members of the neighborhoods of vg and vc, respectively. This means that va
and vb are consistent with more communities than ve and vf and, thus, they capture richer
information.
We introduce the (ε, µ)-Extended Neighborhood Graph, ENGi, of each node vi as the
union of vi’s (ε, µ)-Neighborhood with all the other (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods in which vi is a
member.
Definition 11. The (ε, µ) Extended Neighborhood Graph of a node vi, ENGi, is the union
of all the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods in which the node vi is a member.
We refer to vi as the owner node of ENGi while we refer to the rest of the nodes in ENGi
as peripheral nodes while for ease of presentation we will refer to the (ε, µ) Extended
Neighborhood Graph as the Extended Neighborhood Graph. The ENGs of the nodes
va, vb, vc, vd, ve, vf , vg of the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods in Figure 4.2 are depicted in Figure 4.3.
Definition 12. The Dominant ENG of a set S of ENGs is the graph in S with the
maximum order that (ε, µ)-dominates all the graphs in S of smaller or equal order.
4.2.2 The Advisor Selection Algorithm
In this section we describe the Advisor Selection Algorithm for finding a set of advisors
L. Although our main aim is to identify the communities which provide consistent and
accurate information regarding agents who are Good contributors, we are also interested in
asking a small number of communities that provide consistent information about agents
who are Poor contributors. This is due to the fact that communities might be interested
in misreporting only good contributors in fear of losing them or misreporting only poor
contributors in an effort to get rid of them.
The list L+ consists of the communities that tend to provide consistent information
about agents who are Good contributors while the list L− consists of the communities that
tend to provide accurate information about agents who are Poor contributors. Obviously,
L = L+ ∪ L−. Briefly, the procedure of finding list L+ or L− is as follows:
• Filter the consistency graph by removing the vertices and edges from the consistency
graph which are of no value. We will refer to the graph that occurs as the consistency
subgraph.
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• Find the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods for each vertex in the consistency subgraph (goal: Iden-
tify the strongest neighborhood each vertex participates in.)
• Find the Extended Neighborhood Graph for each vertex in the consistency subgraph.
(goal: Identify the extended neighborhood the vertex participates in.)
• Find the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph. (goal: Identify the strongest ex-
tended neighborhood.)
• Select the winner node w of the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph. (goal:
Identify the strongest node in the strongest extended neighborhood.)
• Insert the community the node w represents in the list of the advisors.
• Remove w from the consistency graph and repeat the procedure.
In the next sections we focus on finding the list L+ and thus we will only consider the
probability distributions Pr+(V ) and Pr+(E). The list L− can be computed in exactly
the same way by simply replacing the probability distributions Pr+(V ) and Pr+(E), with
Pr−(V ) and Pr−(E), respectively.
4.2.3 Filtering the Consistency Graph
The filtering step in the Selection Procedure refers to removing the nodes that represent
communities that either the community Ci would like to ask anyways or represent commu-
nities that provide insufficient information. For example, if a community provides accurate
information with probability 0.1 then this community would be a bad choice, thus it should
be removed from the candidates list.
We refer to the graph that occurs from the consistency graph when removing nodes as
the consistency subgraph and we represent it by Qi(VQi , EQi). In particular, the consistency
subgraph Qi is created by removing:
1. the vertices which represent communities that do not belong to S(aj), the set of
communities the agent aj has been a member, or represent communities whose prob-
ability of telling the truth regarding Good contributors is less than an acceptable
threshold θ+v , or represent communities for which there is insufficient experience and
thus their W (v) is less than an acceptable threshold θepv , and
2. the edges which connect communities whose probability of agreeing about Good con-
tributors is lower than an acceptable threshold θ+e , or edges for which there is insuf-
ficient experience and thus their W (e) is less than an acceptable threshold θepe .
2
2The thresholds θepv and θ
ep
e are set by each community and can be computed based on the community’s
experience.
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An example of a consistency subgraph is depicted in Figure 4.1(b). More specifically,
the latter graph is created from the consistency graph Gi in Figure 4.1(a) if we consider
that the candidate advisor list is S(aj)={a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h}, θ+v = 0.65, θepv = 0.6, θepe = 10,
and θ+e = 10. For example vertex i is removed since it does not belong in S(aj), while
the vertex h and the edge e1 = (ve, vg) are removed because there is insufficient previous
experience (i.e., W (h) < 10 and W (e1) < 10). At this point we have to clarify that in order
to accumulate experience for the above nodes, each time a number of unexplored nodes
can be selected to be asked with some probability p.
4.2.4 Finding the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph
The next step is to exploit the consistency in advice that the communities in the consistency
subgraph provide. In order to achieve this we need to identify the Dominant Extended
Neighborhood Graph. The Dominant ENG is a graph that contains the set of communities
that tend to provide the best quality of information while at the same time are consistent
with each other.
First we need to find the (ε, µ)-Neighborhood of each community in the consistency
subgraph. The (ε, µ)-Neighborhood of a community Cj consists of the set of communities
that are consistent not only with the community Cj but with each other as well. Our
goal is to identify the set of communities that Cj belongs to and which has the following
property: asking Cj is equivalent to asking any of the communities in the latter set, since
if everybody tends to agree with everybody else in the set then simply asking one of them
is sufficient.
The next step is to construct the Extended Neighborhood Graph, ENGj, of each node
vj in the consistency subgraph. Recall, we refer to the node vj as the owner node of the
graph ENGCj . As we described in Definition 4 this is done by merging all the (ε, µ)-
Neighborhoods the community Cj participates in. If a community Cj participates in Ca’s
(ε, µ)-Neighborhoods then asking Cj or Ca’s is equivalent. Thus, if the community Cj also
participates in Cb’s (ε, µ)-Neighborhood then asking Cb is equivalent to asking Cj. For
example, consider the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods in Figure 4.2. The node va participates in
vg’s (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods thus, its Extended Neighborhood Graph is created by merging its
(ε, µ)-Neighborhood with node’s vg (ε, µ)-Neighborhood.
The final step is to find the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph. For a similar
reason to the one that led us to consider the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods instead of only considering
the maximum clique a node belongs to, we find the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph
by applying the (ε, µ)-domination condition on the set of Extended Neighborhood Graphs.
More specifically, the Dominant ENG is the largest Extended Neighborhood Graph that
(ε, µ)-dominates all the Extended Neighborhood Graphs of equal or smaller order.
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Figure 4.4: Directed ENG
4.2.5 Finding the Winning Advisor
The next step is to determine which community that is represented by a node in the Dom-
inant Extended Neighborhood Graph to ask. We will refer to the latter node as the winning
node of the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph and the community it represents as
the winning advisor.
Towards this goal, we turn the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph into a directed
graph. In particular, for each edge e = (v, w) of the graph we give a direction from w to v
if Pr(v) > Pr(w), from v to w if Pr(v) < Pr(w) and a double direction if Pr(v) = Pr(w),
where Pr is the probability distribution over the vertices. Then we simply choose the node
with the highest indegree.3 For example, assume that the Dominant Extended Neighborhood
Graph among the graphs in Figure 4.3 is the graph ENGa in Figure 4.4(a). By adding
direction on its edges the graph in Figure 4.4(b) is created. As we can see the node with
the maximum indegree is va. Note, our approach guarantees that if the node with the
highest probability is the owner of the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph it will be
selected since there is no peripheral node with a degree higher than the owner’s degree.
Summarizing, the algorithm for finding the ordered list L of the advisors is:
3Tie breaking order: highest probability, owner node, number of past interactions.
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ASA
Input: G(V,E), ε, µ, Pr∗(V ), Pr∗(E), S
Output L∗
Find the consistency subgraph Q(VQ, EQ) from G(V,E) and S
while L∗ not full AND VQ not empty do
for all v ∈ VQ do
Find the (ε, µ)-Neighborhood(v) in Q(VQ, EQ)
end for
for all vk ∈ VQ do
Find the Extended Neighborhood Graph ENGk
Add ENGk in list ST
end for
Find the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph ENGp ∈ ST
for all e = (v, w) ∈ EENGp do
if Pr∗(v) < Pr∗(w) then
Give edge e direction v → w
else if Pr∗(v) > Pr∗(w) then
GIVE edge e direction v ← w
else
Give edge e directions v → w and v ← w
end if
end for
Find the node k ∈ VENGp with the maximum in-degree.
Add k at the end of the list L∗
Remove k from VQ and all incident edges
end while
4.2.6 Incentive Compatibility
In this section we prove that in our approach honesty is a Bayes Nash Equilibrium and
thus our approach is incentive compatible. First, we provide some necessary propositions
and then we move to our main theorem. Note, in our mechanism, we refer to a community
as honest if it provides correct information and dishonest otherwise.
Proposition 2. Let ENGk(V, E) be a Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph, Pr(V )
and Pr(E) probability distributions over V and E, and let vk be the owner node. If the
node vk has the largest probability in V then it is always the winning node.
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Proof. Since vk is the owner node and has the largest probability compared to any other
node in ENGk(V,E) then it must be the case that vk’s indegree is equal to its degree.
Since vk participates in all maximal cliques of ENGk then it must be the case that its
degree is greater than, or equal to, the degree of any other node in V , and thus its indegree
is greater than, or equal to, any node. If vk’s indegree is greater than all other nodes, then
by definition, it will be selected as the winning node. If its indegree is equal to at least one
other node, then by our tie-breaking rules vk will still be selected.
Proposition 2 shows that: a) it is in the best interest of a node to be the owner node, and
b) it is in the best interest of the owner node to have and maintain the largest probability
among the other nodes in its ENG.
Proposition 3. Let ENGk(V, E) be the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph, Pr(V )
and Pr(E) probability distributions over V and E, respectively, and vk its owner node. If
the winning node v′
• is a peripheral node then an update from Pr(vk) < Pr(v′) to Pr(vk) > Pr(v′) results
in the change of the winning node
• is the owner node then an update from Pr(w) < Pr(v′) to Pr(w) > Pr(v′) does not
always result in a change of the winning node
Proof. Let v′ be a peripheral node. By definition the owner node vk participates in every
(ε, µ)-Neighborhood in its Extended Neighborhood Graph. If vk’s probability becomes larger
than the previous winning node’s v′, then vk will have higher probability than all the nodes
v′ does, thus its indegree will be equal or higher to v′’s indegree plus 1. Thus, the node v′
cannot be the new winning node.
Let v′ be the owner node (i.e., v′ = vk). First, note that even if a peripheral node has a
higher probability than the owner node of a Dominant ENG graph, it is not guaranteed to
be the winning node. For instance, in Figure 4.4 the node vg has probability higher than
va but its indegree is lower than the owner’s. Thus, if w’s probability becomes higher than
the owner node’s vk, this does not guarantee that v
′ will not be the new winning node.
Proposition 3 shows, that i) it is in the best interest of a node to be the owner node of
the Dominant ENG, and ii) it is in the best interest of any peripheral node to have and
maintain a probability higher than the owner node, and thus the highest probability in
each (ε, µ)-Neighborhood it participates in.
Proposition 4. Let ENGk(V, E) be the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph, Pr(V )
and Pr(E) probability distributions over V and E, respectively, and w the winning node.
There is no clique Q′(VQ′ , EQ′) in which w does not participate in (i.e., w /∈ VQ′) such that:
54
• |VQ′| > indegree(w) + 1, and
• max{Pr(VQ′)} > Pr(w).
Proof. Assume that there is a clique Q′(VQ′ , EQ′) in ENGk such that w /∈ VQ′ , |VQ′| >
indegree(w) + 1 and max{Pr(VQ′)} > Pr(w). Let q be a node in VQ′ such that q =
argmaxPr(VQ′). From the latter we have indegree(q) ≥ indegree(w). Given now that
q has higher probability Pr(q) than w (i.e., Pr(q) > Pr(w)) the node w cannot be the
winning node. Thus, with the existence of q then node w is no longer the winning node,
consequently such clique as Q′ does not exist.
Proposition 4 shows that an update of the probability distribution of a Dominant
Extended Neighborhood ENGk(V, E) that creates such a clique results in the replacement
of the winning node w by another node.
Proposition 5. Let ENGk(V, E) be the Dominant Extended Neighborhood Graph, Pr(V )
and Pr(E) probability distributions over V and E, respectively, and v′ is the winning node
in V . Let O be the descending order of the nodes in V based on the probability distribution
Pr(V ). Any update on Pr(V ) that
• does not influence the order of the nodes V -{v′} in O, and
• increases or maintains the ranking of the node v′ in O
does not influence the selection of the winning node.4
Proof. If the order of the nodes with respect to Pr(V ) does not change then the indegree
of each node which is not adjacent to v′ will remain the same, while the indegree of nodes
that are the adjacent to v′ will either decrease or remain the same. Thus, v′ will remain
the winning node.5
Proposition 5 states that a winning node is better off maintaining or increasing its
probability.
Now, we would like to prove that honest reporting is a Bayes Nash Equilibrium. We
will show if all agents in A− {ai} are honest in their reporting, then agent ai is also best
off, in expectation, when it reports honestly.
4Note that the nodes are ordered in descending order based on their probability, thus the node with 0
has the highest probability.
5If the relation between the probabilities of the vertices does not change the direction of the edge will
also remain the same.
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Theorem 1. If all other communitiess are honest, a community Ci by being dishonest
can only reduce the likelihood of being selected as a winning node, and thus decreases the
probability of being asked.
Proof. Given that the expected utility of a community Ci is
EU(i) = Ptiprovide · Priprovide − Ptirequest · Prirequest (4.6)
and that Ci has no control over the probability Pr
i
request, it is sufficient to show that when
Ci is honest, Pr
i
provide either does not change or increases. The community Ci does not
have a direct control over the probability Prirequest since it cannot control whether other
agents will be interested to join it. More specifically, the community Ci does not have
control over the upper bound of Prirequest
Assume, without loss of generality, that community C1 had requested information from
a set L of communities, with Ci ∈ L. For any Cj ∈ L let vj denote the node representing the
community Cj in the consistency graph of C1, which we denote by G1 = (V1, E1). Assume
also, that all agents in L \ {Ci} reported honest information to C1, whereas Ci lied. We
will show that this lie will only decrease the likelihood that Ci will be selected to provide
information in the future (i.e., Priprovide will decrease). Since all Cj ∈ L\{Ci} were honest,
then they were also consistent with each other, whereas, Ci lied and thus was inconsistent.
Therefore, G1 would be updated such that Pr(vj) would increase (or remain the same if
Pr(vj) = 1), while Pr(vi) would decrease. Similarly, for any edge e = (vj, vk) ∈ E1 such
that j, k 6= i, Pr(e) would increase (or remain the same if Pr(e) = 1). However, for any
edge e′ = (vi, vj) the probability assigned to the edge would remain the same. Let G
∗
1
denote the new consistency graph of C1 after these updates have been made.
Given the new consistency graph of C1, G
∗
1, if the community C1 were to want infor-
mation again, it would only select community Ci if the vertex vi was a member of the
dominant extended neighborhood graph of G∗1. We will now analyze the scenarios that led
vi to be selected in G1 and how this is related to its current chance of being selected in
G∗1. Let ENGk be any dominant extended neighborhood graph of G1 that vi might have
participated in. There are two possible scenarios: i) vi was the owner node, or ii) vi was a
peripheral node. We now investigate these cases.
Case 1: vi was the owner node of ENGk. Assume that node vi was selected and was
the node with the highest probability in ENGk (Proposition 2). In G
∗
1, all nodes vj 6= vi
have had either their probability increase (or remain the same), while in G∗1 the probability
of vi has decreased. Therefore, by misreporting its information when asked, vi decreases
the likelihood of continuing being the node with the largest probability, and thus decreases
the probability of being the winning node since it is only guaranteed that the owner node
will be always the winning node if it has the largest probability. Assume that vi was
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selected as the winning node but did not have the highest probability in G1. Considering
the Propositions 4 & 5, in order for vi to be the winning node in ENGk, given that all
the other nodes increase or maintain their probabilities in G∗1, vi has also to maintain or
increase its probability Pr(vi) (i.e., by telling the truth). Thus, by lying Ci reduces the
possibility of vi being the winning node.
Case 2: vi was a peripheral node in ENGk. Since vi is a peripheral node inG1 and is also
a winning node in G1, it must be the case that the owner node, vk, of ENGk was such that
Pr(vk) < Pr(vi). In G
∗
1, we have that Pr(vi) decreases while Pr(vk) increases or remains
1. Therefore, in G∗1 either vi will remain a winning node (as long as Pr(vk) > Pr(vi)) or
will no longer be a winning node (if Pr(vk) > Pr(vi)) (Proposition 3). Therefore, by lying,
either the community Ci does not change its status as a winning node, or else becomes a
losing node, and is thus not selected.
Furthermore, by following a similar methodology as above, it can be showed that when
Ci lies the probability that vi will be the owner node of a Dominant ENG and the probabil-
ity that it will participate in the Dominant ENG decreases. The reason is that node vi by
decreasing the probabilities that are associated with it weakens all the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods
it could participate in. Given now that every community in L\{Ci} increases its probabil-
ity it strengthens the (ε, µ)-Neighborhoods it participates in. The probability the Extended
Neighborhoods vi participates in will (ε, µ)-dominate other Extended Neighborhoods de-
creases.
4.3 Summary
Summarizing, in this chapter we focused on providing incentives to communities to truth-
fully exchange information regarding their member agents. In particular, we consider that
a community contacts the communities (advisors) the agent is or was previously a member
and requests information about the agent. We depict the consistency of the advice the ad-
visors provide in a graph, the consistency graph, and we select a set of induced subgraphs
which we use to build the subset of advisors the community should consult. We show that
our approach leads to a competitive information environment which provides appropriate
incentives for the advisors to provide truthful reports. In particular, we presented an algo-
rithm for selecting a subset of advisors by exploiting the consistency in providing honest
advice among a set of advisor communities and we showed that honesty is a Bayes Nash
Equilibrium. In our mechanism, we assume that the honest communities can accurately
reason about the behaviour of their agents. Even though this appears to be a strong as-
sumption, this is not necessarily the case since each community is self-interested and thus
it would like to collaborate with communities that provide information that it can use.
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Chapter 5
The Payment Decision Problem
In this chapter we present a scoring function that is used to determine the payment each
advisor community will receive. In particular, as we will discuss, the requirement for the
payment function is to be monotonically increasing with respect to the value of the scoring
function. We refer to the scoring function as the i-Function and to its value as the i-
Score. Our goal is the use of an i-Function that promotes honest exchange of information
regarding the evaluation of an agent. Our scoring function is motivated by the work on
scoring rules [67]: a framework for eliciting probabilistic information from agents.
The two main issues we are interested in addressing are:
1. how an advisor community can be motivated to truthfully report its ratings and
2. how we can value the quality of the rating a community provides in order to com-
pensate it with a fair payment.
As will be seen, we set our i-Function to be maximized only when the community provides
a truthful rating (for 1.) and we introduce a set of properties the scoring function should
follow in order to promote honesty and fairness (for 2.), thus, providing an effective proposal
for the exchange of evaluation information between communities.
A key distinction that we make is between what we refer to as a good or a poor con-
tributor. These are labels that correspond to the desirability for a community to accept
or to reject the agent (the key decision-making that each community must undergo). The
evaluation information that is shared consists of both a rating which can represent either
the reputation or the trustworthiness of the agent and a type which can have either the
value good and poor which is the interpretation of rating. The community receiving the
agent’s evaluation reason about the accuracy and the helpfulness of this information. As
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we will show, evaluation information that leads to the correct decision concerning the ac-
ceptance or rejection of an agent leads to more lucrative payments, thus promoting both
honest reporting and fair payments.
In the following sections, we provide an overview of our model, then introduce the
properties that we believe should be taken into consideration for determining the i-Score
each community should receive. Finally, we provide an example of a family of scoring
functions that satisfies these properties.
5.1 Model
Let Ci denote community i and let aj denote agent j. We assume that if aj is a member
of community Ci then Ci can observe and judge the quality of agent aj. In particular, we
assume that community Ci maintains an evaluation model for all member agents, and is
able to assign an evaluation rating rij to agent aj, where r
i
j is some real number from the
interval [α, β], 0 ≤ α < β.
If agent aj wishes to join community Ci, then before welcoming aj, community Ci
will contact a set of communities in which aj is currently, or was previously, a member.
We denote the set of these communities as m(aj). Recall, the set m(aj) is determined
by our Advisor Selection Algorithm. The communities in m(aj) are asked to provide two
pieces of information. First, each community Ck ∈ m(aj) is asked to report its evaluation
rating rkj for agent aj. Since communities may use different evaluation models, or may
interpret ratings differently, communities are also requested to provide type information,
θkj , for agent j where θ
k
j ∈ {good, poor}. The type θkj is essentially the interpretation that
community Ck makes concerning its evaluation rating r
k
j for agent aj.
1
In exchange for information, community Ck receives a payment from community Ci.
This payment, P , depends on how useful or important community Ci finds the information
provided by Ck. If community Ci is interested in possibly welcoming agent aj, it will contact
the communities in m(aj) to request information about the agent aj. Each community
Ck ∈ m(aj) reports its evaluation rating (rkj ) and type information (θkj ) for agent aj,
possibly misreporting the information.
Based on the information received from communities in m(aj), Ci decides whether to
accept agent aj or to reject it. If Ci accepts agent aj then it gets to observe and evaluate aj.
By doing so, Ci is able to assign both a rating, r̂, and a type, θ̂ to the agent. If community
Ci decides to reject agent aj, then the payment procedure is a little more complicated
1For example, a rating 0.55 in one community could indicate an agent which is a poor contributor
while in another community, which might be more strict in providing high ratings, the same rating might
indicate a good contributor.
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since the community never gets the opportunity to directly observe and evaluate agent aj.
Instead, community Ci sets the type of agent aj to be θ̂ = poor, and computes r̂ to be
the average evaluation rating of all communities in m(aj) that also assigned type equal to








Only after this decision is made do the communities in m(aj) get paid for the informa-
tion that they provided. In particular, for each community Ck ∈ m(aj), the payment it
receives for its information (rkj and θ
k
j ) is determined by the payment function,
P (I(rkj , r̂, θ
k
j )) : R+ 7→ R+ (5.1)
where rkj is the evaluation rating of the agent by a community Ck ∈ m(aj), r̂ is the
evaluation rating of the agent by the recipient community, I(x, r̂, θ) is the i-Function used
by community Ck to determine the importance of the information provided by community
Ck. The main requirements for the payment function is for it to be a monotonically
increasing function with respect to the i-Score I(rkj , r̂, θ
k
j ). Thus, the key part of the
payment function is the i-Function.
In the following sections we present the properties we believe the i-Function should
exhibit, a family of functions that satisfy these properties and two particular instances.
5.2 The i-Function
In this section we describe the basic desirable properties of the i-Function. In the previous
section we informally introduced i-Function as I(rkj , r̂, θ
k
j ) where r
k
j was the evaluation
rating for agent aj given by community Ck, r̂ was community Ci’s (the community making
the payment) evaluation rating of the agent, and θkj was Ck’s assigned type to the agent.
We define I as I : R×R× {good, poor} → R such that I(x, r̂, θ) = −∞ if x < α or x > β
for some predefined α, β ≥ 0. Because of this, a community Ck, reporting on agent aj is
best off revealing a legal rating. We will refer to the outcome of the i-Function as i-Score.
Our first desired property is that I is continuous when a legal evaluation rating is given.
Property 1. Let α ≥ 0. In the restricted domain [α, β] × [α, β] × {good, poor}, I is
continuous.
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Figure 5.1: Example of ratings
If the community accepts the agent, then it is able to observe and evaluate the agent,
and thus determine its own evaluation rating, r̂. When determining payments we desire
that the communities that provided the more accurate information are rewarded. Consider
the following example.
Example 1. Assume that community Ci requests information about agent aj. Assume that
four communities submitted evaluation ratings r1j = 0.6, r
2
j = 0.65, r
3
j = 0.75 and r
4
j = 0.8.
After observing the agent, community Ci set r̂ = 0.7 (Figure 5.1).
We would like our i-Function to reward the communities that submitted evaluation ratings
of 0.65 and 0.75 more than those that submitted 0.6 and 0.8, respectively. That is, we
would like to capture the property that as x approaches r̂, the importance of x increases.
Property 2 captures this.
Property 2. For any r̂ ∈ [α, β] and for any θ ∈ {good, poor}, if x ∈ [α, r̂] then I(x, r̂, θ)
is strictly monotonically increasing, and if x ∈ [r̂, β] then I(x, r̂, θ) is strictly monotonically
decreasing.
Given Property 2, the i-Function should reward communities C2 and C3 in Example 1 more
than communities C1 and C4, respectively. We may want, however, to further distinguish
between the information received from communities C2 and C3 since even though the
evaluation values were equally far from r̂, C2 stated that aj had a lower evaluation than
observed, while community C3 stated aj had a higher evaluation than observed.
Define
δ(r̂, ε, θ) = I(r̂ + ε, r̂, θ)− I(r̂ − ε, r̂, θ)
for any ε ∈ (0,min[r̂ − α, β − r̂]]. This measures the difference in the i-Score when com-
munities over-report and under-report by the same amount. If δ(r̂, ε, θ) = 0 for all ε then
the i-Function would treat over- and under-reported evaluation ratings equally. We be-
lieve that the i-Function should be used to reward communities that provide ratings which
deviate towards the correct direction (i.e., good or poor) higher than those communities
who provided ratings of equal deviation but towards the wrong direction.
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Property 3. For any r̂ and any ε ∈ (0,min[r̂ − α, β − r̂]] let I(x, r̂, θ) be such that
δ(r̂, ε, good) > 0
and
δ(r̂, ε, poor) < 0.
In words, Property 3 says that if Ci determines that the agent is a good agent, then commu-
nities who reported higher evaluation ratings should be rewarded more than communities
who reported lower evaluation ratings, assuming that the difference from r̂ is the same.
A similar property should hold if Ci determined that the agent was poor. Referring back
to Example 1, if Ci determined that θ = good, then community C3 should have a higher
i-Score than C2, and C4 should have a higher i-Score than C1. If θ = poor, then C2 should
have a higher i-Score than C3 and C1 should have a higher i-Score than C4.
Our last two desired properties describe how δ(r̂, ε, θ) should behave.
Property 4. For any r̂
• δ(r̂, ε, good) is strictly monotonically increasing in ε,
• δ(r̂, ε, poor) is strictly monotonically decreasing in ε.
We interpret Property 4 in that if an agent is judged to be good, then communities who
submitted high evaluation ratings for the agent deserve higher i-Score, since they were
offering support for the agent (and vice-versa for the case when an agent is judged to be
poor). Referring back to Example 1, if the agent was judged to be good, then community
C4 would receive the highest i-Score, whereas if the agent was judged to be poor, then
community C1 would receive the highest i-Score.
Property 5. For any ε ∈ (0,min[r̂ − α, β − r̂]] and for any θ ∈ {poor, good}, δ(r̂, ε, θ) is
monotonically decreasing in r̂.
Property 5 states that a given deviation ε has different significance for different values of
r̂. For instance, if the agent’s type is judged to be good then the significance of a deviation
ε increases as the reported rating r̂ decreases. This is due to the fact that as r̂ decreases
the rating r̂ − ε might be crossing the cutoff r̄ value that a community considers in order
to accept an agent or not. In particular, the further the rating r̂ − ε crosses r̄ the more
in doubt it can put a community regarding the agent’s real value. Analogous, is the case
where the agent’s type is judged to be poor.
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5.2.1 i-Function and Payments
The i-Function forms the foundation of our payment system, and thus the properties of the
i-Function have a profound influence on the properties of the payments, and the incentives
for communities to report their evaluation ratings and type information when requested.
We first note that if the i-Function satisfies Properties 1 and 2, then it is uniquely
maximized when communities report r̂ (i.e., I(r̂, r̂, θ) is the global maximum). Since the
payment a community receives is monotonically increasing with respect to the i-Scores,
a community has incentive to report the evaluation rating that it truly believes Ci will
experience if Ci accepts the agent since this will result in the highest possible i-Score.
We introduce Properties 3 through 5 so as to ensure a certain level of fairness in the
system. While the communities who present the most accurate information to community
Ci benefit the most from the i-Function, communities, which provide information that tried
to convince community Ci to make the appropriate decision with respect to the agent, are
also well rewarded payment-wise.
5.3 A Class of i-Functions
In the previous section we outlined the desirable properties for an i-Function. The obvious
question is then “Does there exist any functions which could be used as i-Functions?” In
this section we introduce a class of functions that satisfy Properties 1 to 4, and that contains
a subclass which satisfies Property 5.
Let φ : [α, β] → R+ and ψ : [α, β] → R+ be arbitrary continuous functions on [α, β].
Let φ be strictly monotonically decreasing and let ψ by strictly monotonically increasing.
Now, define the i-Function I(x, r̂, θ) as












ψ(y)dy|, if θ = poor
(5.2)
We now show that for any choice of ψ and φ, I(x, r̂, θ) satisfies Properties 1 to 4. Later
we show that for particular choices of φ and ψ it is possible to also satisfy Property 5.
First, since both φ and ψ are continuous on [α, β], then I(x, r̂, θ) is also continuous on
the restricted domain [α, β]× [α, β]×{good, poor}. That is, I(x, r̂, θ) satisfies Property 1.




decreasing. Consequently, I(x, r̂, θ) is strictly increasing in [a, r̂]. As the x goes away from
r̂ then the area that is defined by the |
∫ x
r̂
φ(y)dy| is strictly increasing. Thus, I(x, r̂, θ)
is strictly decreasing in [r̂, β]. Similarly, it can be proved that the function ψ satisfies
Property 2 as well. Property 3 is also satisfied. We can rewrite δ(r̂, ε, θ) as:
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r̂−ε ψ(y)dy, if θ = poor
We show the case for θ = good since the case when θ = poor is analogous. Given that
























φ(y)dy ⇔ δ(r̂, ε, good) > 0
Regarding Property 4 we need to show that the partial derivative of δ(r̂, ε, θ) with





φ(r̂ − ε)− φ(r̂ + ε), if θ = good
ψ(r̂ − ε)− ψ(r̂ + ε), if θ = poor
Given that φ and ψ are strictly monotonically increasing and strictly monotonically
decreasing, respectively, and r̂ ∈ [α, β], where β > α ≥ 0, and ε ∈ (0,min[r̂ − α, β − r̂]]:
φ(r̂ + ε) < φ(r̂ − ε) and ψ(r̂ − ε) < ψ(r̂ + ε). Thus:
∂δ(r̂,ε,θ)
∂ε
> 0, if θ = good
∂δ(r̂,ε,θ)
∂ε
< 0, if θ = poor
Finally, Property 5 is also satisfied by (5.2) if:{
2φ(r̂)− φ(r̂ + ε)− φ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0
2ψ(r̂)− ψ(r̂ + ε)− ψ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0 (5.3)
for ∀r̂ ∈ [α, β], where β > α ≥ 0, and ∀ε ∈ (0,min[r̂−α, β− r̂]]. More specifically, we need
to prove that the partial derivatives of δ(r̂, ε, θ) with respect to r̂ are less than or equal to






2φ(r̂)− φ(r̂ + ε)− φ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0, if θ = good
2ψ(r̂)− ψ(r̂ + ε)− ψ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0, if θ = poor
Thus, if φ and ψ satisfy inequalities (5.3) then Property 5 is also satisfied.
Proposition 6 states that certain linear transformations of the functions φ and ψ can
be also used to create an i-Function.
Proposition 6. Let φ : [α, β]→ R+ and ψ : [α, β]→ R+ be arbitrary continuous functions
on [α, β], β > α ≥ 0. Let φ be strictly monotonically decreasing and let ψ by strictly
monotonically increasing in [α, β], and:
2φ(r̂)− φ(r̂ + ε)− φ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0
2ψ(r̂)− ψ(r̂ + ε)− ψ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0 (5.4)
for ∀r̂ ∈ [α, β] and ∀ε ∈ (0,min[r̂ − α, β − r̂]]. The function:












Ψ(y)dy|, if θ = poor
where Φ(y) = λ1·φ(y)+λ2, Ψ(y) = κ1·ψ(y)+κ2, λ1, κ1 ∈ R+, λ2, κ2 ∈ R and Φ(y),Ψ(y) ≥ 0
in [α, β], is a valid i-Function which satisfies Properties 1 to 5.
Proof. Given λ1, κ1 ∈ R+, λ2, κ2 ∈ R and φ(x) and ψ(x) are monotonically decreasing
and increasing, respectively, we have that Φ(x) is monotonically decreasing and Ψ(x) is
monotonically increasing. Thus, Properties 1 to 4 are satisfied. For Property 5, we just
need to prove that
2Φ(r̂)− Φ(r̂ + ε)− Φ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0
2Ψ(r̂)−Ψ(r̂ + ε)−Ψ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0 . (5.5)
We have that
2Φ(r̂)− Φ(r̂ + ε)− Φ(r̂ − ε) = 2(λ1φ(r̂) + λ2)− (λ1φ(r̂ + ε) + λ2)− (λ1φ(r̂ − ε) + λ2)
= λ1(2φ(r̂)− φ(r̂ + ε)− φ(r̂ − ε)) ≤ 0 (5.6)
Since 2φ(r̂)− φ(r̂ + ε)− φ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0 and λ1 ∈ R.
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Figure 5.2: Examples of φ
Similarly for Ψ(x) we have:
2Ψ(r̂)−Ψ(r̂ + ε)−Ψ(r̂ − ε) = 2(κ1ψ(r̂) + κ2)− (κ1ψ(r̂ + ε) + κ2)− (κ1ψ(r̂ − ε) + κ2)
= κ1(2ψ(r̂)− ψ(r̂ + ε)− ψ(r̂ − ε)) ≤ 0 (5.7)
Since 2ψ(r̂)− ψ(r̂ + ε)− ψ(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0 and κ1 ∈ R.
5.3.1 Examples of i-Functions
In this section we introduce two examples of an i-Function.
Example 1. Let φ(y) = (β − y)n and ψ(y) = ym. Then:




(β − y)ndy − |
∫ x
r̂





ymdy| θ = poor
(5.8)
where x, r̂ ∈ [α, β], β > α ≥ 0, and n,m ∈ N+. An example of φ(y) with β = 0.8 and
n = 2 is depicted in Figure 5.2.
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Since φ and ψ are continuous, positive and strictly monotonically decreasing and strictly
monotonically increasing, respectively (as can be seen by a simple check of the first and
second derivatives), I(x, r̂, θ) satisfies Properties 1 to Property 4. In order to prove that
I(x, r̂, θ) also satisfies Property 5 it is sufficient to prove that
2φ(r̂)− φ(r̂ + ε)− φ(r̂ − ε) = 2(β − r̂)n − (β − (r̂ + ε))n − (β − (r̂ − ε))n ≤ 0 (5.9)
and
2ψ(r̂)− ψ(r̂ + ε)− ψ(r̂ − ε) = 2r̂m − (r̂ + ε)m − (r̂ − ε)m ≤ 0 (5.10)
for ∀r̂ ∈ [α, β] and ∀ε ∈ (0,min[r̂−α, β− r̂]]. Inequality (5.9) can be proved by induction.
More specifically:
For n = 1, we have
2β − 2r̂ − β + r̂ − ε− β + r̂ − ε = −2ε ≤ 0
Assume that inequality (5.9) is true for n = k:
2(β − r̂)k − (β − (r̂ + ε))k − (β − (r̂ − ε))k ≤ 0 (5.11)
We now prove that it is also true for n = k + 1:
2(β − r̂)k+1 − (β − (r̂ + ε))k+1 − (β + (r̂ − ε))k+1
= 2(β − r̂)k(β − r̂)− (β − (r̂ + ε))k(β − (r̂ + ε))− (β + (r̂ − ε))k(β + (r̂ − ε))
= (β − r̂)(2(β − r̂)k − (β − (r̂ + ε))k − (β − (r̂ − ε))k) +
+ ε((β − (r̂ + ε))k − (β − (r̂ − ε))k) ≤ 0 (5.12)
Given inequality (5.11) the inequality (5.12) is true as it is the summation of two negative
numbers. Similarly, we will prove that inequality (5.10) is also true.
For m = 1, we have
2r̂1 − (r̂ + ε)1 − (r̂ − ε)1 = 0
For m = 2, we have
2r̂2 − (r̂ + ε)2 − (r̂ − ε)2 = −ε2 ≤ 0
Assume that it is true for m = k:
2r̂k − (r̂ + ε)k − (r̂ − ε)k ≤ 0
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Now, we prove that it is also true for m = k + 1:
2r̂k+1 − (r̂ + ε)k+1 − (r̂ − ε)k+1
= 2r̂r̂k − (r̂ + ε)(r̂ + ε)k − (r̂ − ε)(r̂ − ε)k
= r̂(2r̂k − (r̂ + ε)k − (r̂ − ε)k) + ε((r̂ − ε)k − (r̂ + ε)k) ≤ 0 (5.13)
Inequality (5.13) is true since it is the summation of two negative numbers.
Example 2. In the second example we consider φ(y) = (β − y)ne(β−y) and ψ(y) = ymey.
In this case the i-Function (5.2) will become:




(β − y)ne(β−y)dy − |
∫ x
r̂





ymeydy| θ = poor
(5.14)
An example of φ for β = 0.8 and n = 2 is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Similarly with the first example, since φ and ψ are continuous, positive, and strictly
monotonically decreasing and strictly monotonically increasing, respectively (as can be
seen by a simple check of the first and second derivatives), I(x, r̂, θ) satisfies Properties 1
to 4.
As in the case of the first family, in order to prove that i-Function (5.14) also satisfies
Property 5 it is sufficient to show that ∀n,m ∈ N, ∀r̂ ∈ [α, β] and ∀ε ∈ (0,min[r̂−α, β− r̂]]:
2φ(r̂)− φ(r̂ + ε)− φ(r̂ − ε) =
= 2(β − r̂)neβ−r̂ − (β − (r̂ + ε))ne(β−(r̂+ε)) − (β − (r̂ − ε))ne(β−(r̂−ε)) ≤ 0
⇔ 2(β − r̂)n − (β − (r̂ + ε))ne−ε − (β − (r̂ − ε))neε ≤ 0 (5.15)
and
2ψ(r̂)− ψ(r̂ + ε)− ψ(r̂ − ε) = 2r̂mer̂ − (r̂ + ε)mer̂+ε − (r̂ − ε)mer̂−ε ≤ 0
⇔ 2r̂m − (r̂ + ε)meε − (r̂ − ε)me−ε ≤ 0 (5.16)
Consider the case where θ = poor. We will prove that inequality (5.16) is true by
induction.2 For m = 0 we have: 2 − eε − e−ε which is clearly less or equal to zero. For
m = 1 we have:
2Given that er > 0 we can omit it.
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2r̂ − eε(r̂ + ε)− e−ε(r̂ − ε) = ε(e−ε − eε) + (2− eε − e−ε) ≤ 0
which is true since it is the summation of two negative numbers. Assume now that (5.16)
is true for m = k:
2r̂k − eε(r̂ + ε)k − e−ε(r̂ − ε)k ≤ 0 (5.17)
We will prove that it is also true for m = k + 1.
2r̂k+1 − eε(r̂ + ε)k+1 − e−ε(r̂ − ε)k+1 ≤ 0⇔
−eε(r̂ + ε)k(r̂ + ε) + 2r̂kr̂ − e−ε(r̂ − ε)k(r̂ − ε) ≤ 0⇔
(−eε(r̂ + ε)k + 2r̂k − e−ε(r̂ − ε)k)r̂ + ε(e−ε(r̂ − ε)− eε(r̂ + ε)) ≤ 0
which is true since it is the summation of two negative numbers. Consequently, the in-
equality (5.16) holds for ∀m ∈ N.
Consider the case where θ = good. We will prove that inequality (5.15) is true by
induction.3
For n = 1 we have:
2(β − r̂)− (β − (r̂ + ε))e−ε − (β − (r̂ − ε))eε = (β − r̂)(2− eε − e−ε) ≤ 0
which is clearly less or equal to zero since (β − r̂) ≥ 0 and (2− eε − e−ε) ≤ 0.
Assume now that (5.16) is true for n = k:
2(β − r̂)k − (β − (r̂ + ε))ke−ε − (β − (r̂ − ε))keε ≤ 0
We will prove that it is also true for n = k + 1.
2(β − r̂)k+1 − (β − (r̂ + ε))k+1e−ε − (β − (r̂ − ε))k+1eε ≤ 0⇔
(β − r̂)(2(β − r̂)k − (β − (r̂ + ε))ke−ε − (β − (r̂ − ε))keε) + ε((β − r̂ − ε)e−ε − (β − r̂ + ε)eε) ≤ 0 (5.18)
which is true since it is the summation of two negative numbers. Consequently, the in-
equality (5.15) holds for ∀n ∈ N.
3Given that er > 0 we can omit it.
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Choosing φ and ψ
In order to find the most suitable instances of the above families of functions a number
of different criteria could be used. For example, one criterion is bounding the maximum
value of δ(r̂, ε, θ).
More specifically, consider the case of θ = good, a criterion could be to choose the
function φ in such a way that the maximum value of the δ(r̂, ε, θ) (which essentially defines
the maximum difference of the i-Scores of two ratings that deviate equally from the rating
r̂ only by absolute value) is bounded by U and L, where U,L ∈ R+, in order to avoid
over-penalizing communities. A simple way of finding φ and ψ that satisfy the following
bounds:
L ≤ max[δ(r̂, ε, good)] ≤ U and L′ ≤ min[δ(r̂, ε, poor)] ≤ U ′
in an interval [w1, w2], where U,L,w1, w2 ∈ R+ and U ′, L′ ∈ R− is presented in Proposi-
tion 7.
Proposition 7. Given an upper bound U and a lower bound L finding the function φ such
that for ∀ε ∈ (0,min[w2 − r̂, r̂ − w1]] and ∀r̂ ∈ [w1, w2]:
L ≤ max[δ(r̂, ε, good)] ≤ U





where ε = min[w2 − r̂, r̂ − w1], and x is the solution to: I(r̂ + ε, r̂, good) = I(x, r̂, good).
While finding the function ψ that for ∀ε ∈ (0,min[w2 − r̂, r̂ − w1]] and ∀r̂ ∈ [w1, w2]
L′ ≤ min[δ(r̂, ε, poor)] ≤ U ′




ψ(y)dy ≤ U ′
where ε = min[w2 − r̂, r̂ − w1], and x is the solution to: I(r̂ − ε, r̂, poor) = I(x, r̂, poor).
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Proof. Consider the case where θ = good.4 Given that δ(r̂, ε, good) is monotonically in-
creasing in ε: i) it is maximized when ε = min[r̂ − w1, w2 − r̂], and ii) there will be a
x ∈ (r̂ − ε, r̂) such that I(x, r̂, good) = I(r̂ + ε, r̂, good). Thus, we can write δ(r̂, ε, θ) as:




Essentially, Proposition 7 states that in order to find a φ that leads to an δ(r̂, ε, θ)





where ε = min[w2 − r̂, r̂ − w1], and x is the solution to: I(r̂ + ε, r̂, good) = I(x, r̂, good).
Analogous is the case for the function ψ.
5.3.2 Example of i-Score-based Payment Function
Let (5.8) be our i-Function. For θ = good and [α, β] = [0, 1] we have





















For θ = poor and [α, β] = [0, 1] we have



















Graphical representations of the i-Functions in (5.19) and (5.20) for n = 2 are presented
in Figures 5.3 & 5.4, respectively.
Consider now that when the communities provide information they have to share an
amount κ based on their i-Score. In particular, we define the payment P (rkj , r̂, θ
k
j ) that
each community Ck ∈ m(aj) will receive as
4The proof for θ = poor is analogous.
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Figure 5.3: i-Function example for n=2, r̂ = {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} and type good
Figure 5.4: i-Function example for n=2, r̂ = {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} and type poor
P (rkj , r̂, θ
k
j ) = I(r
k
j , r̂, θ
k
j ))










Thus, the payment function is
P (I(rkj , r̂, good)) = (I(r
k











where d ∈ Z.
Given that the i-Function is positive the function P (I(rkj , r̂, good)) is monotonically
increasing with respect to the i-Score I(rkj , r̂, good). For example, if a community Ck re-
ceives a higher score than community Cj, it will also receive a higher payment. Essentially,
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the i-Function determines the order of the i-Scores and the distance between each pair of
i-Scores. By choosing d = 1 we use directly the i-Scores for determining the payments.
As we will see in the following examples the higher the d the larger the difference in
the payment between honest agents and agents that are less honest. However, we can also
control the variance of the payments by choosing an appropriate i-Function.5
In the following sections we provide an example that demonstrates the i-Scores and the
payment the advisor communities will receive by using our suggested i-Functions.
Example.
Assume now that community Ci requests information from the communities m(a2) =
{Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, Ce, Cf , Cg, Ch} about an agent a2. The communities in m(a2) provided the
following information:
• Ca: (ra2 = 0.2, θa2 = poor),
• Cb: (rb2 = 0.3, θb2 = poor),
• Cc: (rc2 = 0.4, θc2 = poor),
• Cd: (rd2 = 0.5, θd2 = poor),
• Ce: (re2 = 0.5, θe2 = good),
• Cf : (rf2 = 0.6, θ
f
2 = good),
• Cg: (rg2 = 0.7, θ
g
2 = good),
• Ch: (rh2 = 0.8, θh2 = good).
Poor Contributor Scenario
Assume that the community Ci decided to accept the agent a2 which proved to have
a type θ = poor.6 Table 5.1 presents the i-Score each community will receive for any of
the ratings r̂ ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} the community Ci might experience. For example, if the
5Recall, we consider that the honest communities can accurately reason about the behaviour of their
agents and that their agents do not change their behaviour from one community to another. In addition
we consider that a community which does not (strategically or not) or cannot reason about the value of
its agents is dishonest.
6Note, the mechanism for determining whether to accept or not the agent is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
73
r̂ Ca(.2, pr) Cb(.3, pr) Cc(.4, pr) Cd(.5, pr) Ci ∀i ∈ {e, f, g, h}
0.5 0.294333 0.300667 0.313000 0.333333 0
0.4 0.314667 0.321000 0.333333 0.313000 0
0.3 0.327000 0.333333 0.321000 0.300667 0
0.2 0.333333 0.327000 0.314667 0.294333 0
Table 5.1: Example-Poor Contributor: i-Scores for n = 2
r̂ Ca(.2, pr) Cb(.3, pr) Cc(.4, pr) Cd(.5, pr) Ci ∀i ∈ {e, f, g, h}
0.5 1.9 1.94 2.02 2.15 0
0.4 1.97 2.00 2.08 1.95 0
0.3 2.04 2.08 2.00 1.88 0
0.2 2.10 2.06 1.98 1.86 0
Table 5.2: Example-Poor Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 1 and n = 2
Figure 5.5: Example-Poor Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 1 and n = 2
community Ci experiences a rating r̂ = 0.3, the community Cb that provided a rating equal
to 0.3 will receive the maximum possible score which is 0.333333, while the communities
Ca and Cc that provided ratings 0.2 and 0.4 will receive 0.313 and 0.321, respectively. We
assign an i-Score equal to 0 to all the communities which misclassified the type of the
agent. In this case, this includes the communities that assigned a type equal to good (i.e.,
{Ce, Cf , Cg, Ch}).
Let $8 be the amount the community Ci has allocated to pay the communities in
m(a2). We have κ = 8. If all the communities in m(a2) provide accurate information
they will receive $1 each. However, since the communities Cd, Ce, Cf , and Cg influenced
the community Ci towards making the wrong decision and accept an agent that is a poor
contributor they will not receive any payment. Thus, the amount κ will be distributed
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r̂ Ca(.2, pr) Cb(.3, pr) Cc(.4, pr) Cd(.5, pr) Ci ∀i ∈ {e, f, g, h}
0.5 1.50 1.67 2.04 2.79 0
0.4 1.81 2.00 2.42 1.77 0
0.3 2.18 2.40 1.99 1.43 0
0.2 2.50 2.28 1.88 1.34 0
Table 5.3: Example-Poor Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 5 and n = 2
Figure 5.6: Example-Poor Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 5 and n = 2
r̂ Ca(.2, pr) Cb(.3, pr) Cc(.4, pr) Cd(.5, pr) Ci ∀i ∈ {e, f, g, h}
0.5 1.06 1.31 1.96 3.67 0
0.4 1.62 1.97 2.88 1.53 0
0.3 2.30 2.79 1.91 1.00 0
0.2 2.99 2.47 1.68 0.86 0
Table 5.4: Example-Poor Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 10 and n = 2
among the communities Ca, Cb, Cc and Cd based on their i-Score (Table 5.1).
Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 depict the distribution of the amount κ using the payment
function (5.22) for d = 1, 5, 10 and n = 2. Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 depict the graphical
representation of the payments distribution for d = 1, d = 5 and d = 10, respectively.7
As we can see, the community that correctly classified the agent as poor and reported
a rating r̂ equal to the one Ci experiences will receive the highest payment for any r̂. In
addition, the communities that deviated by an amount |ε| will receive higher payment if
their rating is equal to r̂ − |ε| from the communities whose rating is r̂ + |ε|. Furthermore,
similarly to Example 1, as d increases the variance of the distribution of the amount κ
7Note that r′ = r̂.
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Figure 5.7: Example-Poor Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 10 and n = 2
r̂ Ce(.5, gd) Cf (.6, gd) Cg(.7, gd) Ch(.8, gd) Ci ∀i ∈ {a, b, c, d}
0.8 0.294333 0.314667 0.327000 0.333333 0
0.7 0.300667 0.321000 0.333333 0.327000 0
0.6 0.313000 0.333333 0.321000 0.314667 0
0.5 0.333333 0.313000 0.300667 0.294333 0
Table 5.5: Example-Good Contributor: i-Scores for n = 2
increases. For example, if r̂ = 0.4 then the community Cc will receive $2.08 for d = 1,
$2.42 for d = 5, and $2.88 for d = 10. The community Cb that reported a rating 0.3 will
receive $2.00 for d = 1, $2.00 for d = 5, and $1.97 for d = 10. While the community Cd
that reported a rating 0.5 will receive $1.95 for d = 1, $1.77 for d = 5, and $1.53 for d = 10.
r̂ Ce(.5, gd) Cf (.6, gd) Cg(.7, gd) Ch(.8, gd) Ci ∀i ∈ {a, b, c, d}
0.8 1.86 1.98 2.06 2.10 0
0.7 1.88 2.00 2.08 2.04 0
0.6 1.95 2.08 2.00 1.97 0
0.5 2.15 2.02 1.94 1.90 0
Table 5.6: Example-Good Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 1 and n = 2
r̂ Ce(.5, gd) Cf (.6, gd) Cg(.7, gd) Ch(.8, gd) Ci ∀i ∈ {a, b, c, d}
0.8 1.34 1.88 2.28 2.50 0
0.7 1.43 1.99 2.40 2.18 0
0.6 1.77 2.42 2.00 1.81 0
0.5 2.79 2.04 1.67 1.50 0
Table 5.7: Example-Good Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 5 and n = 2
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Figure 5.8: Example-Good Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 1 and n = 2
Figure 5.9: Example-Good Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 5 and n = 2
r̂ Ce(.5, gd) Cf (.6, gd) Cg(.7, gd) Ch(.8, gd) Ci ∀i ∈ {a, b, c, d}
0.8 0.86 1.68 2.47 2.99 0
0.7 1.00 1.91 2.79 2.30 0
0.6 1.53 2.88 1.97 1.62 0
0.5 3.67 1.96 1.31 1.06 0
Table 5.8: Example-Good Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 10 and n = 2
Good Contributor Scenario
Assume now that the community Ci decides to accept the agent a2 and a2 proves to
have a type θ = good. Table 5.5 presents the i-Score each community will receive for
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Figure 5.10: Example-Good Contributor: Payment Distribution for d = 10 and n = 2
any of the following ratings r̂ ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8} the community Ci might experience.
Recall, we assign an i-Score equal to 0 to all the communities which misclassified the
type of the agent. In this case, this is the communities that assigned a type equal to
poor (i.e., {Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd}). Also, these communities are not going to get paid since they
influenced the community Ci to make the wrong decision and accept an agent that is a
poor contributor. Thus, the amount κ will be distributed among the communities Ce, Cf ,
Cg and Ch based on their i-Score.
Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 depict the distribution of the amount κ using the payment
function (5.22) for n = 2 and d = 1, d = 5 and d = 10, respectively Figures 5.9 & 5.10
depict the graphical representation of the payments distribution for d = 1, d = 5 and
d = 10, respectively.
For example, if r̂ = 0.7 then the community Cg will receive $2.08 for d = 1, $2.4 for
d = 5, and $2.79 for d = 10. The community Cf that reported a rating 0.6 will receive
$2.00 for d = 1, $2.00 for d = 5, and $1.91 for d = 10. While the community Ch that
reported a rating 0.8 will receive $2.08 for d = 1, $2.18 for d = 5, and $2.3 for d = 10.
5.4 Summary
Summarizing, in this chapter we presented the properties a scoring function, that deter-
mines compensation a party will receive when it provides evaluation information, should
follow. The compensation takes into consideration both the ratings and their interpreta-
tion. We set our scoring function to maximize the payment of a community only when it
provides a truthful rating and we introduced a set of properties a scoring function should
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follow in order to promote honesty and fairness. The key idea of the properties is as follows:
If the reported rating deviates from the rating r̂ (the recipient community experiences) and
influences the recipient community towards making the wrong decision (i.e., decline a good
contributor or accept a poor contributor), the advisor community that provided this rating
should receive a lower payment than if it had reported a rating of equal deviation but which
was influencing towards the right decision (i.e., accept a good contributor or decline a poor
contributor). Furthermore, we showed that such scoring function exists and we provided
examples of specific families of functions that can be used. Finally, we presented directions
of possible criteria in selecting a specific instance of the latter families.
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Chapter 6
The Trust Modeling Problem
As Binmore & Dasgupta stated [6] we have significantly limited knowledge on how people
acquire trust. Thus, we believe that trying to provide a general model of trust for a
multiagent system in which agents are controlled by and act on behalf of users is very
ambitious. For this reason, in our work we focus on modeling trust in terms of promises.
In particular, in this chapter we present the minimum requirements of a framework for
reasoning about the trustworthiness of agents who contribute resources in settings where
important decisions are made based on these resources and thus their truthful disclosure
is crucial. Examples of these settings include planning [7], task allocation [56] etc. Our
ultimate goal is to discourage the agents from both over-stating and under-stating their
potential contributions.
Consider the following motivating examples. A set of underwater robots belong to
different companies and collaborate to complete tasks like repairing cables and pipes or
stopping the leak of sinked ships’ oil tanks. Each robot is represented by an agent and
has to disclose its capabilities in order to generate a plan that will allow all the robots
to collaborate efficiently and effectively for completing their mission. Since the cost of
the operation for this type of robot is high, the agents have incentives to exhibit strategic
behaviour. They might try to over-declare the capabilities of the robots they represent
to ensure their participation in the mission or they might under-declare their capabilities
hoping that another robot will do the costly or risky tasks. These agents only reveal the
true capabilities of the robots they represent, when the time for the contribution of the
robot arrives, or when the plan fails or if the payoff of the plan turns out to be lower than
their expectation. However, if agents truthfully reveal what they are capable of delivering,
then the best plan can be found and the robots can be deployed in the most effective
manner. We thus want a trust model which can be used to judge the reliability of the
agents and also to encourage them to be reliable.
Another example is the following: Consider a set of agents A that are interested in
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selling a set of tickets through an online company. The company offers a number of
different plans (i.e., reduced posting fee, access to reduced shipping fee) depending on the
number of tickets the sellers offer. The agents in A can form groups in order to achieve
their participation in a better plan. However, some agents can behave strategically and lie
regarding the number of tickets they can provide hoping that other agents will provide a
sufficient number of tickets while they will be able push their extra tickets through a better
deal. If the agents have the flexibility to increase their contribution after a plan has been
selected, the deceptive agents can push their tickets if their other deals failed pretending
that they were honestly not aware of these extra tickets.
In our model each agent promises to contribute a certain amount of resources/services
and its trustworthiness depicts the extent that it deviates from its promise. Since we target
settings where the exact knowledge of the resources a member can contribute is crucial
for collective decisions we aim to discourage agents from strategic behaviour (i.e., over-
stating and under-stating their resources). Our proposed model is incentive compatible in
that agents maximize their trust scores by delivering what they promise. The agents are
interested in maximizing their trustworthiness because this would maximize their chances
of participating in beneficial collaborations (i.e., be chosen as the as the seller to interact
with in systems like ebay.com). However, we argue that this alone is not sufficient. A
promise-based trust model should be able to cope with different deviations from the initial
promise. Furthermore, it should guarantee that an agent cannot benefit at the expense of
others, by failing to deliver what it promised. As we will show, our model provides this
guarantee. Here, we would like to note that we chose to develop a trust model that results
in continuous instead of discete ratings, since we argue that this provides a more accurate
and flexible tool to depict the trustworthiness of an agent. Furthermore, a continuous
rating can be easily converted to a discrete rating without loss of information. This can
be achieved by defining the intervals that correspond to each discrete value the rating can
receive.
For example, consinder a discrete evaluation model in which the domain of the input
and output is the set {Bad,OK,Good, V eryGood,Excellent}. Assume we would like to
use this discrete model to determine the overal rating of two agents a1 and a2. Assume
that the agent a1 received four ratings, 2 Excellent and 2 Bad and the agent a2 received 4
ratings Good. In the case of the agent a2 it is straight forward that the output rating should
be Good, however this is not the case for the agent a1. In particular, it is not clear what
should be the overall rating for a1. More specifically, we argue that none of the ratings in
{Bad,OK,Good, V eryGood,Excellent} is guarranteed that it can depict accurately the
value of the agent a1, since the real value of the agent can be something in between.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We first introduce our model, we describe
the properties our trust function should exhibit and we present an instantiation. We show
that these properties ensure that an agent maximizes its trust-score by both delivering
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what it promised and by promising what it can deliver. We also discuss how our model
can be adapted to settings where, due to changing circumstances, an agent may be unsure
when they make a promise that they will be able to deliver as desired. In particular,
we define conditions under which an agent can update its promise without harming its
trustworthiness.
6.1 The Model
Let C denote a community and let a represent an agent which is interested in joining
the community C. There are many reasons why the agent a may be interested in joining
C, including wishing to be able to partake in resources and opportunities available to
community members, or to belong to a group of like-minded individuals. In exchange for
becoming a member of the community, C requests that a contributes to the community
by offering services, S. For example, a community may request that an agent provides
CPU, bandwidth, disk space or even information. Agent a selects a service, s ∈ S and
then makes a promise to the community that it will contribute a particular level of that
service.
Let pm(s, a) be the promised level of service that agent a makes to the community. We
normalize pm(s, a) so that pm(s, a) ∈ [0, 1]. Up to some agreed-upon time period, T , the
agent is required to deliver its contribution. We denote the actual delivered contribution
of service s by agent a by dl(s, a) ∈ [0, 1]. Once a community has observed the delivered
contribution of the agent, it can compare them to the promised contribution. This compar-
ison results in the community assigning the agent a trust score, Tr(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)) ∈ R+
which depends on whether the agent delivered what it promised.
6.2 Promise-Based Trust
In this section we describe our trust model which is based on a comparison between the
promises made, and the level of services delivered by a particular agent, a.
Given our basic framework, there are several key properties which we believe the trust
function should exhibit:
1. An agent that delivers what it promises should be considered to be trustworthy.
2. An agent that delivers more than it promised should be considered to be more trust-
worthy than an agent that delivers less than it promised, assuming all other things
are equal.
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3. If two agents both deliver less than they promised, then the one that delivered closest
to its promise should be considered to be more trustworthy. Similarly, if two agents
both deliver more than they promised, then the agent that delivers closest to its
promise should be considered to be more trustworthy.
Our fourth property below is an extension of our third desired property and allows us to
reason about what to do if two agents both under-contribute or over-contribute equally.
We explicitly state it since we will find its formalization useful later in the chapter.
4. Assume two agents under-delivered on their promise by the same amount. Then the
one who promised less should be considered to be more trustworthy. Similarly if
two agents both over-delivered on their promise by the same amount, the one who
promised more should be considered to be more trustworthy.
To capture the four properties, we propose a trust function, Tr, which is decompos-
able into two separate components. The first component measures whether the agent has
actually delivered what it promised, and we capture this by using a reliability function,
RL. The second component measures the quality of the delivered contribution of the agent
to the group, and we capture this be using a quality-of-contribution function, QoC. We
initially do not specify how the trust function is composed of the reliability and quality-
of-contribution function and instead state merely that
Tr(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)) = RL(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)) QoC(pm(s, a), dl(s, a))
where  is some unspecified operation. We provide a particular instantiation later in this
chapter.
6.2.1 The Reliability Function
The reliability function RL : [0, 1] × [0, 1] 7→ R+ measures whether an agent, a, has
delivered the service, s, that it promised. In particular, we say that an agent is reliable if
pm(s, a) = dl(s, a) and aim to discourage the agent from either under- or over-delivering
on their promise. Thus, we argue that reasonable candidates for the reliability function,
RL(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)), are functions which are maximized when pm(s, a) = dl(s, a). We
place the additional condition that for a promise pm(s, a), the function should be strictly
monotonically increasing for 0 ≤ dl(s, a) ≤ pm(s, a) and strictly monotonically decreasing
for pm(s, a) ≤ dl(s, a) ≤ 1.
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6.2.2 The Quality-of-Contribution Function
The quality-of-contribution function, QoC : [0, 1]×[0, 1] 7→ R+, measures the quality of the
delivered service. There are two key properties we believe candidates for the QoC function
should exhibit. First, we believe that larger contributions should be considered better than
smaller contributions given a promise. We can formalize this property as follows;
QoC Property 1. For any promise pm(s, a), QoC(pm(s, a), 0) = 0, and for dl(s, a) > 0,
QoC(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)) is positive and strictly monotonically increasing in dl(s, a).
The second property we endorse is the following. If two agents both over-deliver on
their respective promises by some amount ε, then the one who initially promised more will
be deemed to be making a better contribution. Similarly, if two agents both under-deliver
on their respective promises by some amount ε then the one who initially promised less is
deemed to be making a better contribution, since the expectations about the agent were
less to start with. Formally
QoC Property 2. Assume that agent a made promise pm(s, a). Then for any ε > 0 and
for any p′ < pm(s, a)
QoC(pm(s, a), pm(s, a) + ε) > QoC(p′, p′ + ε)
and
QoC(pm(s, a), pm(s, a)− ε) < QoC(p′, p′ − ε).
6.2.3 The Trust Function
At the start of this section we outlined four properties we believe a promise-based trust
function should have. In this subsection we formalize these properties for a function Tr :
[0, 1] × [0, 1] 7→ R+. First, we argued that an agent who delivers what it promises is
trustworthy. We place an additional constraint on the function so as to ensure that the
trust function is maximized only when it delivers what it promised.
Trust Property 1. For any promise pm(s, a), Tr is maximized at Tr(pm(s, a), pm(s, a)).
Additionally, for a given promise pm(s, a), Tr(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)) is strictly monotonically
increasing for 0 ≤ dl(s, a) ≤ pm(s, a) and is strictly monotonically decreasing for pm(s, a) ≤
dl(s, a) ≤ 1.
The monotonicity restrictions also ensure that agents who deliver close to their promise
are considered to be more trustworthy than agents who delivered far from their promise.
Our second desired property is that agents who contribute more than they promised
should be considered to be more trustworthy than those who delivered less than what they
promised, when they both deviate by ε.
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Trust Property 2. For any promise pm(s, a) and for any ε > 0
Tr(pm(s, a), pm(s, a) + ε) > Tr(pm(s, a), pm(s, a)− ε).
The third property states that if two agents both over- or under-deliver on their promise,
then the one who delivered services closest to its promised level is more trustworthy.
Trust Property 3. Assume agents a and a′ have promised pm(s, a) and pm(s, a′) re-
spectively, and assume that dl(s, a) = dl(s, a′) = d. If d ≥ pm(s, a) > pm(s, a′) then
Tr(pm(s, a), d) > Tr(pm(s, a′), d). If pm(s, a) > pm(s, a′) ≥ d then Tr(pm(s, a), d) <
Tr(pm(s, a′), d).
Our fourth property states that if two agents over-deliver on their promise by the same
amount ε then the one who promised more is more trustworthy, and if both under-deliver
their promise by the same amount ε then the one who promised less is more trustworthy,
since the expectations about the agent were less to start with.
Trust Property 4. Assume that agent a made promise pm(s, a). Then for any ε > 0 and
for any p′ < pm(s, a)
Tr(pm(s, a), pm(s, a) + ε) > Tr(p′, p′ + ε)
and
Tr(pm(s, a), pm(s, a)− ε) < Tr(p′, p′ − ε).
6.2.4 Instantiating the Trust Model
In the previous section we proposed a set of properties we believe a promise-based trust
model should have. In this section we provide a particular instantiation of the trust model
which satisfies our properties. We note that other families of functions may also work, and
that the application in which our model is used would play a role in determining what an
appropriate set of functions would be. To simplify our notation, in this section we refer
only to agent a and service s, and let p = pm(s, a) and d = dl(s, a).




1− |d− p| otherwise (6.1)
The sole requirement we had for the reliability function was that it had to be monotonically
increasing for d ∈ [0, p], monotonically decreasing for d ∈ [p, 1], and RL(p, 0) = 0. It is
straightforward to verify that RL(p, d) satisfies this requirement.
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for p, d ∈ [0, 1] and n = 2.












where n ∈ N, n > 1. We now show that this family of functions satisfies the properties we
outlined for the QoC function.




























since d > 0 and n > 1. Thus, QoC Property 1 is satisfied.
QoC Property 2: It is sufficient to show that QoC(p, p + ε) is strictly monotonically
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increasing in p. This can be done by considering the partial derivative of QoC with respect




(p+ ε)n−1 − pn−1
n
> 0 (6.3)
which is positive since the function φ(x) = xn is strictly monotonically increasing for
∀x > 0 and n > 0.
In Equation 6.1 we defined the trust function using a generic operation, . We now
propose to replace that operation with multiplication resulting in
Tr(p, d) = RL(p, d) ·QoC(p, d)






We now show that this trust function satisfies the three properties outlined in Section 6.2.3.
Trust Property 1: Consider first the case d ∈ [0, p]. We have







(dn − pn). (6.4)
Since RL(p, d) and QoC(p, d) are both positive and strictly monotonically increasing
in [0, p], the function
Tr(p, d) = RL(p, d) ·QoC(p, d) (6.5)
is also strictly monotonically increasing.

































































Trust Property 2: Let d = ε+ p and d′ = p− ε. Now, we wish to show that Tr(p, d) >
Tr(p, d′) which is equivalent to
QoC(p, d) ·RL(p, d) > QoC(p, d′) ·R(p, d′). (6.9)
Since RL(p, d) = RL(p, d′) = 1− ε, it is sufficient to show that QoC(p, d) > QoC(p, d′).
This is true since QoC is strictly monotonically increasing with respect to the delivered
contribution (QoC Property 1) and d > d′. Thus, Trust Property 2 is satisfied.
Trust Property 3: For this property it is sufficient to show that the function Tr(p, d)
is monotonically increasing in [0, d) and strictly monotonically decreasing in (d, 1] with
respect to the promised contribution, p. For p ∈ [0, d)


































since 1 ≥ d > p and n > 1. Thus, the function Tr(p, d) is monotonically increasing when
p ∈ [0, d).
Similarly, for p ∈ (d, 1]











































since 1 ≥ p > d and n > 1. Thus, the function Tr(p, d) is monotonically decreasing when
p ∈ (d, 1].
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Figure 6.2: Examples of the Disadvantage Bound, Gap and Critical Gap for p and p′ where
p′ > p.
Trust Property 4: Since RL(p, p + ε) = 1 − |ε|, then from QoC Property 2 the result
follows.
Figure 6.1 depicts examples of RL, QoC, and Tr. As we can see in Figure 6.1(a),
the QoC function monotonically increases as the delivered contribution d increases (QoC
Property 1). As for the trust function, Tr, when the delivered contribution is less than or
equal to the promise then Tr is monotonically increasing. Otherwise, the trust function
decreases monotonically (Trust Property 1). Furthermore, we can observe that the rate
in which it increases is faster than the rate in which it decreases. Thus, it is easy to see
that Trust Property 2 is satisfied. The QoC Property 2 and Trust Property 3 cannot be
observed in Figure 6.1(a) since they focus on the dimension of the promised contribution
p. Figure 6.1(b) depicts the Tr function for n = 2 and p, d ∈ [0, 1].
6.2.5 The Disadvantage Gap
One interesting property of our trust model is that it provides incentives so that agents will
not promise less than what they can actually deliver. In this section we will prove that if an
agent knows it can deliver some level of service dl(s, a), then it puts itself at a disadvantage
(i.e., reduces its trust value) by promising (and then delivering) some lesser contribution.
Before proving this, we need to introduce two new concepts: the disadvantage bound and
the disadvantage gap.
Definition 13. Let pm(s, a) be the promised contribution of agent a, and let dl(s, a)
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be the delivered contribution. Assume that dl(s, a) > pm(s, a). That is, the agent con-
tributed more than it promised. The Disadvantage Bound is the minimum contribution,
v = v(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)), the agent could have delivered such that
Tr(pm(s, a), v) = Tr(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)).
Definition 14. Let pm(s, a) be the promised contribution of agent a. For any delivered con-
tribution dl(s, a) > pm(s, a) and associated Disadvantage Bound v = v(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)),
the Disadvantage Gap is the interval
[v, dl(s, a)].
Consider an agent who promised pm(s, a) and then delivered dl(s, a) > pm(s, a).
The Disadvantage Gap is the region of contributions that some agent a′ who promised
pm(s, a′) = pm(s, a) could make (even under-contributing such that dl(s, a′) < pm(s, a′))
and yet still have the same or higher trust value as agent a.
Definition 15. Let pm(s, a) be the promised contribution of agent a. For any delivered con-
tribution dl(s, a) > pm(s, a) and associated Disadvantage Bound v = v(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)),
the Critical Disadvantage Gap is the interval
[v, pm(s, a)].
The gaps represent ranges of contributions which result in the same or greater trust
values than the trust value currently received by the agent who promised and delivered
pm(s, a) and dl(s, a). In particular, the intervals are the ranges in which another agent,
making the same promise, could under-deliver by and still be assigned a greater trust value.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the disadvantage bounds and the critical disadvantage gaps:
i) for three different promises and different deliverables and ii) for p = 0.7 and different
values of n.
What we show in Theorem 2 is that if an agent can deliver dl(s, a), then it is to its
advantage to make a promise which is equal to dl(s, a) or possibly a little less, as opposed
to significantly under-promising. In particular, we will show that as pm(s, a) approaches
dl(s, a) the range for which another agent could under-deliver and still receive a higher
trust rating decreases. Thus, an agent is better off, from a trust perspective, to try to
promise close to, if not exactly, what it can actually deliver. Note that Theorem 2 also
implies Corollary 1.
Theorem 2. Let Tr : [0, 1]× [0, 1] 7→ R+ be a function which satisfies our four trust prop-
erties. Let dl(s, a) be the actual delivered contribution of agent a. For promise pm(s, a) <
dl(s, a) let v = v(pm(s, a), dl(s, a)) be the disadvantage bound. Then, as pm(s, a) ap-
proaches dl(s, a), the size of the Critical Disadvantage Gap [v, pm(s, a)] decreases.
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Figure 6.3: Disadvantage Bound, Disadvantage Bound percentage over promise p = 0.7,
and Disadvantage Gap and Critical Gap diagrams ∀d ∈ (p, 1] given p = 0.7 and n =
{2, 3, 5, 9}.
Proof. Let p = pm(s, a) and d = dl(s, a). Assume that another promise, p′ was made such
that p < p′. Let v = v(p, d) and v′ = v(p′, d) be the respective disadvantage bounds. We
are required to show that for any p and p′ with p < p′ < d it is the case that p−v > p′−v′.
Since v and v′ are the disadvantage bounds for p and p′ then by definition, Tr(p, v) =
Tr(p, d) and Tr(p′, v′) = Tr(p′, d). Since d > p′ > p then according to Trust Property 3
we have that Tr(p′, d) > Tr(p, d), and so therefore Tr(p′, v′) > Tr(p, v).
Since p′−v′ > 0 then by Trust Property 4 we have that Tr(p, p− (p′−v′)) > Tr(p′, p′−
(p′ − v′)) = Tr(p′, v′) and thus Tr(p, p − (p′ − v′)) > Tr(p, v) since Tr(p′, v′) > Tr(p, v).
Therefore, given Trust Property 1 we have that p−(p′−v′) > v and thus p−v > p′−v′.
Corollary 1. Let Tr be a trust function that satisfies Trust Properties 1 and 3, and let
d = dl(s, a) be the delivered contribution of agent a. Then, the Disadvantage Gap for agent
a decreases as the promised contribution pm(s, a) increases, for pm(s, a) < d.
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Figure 6.4: Disadvantage Bound, Disadvantage Bound percentage over promise p, and
Disadvantage Gap and Critical Gap diagrams ∀d ∈ (p, 1] and p = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9} given
n = 2 .
6.2.6 Allowing for Changing Circumstances
The main goal of this chapter is to develop an incentive-compatible trust model, where
agents who make good promises, and then deliver on these promises, are regarded as
trustworthy. We have achieved this since we need only to prove that Tr(pm(s, a), dl(s, a))
is uniquely maximized when pm(s, a) = dl(s, a). This is achieved through Trust Property
2 and thus any trust function which satisfies this property is incentive compatible.
However, there is one unintended side-effect of our trust model as described to date.
Consider an agent who, when asked to make a promise about its contribution, is uncertain
as to what it will be able to actually deliver when called upon to do so. To be safe, the agent
may promise less than it may actually be able to deliver. For example, assume that agent a
has promised pm(s, a), but then finds that it is capable of delivering dl(s, a) = pm(s, a)+ε.
If the agent actually delivers this service at this new level, then while its QoC score would
increase compared to if it delivered what it promised, its overall trustworthiness would
decrease. Thus, the agent may decide not to deliver the extra ε of service. In a number
of cases over-delivering might be undesirable from the community’s perspective since the
community must make plans based on the promised services. This is due to the fact that
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there are cases when the update on the agent’s promises might circumscribe the planning
process of the community.
To overcome the problem outlined above, we would like to allow agents the ability
to update their promises, so that once they are better able to predict their contribution
capabilities, they can inform the community without being penalized. On the other hand,
however, we need to ensure that such a mechanism is not abused by agents in an attempt
to manipulate the system and improve their trust scores, by always initially making small
promises.
The main idea is that if the delivered contribution of an agent is different than its
promised contribution but it is done during a certain time period in which any change will
not impact the community in any key way, then the trustworthiness of the agent should
not be penalized. Instead, we propose that both the QoC function and the trust value, Tr
should be computed using pm(s, a) = dl(s, a). If the latter time period expires then the
trustworthiness of the agent should get penalized except when certain conditions apply. In
the rest of the section we enumerate these conditions but first we provide some necessary
definitions.
Definition 16. Given a set of alternative allocations of goods or outcomes for a set of
agents, a change from one allocation to another that can make at least one agent better off
without resulting in any other agent being worse off is called a Pareto Improvement.
Definition 17. An allocation is Pareto Optimal when no further Pareto improvements
can be made.
In our setting our definition of worse off is as follows:
Definition 18. An agent ai is worse off with respect to the contribution of another agent
aj, if aj’s exact reporting of its contribution would have resulted in ai acquiring a higher
utility.
For example, consider two agents a1 and a2. Assume that a2 promised a contribution
pm(s, 2) = p but provided a contribution p′. The agent a1 is worse off with respect to the
contribution of a2 if the reporting p
′ of a2’s contribution would have resulted in a higher
utility for a1.
We propose the following protocol to deal with changing circumstances. First, upon
making its initial promise, we allow for some time period in which the agent may update
its promise with no penalty. After this agreed-upon time period has passed, then the agent
is only allowed to make updates if one of the two following condition holds:
• The updated delivered contribution results in a Pareto Improvement.
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• The allocation of the benefits the agents would have received with respect to their
contributions was Pareto optimal and satisfies the following two requirements:
1. results in a Pareto optimal allocation,
2. the updated promised contribution is equal or greater than the average promised
contribution. 1
For each of these cases the agent’s trustworthiness should not get penalized and its
trust score will be computed as Tr(d, d) where d is the delivered contribution. In any
other case, the agent’s trust score is computed as Tr(p, d) based on its initial contribution
p. We believe that this approach allows an appropriate level of flexibility for agents, but at
the same time protects the community of the agents from malicious strategic behaviour.
Summarizing, in order for an agent to avoid reducing its trust value by delivering
a different contribution than it promised, it must either update its promise during the
predefined time period, or hope that its delivered contribution is a Pareto Improvement or
results in the same Pareto Optimal allocation.
6.3 Examples
In this section we provide some examples of scenarios where our trust function would be
used and the numerical values of the trustworthiness of each participant for each scenario.
The instances of the functions we use are the following:










Tr(p, d) = RL(p, d) ·QoC(p, d)






Note that we will only consider the normalized value of the function Tr in the interval
[0, 1].
1This condition aims to prevent a domino effect from taking place.
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6.3.1 Over-delivery
Consider a set of agents {a1, a2, a3, a4} that are interested in selling a set of tickets through
an online electronic company. Each agent has to declare the number of tickets it has to
sell. For each ticket they sell they have to pay two fees: i) posting fee PF and ii) shipping
fee SF . The company offers the following plans:
• Plan A: If number of tickets < 10 then PF = $1.5 and regular SF
• Plan B: If 10 ≤ number of tickets < 25 then PF = $1.2 and regular SF
• Plan C: If 25 ≤ number of tickets < 50 then PF = $0.8 and regular SF
• Plan D: If 50 ≤ number of tickets then PF = $0.4 and reduced SF
Agents can form groups in order to achieve their participation in a better plan. Once a
group commits to a number of tickets it cannot decrease it without the trustworthiness of
the group getting penalized. Let assume that the agents a1, a2, a3 and a4 can offer 15, 20,
15 and 5 tickets, respectively. The agents a1, a2, a3 and a4 form a group and thus the total
number of tickets they can offer is 55. With 45 tickets in total the group of the agents can
participate in Plan C. Assume now that a1, a2, and a3 were truthful but a4 was not.
The agent a4 played strategically and only reported 5 from the 11 tickets it owns.
The agent a4 reserved the rest of the 6 tickets to contribute to another group of agents.
Assume now that the other deal a4 was trying to participate failed and a4 is interested
now in selling the remaining 6 tickets through the Plan C pretending that it honestly did
not know about these extra 6 tickets. If the agents cannot update their offer so they can
access Plan D only the agent a4 is benefitted. In this case by using our proposed Trust
function the trustworthiness of the agent a4 inside the group is not maximized (i.e., 1) due
to the possibility that the agent a4 was intentionally dishonest. However, its QoC value
can still reveal that the non-perfect trustworthiness is the result of over delivering.
























= 0.22 0.897 0.510 0.88
Table 6.1: The Tr, QoC, and Rl values for E-market Over-Delivery Example
If a4 was honest from the beginning and had reported all of its 11 tickets the agents could
participate in Plan D instead of Plan C. Thus, they would have all achieved a better deal.
Table 6.1 depicts the normalized trustworthiness Tr value, the quality of contribution QoC
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value and the reliability Rl value for each agent in {a1, a2, a3, a4} when using the functions
(6.14), (6.13), and (6.12), respectively. In particular, the trustworthiness of the agents a1,
a2, a3, and a4 is 1, 1, 1, and 0.897, respectively.
6.3.2 Under-delivery
Consider an electronic market place that is in urgent need of three very popular items: a)
a new game console, b) a new book and c) tickets for a concert. The site requests from the
participants to contribute any of the above items. In particular, a contribution of 10 game
consoles or of 20 books or of 6 tickets with seats next to each other would be characterized
as sufficient. Consider now 6 agents such that:
• a1: promised 8 game consoles but delivered 7 game consoles
• a2: promised 5 books but delivered 4 books
• a3: promised 3 tickets and delivered 3 tickets
• a4: promised 10 books but delivered 9 books
• a5: promised 4 tickets but delivered 3 tickets
• a6: promised 2 tickets but delivered 1 ticket
We can calculate pm(s, a) based on the number of items the agent contributed divided
by the number of items the market considers as a sufficient contribution. If the contribution
exceeds the latter number we consider a contribution equal to this number. Table 6.2
depicts the normalized trustworthiness Tr value, the quality of contribution QoC value
and the reliability Rl value for each agent in {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6} when using the functions
(6.14), (6.13), and (6.12), respectively. In particular, the trustworthiness of the agents a1,
a2, a3, a4, a5, and a6, are 0.833, 0.939, 1 , 0.927, 0.762 and 0.806, respectively.






























6 = 0.17 -0.16 0.806 0.48 0.84
Table 6.2: The Tr, QoC, and Rl values for E-market Under-Delivery Example
As we can see from Table 6.2 the agents a5 and a6 deviated both by −0.16 (i.e., 1 ticket
out of 6 tickets) but the agent a5 receives a higher trustworthiness than the agent a6. In
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general, the higher the number of the tickets that refer to seats next to each other the less
likely is to find a seller than can provide these tickets. Thus, a lie in a higher range should
result in a higher penalty. For instance, assume that the market place had committed to
provide to a buyer four tickets that refer to 4 seats next to each other if a5 ends up only
delivering 3 tickets the marketplace will not be able to satisfy this request resulting to the
dissatisfaction of the buyer.
Similar is the case of the agents a2 and a4 that deviated by ε = −0.05 from their initial
promise (i.e., delivered one book out of twenty books). The agent a4 that gave the higher
promise will receive a lower score. Similarly to the case of the tickets, as the likelihood of
finding sellers to offer this number of books decreases. For instance, consider a buyer that
is interested to purchase 10 books and that only a2 was offering to sell 10 books. If a2 only
ends up providing 9 the market-place should find the extra book from another seller a′.
Having to ship the books to the buyer from two different sellers will result in an additional
shipping cost to either the buyer or the marketplace.
Note that in our example we used the same instantiation of the Tr, QoC, and RL
functions. However, different instantiations could be used with respect to the importance
of each item (i.e., different for the books, for the tickets and so on). Furthermore, the
decision of the most proper instantiations may differ from setting to setting and is subject
to the conditions that are more desirable.
6.4 Experiments
In this section we present an empirical evaluation of the over delivery component of our
proposed model (experiment 1) in addition to an effort to study the possibility of extending
a probabilistic-based trust model to approximate our proposed trust properties (experiment




To the best of our knowledge there is no trust model that was designed to consider both
under-delivery and over-delivery of contributions of goods or services. For this reason
we focused on comparing our model with a probabilistic model in a setting where the
probabilistic model can reach its optimal performace. Due to symmetry we only focused
on the case where over-delivery takes place. We chose the over-delivery case because this
also demonstrates the negative impact over-delivery can have.
In particular, the goal of experiment 1 is twofold:
1. to examine the extent a deployment of a trust model can achieve an increase in the
utility (i.e., revenue) for truthful agents in settings where the untruthful agents over
deliver their contribution, and
2. to examine the degree the instantiation of the promise-based trust model that we
provided in section 6.2.3 can compete with a standard probabilistic model [25].
Experiment 1a
Experiment 1a examines the degree the instantiation of the promise-based trust model
that we provided in section 6.2.3 compares with the probabilistic model [25] in settings
where the probabilistic can reach its optimal performance.
Scenario: The experiment follows a similar scenario to the one in Example 1. We
have a group G of agents which are interested in participating in a plan that provides a
certain deal. The plan the group G can access depends on the budget B(G) of the group.
The higher the budget the better deal the group G can access. In order to increase the
likelihood of participating in a good plan the agents in G wish to collaborate with a set
of agents S ⊆ AUT , where AUT is the set of manipulating agents. The agents in AUT
appear to play strategically and under-declare their contributions. More specifically, when
an agent in a ∈ AUT promises a contribution pm(a) it ends up delivering a contribution
equal to pm(a) + ε for some ε > 0. In order to ensure that pm(a) + ε ≤ 1 we consider that
for the case of the untruthful agents pm(a) ∈ [0, 1− ε].
The revenue R(G) of the group G is equal to the deal o(B(G) + B(S)) the group G
achieved, after collaborating with the agents in S, multiplied by the group’s budget B(G).
In particular
R(G) = o(B(G) +B(S)) ·B(G) (6.15)
where B(G) and B(S) is the budget of group G and S, respectively. Each group G
participates in a number of transactions that make an epoch. The goal of the group G
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is to maximize the revenue it accumulates in each epoch. We consider that during each
transaction only a subset L of AUT , where L ⊇ S, can contribute to the budget of the
group G. Since which plan the group can enter depends also on the contributions of the
agents in S it is important to decide how to select the set of agents S from the set L. For
our experiment for determining the set S we consider the following two methods.
• Method A: S consists of the agents in L with the |S| highest promised contributions.
• Method B: S is determined as follows:
– 1st Step: Add in S the agents in L with the |S| highest promised contributions.
– 2nd Step: Find the plan P the group G can access based on its budget B(G) +
B(S).
– 3rd Step: Let a be the agent with the highest promised contribution in L. If
there is an agent a′ in L− S such that
∗ TRt(a′) > TRt(a) and2
∗ the group S ′ ← S−{a}∪{a′} has a budget B(G) +B(S ′) that gives access
to the same plan than the one the group G can access.3
then replace a with a′ in S, and repeat the procedure for the agent a with the
second highest promised contribution in S and so on until the agent with the
|S|-th highest contribution in S is reached.
– 4th Step: Repeat Step 3 until no swapping of agents between S and L−S takes
place.
Essentially, Method B tries to find the set S with the highest trustworthiness that could
achieve a plan equal to the best plan G can achieve given that it can only select |S| agents
from the set L.
We compared 3 different settings:
Setting 1: No Trust: In this setting we consider that there is no trust mechanism ap-
plied. Thus, the agents in AUT always under-declare their contributions while the selection
of the group G is done through method A.
Trust-based Settings. In the following settings the selection of the group G is done
through method B. We assume that each untruthful agent can observe and estimate the
trustworthiness of a set of untruthful agents, which we refer to as the horizon. The agents
in AUT will only tell the truth if
2t is the time the group is formed.
3The plan that is selected by considering the agents in L with the m highest promised contributions is
guaranteed to be the best plan that the group G can access.
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1. their overall trustworthiness TR is not the maximum possible (i.e., 1) and it is below
the average overall trustworthiness of half of the agents in their horizon or
2. they have participated in the list L but not in S more than a number of times which
we will refer to as the “tolerance” of the agent.
The trustworthiness TR(a) of each agent a in S is updated only at the end of every epoch.
• Setting 2: Promise-based: The overall trustworthiness of an agent a in epoch t is
computed at the end of epoch t− 1 as follows:
TRt(a) = TRt−1m (a) (6.16)
where m is the number of interactions during epoch t and
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(6.18)
and is normalized in [0, 1].
• Setting 3: Probabilistic. The overall trustworthiness of an agent a in epoch t is
computed at the end of epoch t− 1 as follows






where b and c are the number of times during epoch t − 1 the agent proved to be
truthful and untruthful, respectively.
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For this experiment we consider γ = 0.5. By setting γ = 0.5 we weight equally the
trustworthiness of each epoch and the past overall trustworthiness when computing the new
overall trustworthiness of an agent. The appropriate value of γ depends on the behaviour of
the agents. A reinforcement learning technique could be applied in order to determine the
optimal γ value with respect to the behaviour of the agents at each time. We chose γ = 0.5
since by setting a value of γ < 0.5 an agent can build a high overall trustworthiness TR and
then counting on the fact that it will take a while until a deceptive behaviour is reflected
on its trustworthiness TR, it may start to significantly under-declare its contributions (the
smaller the γ the longer it will take). In the case of γ > 0.5 an agent might continuously
under-declare its contribution and occasionally provide truthful reports in order boost its
overall trustworthiness.
The budget of the group G is selected from the range [0, 8] uniformly at random, |AUT |
is set to 500, the horizon to 10 which is 2% of the agents in AUT , |S| to 4, γ to 0.5, |L|
to 50 which is the 10% of the agents in AUT and the Tolerance to 40 which corresponds
to 2 epochs assuming that an agent was selected in L, but not in S, in all the iterations
of 2 epochs. In each case we assumed that each agent in AUT under-declares by the same
amount ε, where ε ∈ {i ·0.1|i = 1, ..., 9}. Depending on its B(G) and the budget the agents
in S can contribute, one of the following plans will get selected
• Plan A: 0 < B(G) +B(S) ≤ 1 Offer: o = $100
• Plan B: 1 < B(G) +B(S) ≤ 3 Offer: o = $600
• Plan C: 3 < B(G) +B(S) ≤ 5 Offer: o = $800
• Plan D: 5 < B(G) +B(S) ≤ 7 Offer: o = $1100
• Plan E: 7 < B(G) +B(S) Offer: o = $1500
We would like to stress that the above case is a representative of the numerous tests
we performed using a large number of different combinations of the values of the above
parameters.
For all ε ∈ {i · 0.1|i = 1, ..., 9} we computed:
1. the average maximum cumulative revenue per epoch the group G would have enjoyed
if no agent was untruthful.
2. the average revenue of the group G per epoch for each setting.
3. the percentage of the average cumulative revenue with respect to the average maxi-
mum cumulative revenue of the group G per epoch for each setting.
101
Figure 6.5: Experiment 1a - Average revenue per epoch.
Results - Experiment 1a.
For each ε we repeated each experiment 100 times and we present the average results
in Figures 6.5 to 6.7.
Figure 6.5 depicts the average revenue a group accumulates per epoch for each of the 3
settings over the 100 times we ran the experiment. The maximum revenue represents the
maximum average revenue the group can achieve. As we can see, both the probabilistic
and the promise-based trust model are close to the maximum average revenue while in the
case where no trust model is used the average revenue decreases significantly.
Figure 6.6 presents the percentage of the maximum revenue each setting approaches.
As we also saw in Figure 6.5 both the probabilistic and the promise-based trust model are
close to 100% of the maximum revenue with the probabilistic doing slightly better than
our proposed promise-based approach.
The exact difference of the latter models can be observed in Figure 6.7 where we can
see that the probabilistic model marginally outperforms the promise-based model. As we
will discuss in the next section the reason we believe this happens is due to the high scores
that the particular instantiation assigns. This is also the reason why the difference between
the percentages they achieve overall decreases as the deviation ε increases.
Statistical Analysis - Experiment 1a.
In order to validate our results we proceeded to do a statistical analysis of the data we
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Table 6.3: Experiment 1a - p-values for ANOVA Single Value Test.
aggregated. First, given that we are comparing more than two methods we executed an
ANOVA single value test [45]. The input data is the average revenue per epoch that was
computed for each of the 200 epochs of the 100 runs. The p-values for each ε are presented
in Table 6.3. Given that the p-values for all the ε are less than 0.05 we can conclude that
for each ε there is a statistical significance of the average between the 4 cases we considered.
The next step was to perform paired sample t-tests [82] for the following cases
• No Trust vs Promise-based
• Promise-based vs Probabilistic
• Probabilistic vs Maximum
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Figure 6.7: Experiment 1a - Percentage of the average maximum revenue per epoch.
ε No Trust vs Promise-based Promise-based vs Probabilistic Probabilistic vs Maximum
0.1 0 7.0524E-137 0
0.2 0 1.17357E-84 0
0.3 0 4.40154E-76 0
0.4 0 9.1864E-142 0
0.5 0 2.82523E-47 0
0.6 0 4.05E-20 7.8628E-206
0.7 0 5.00E-12 2.32E-131
0.8 0 6.04681E-08 1.4881E-70
0.9 0 8.50951E-06 3.07501E-41
Table 6.4: Experiment 1a - p-values for the one-tailed paired t-test.
The p-values we received are presented in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. From the p-values for
∀ε ∈ {0.1, ..., 0.9} we can conclude that there is a statistical significance of the average of
the methods we examined.
A visual representation of the aggregated data is presented in Figures 6.8 to 6.10. In
particular, in these Figures we display the average revenue per epoch for each epoch and
for each of the 100 runs for ∀ε ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}. For example, in Figure 6.8(a) we depict
the points (x,y) where x is the average revenue of an epoch i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 200, during
a run k, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 200, when no trust model is used and y is the corresponding
average revenue when the promise-based model is used. The light line we can observe in
the diagrams in Figure 6.9 is y = x.
A data point (x′, y′)
• on the left of the line y = x means that y′ > x′
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ε No Trust vs Promise-based Promise-based vs Probabilistic Probabilistic vs Maximum
0.1 0 1.4105E-136 0
0.2 0 2.34714E-84 0
0.3 0 8.80307E-76 0
0.4 0 1.8373E-141 0
0.5 0 5.65046E-47 0
0.6 0 8.10976E-20 1.5726E-205
0.7 0 9.99271E-12 4.6438E-131
0.8 0 1.20936E-07 2.97619E-70
0.9 0 1.7019E-05 6.15002E-41
Table 6.5: Experiment 1a - p-values for two tailed paired t-test.
• on the right of the line y = x means that x′ > y′, and
• on the line y = x that x′ = y′.
As we can see from the Figure 6.8 the promise-based model overall performs better
than the case where no the trust model is used. Similar, in Figure 6.9 the probabilistic
model overall performs almost equal to the promise-based model, and thus it also performs
better than the case where no trust model is applied.
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Figure 6.8: Experiment 1a. Data Distribution Diagram - No Trust vs Promise-based.
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Figure 6.9: Experiment 1a. Data Distribution Diagram - Probabilistic vs Promise-based.
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In Experiment 1b we consider settings where the untruthful agents do not have informa-
tion about the trustworthiness of other agents. This experiment essentially demonstrates
the impact of Trust Property 4. Recall, Trust Property 4 says that assume that agent a
made promise pm(s, a). Then for any ε > 0 and for any p′ < pm(s, a)
Tr(pm(s, a), pm(s, a) + ε) > Tr(p′, p′ + ε)
and
Tr(pm(s, a), pm(s, a)− ε) < Tr(p′, p′ − ε)
Essentially, Experiment 1b is similar to the Experiment 1a with the following difference:
• The untruthful agents (that is the agents in AUT ) under-declare their contribution
only when they have participated in the list L but not in S more than their “toler-
ance”.
We considered exactly the same setting and values for the parameters as in Experiment
1a. Recall, the budget of the group G is selected in [0, 8] through the uniform distribution,
|AUT | is set to 500, the horizon to 10 which is the 2% of the agents in AUT , |S| to 4, γ
to 0.5, |L| to 50 which is the 10% of the agents in AUT and the Tolerance to 40 which
corresponds to 2 epochs assuming that an agent was selected in L, but not in S, in all the
iterations of 2 epochs. In each case we assumed that each agent in AUT under-declares by
the same amount ε, where ε ∈ {i · 0.1|i = 1, ..., 9}. However, we would like to note that
this is also a representative sample of numerous tests we performed.
In this experiment, we computed i) average maximum cumulative revenue per epoch
the group G would have enjoyed if no agent was untruthful, ii) the average cumulative
revenue of the group G per epoch for each of the following cases: no trust model is applied,
the promise-based is applied, and the probabilistic model is applied, iii) the percentage of
the average cumulative revenue with respect to the average maximum cumulative revenue
of the group G per epoch for each of the latter cases.
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Figure 6.11: Experiment 1b - Average revenue per epoch.
Figure 6.12: Experiment 1b - Percentage of the average maximum revenue per epoch.
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ε No Trust Model PromiseBased Model Probabilistic Model
0.1 98.47 % 99.148 % 98.471 %
0.2 96.696 % 98.175 % 96.698 %
0.3 94.713 % 96.967 % 94.716 %
0.4 92.431 % 95.476 % 92.435 %
0.5 89.894 % 93.842 % 89.902 %
0.6 87.005 % 92.489 % 87.012 %
0.7 83.82 % 90.695 % 83.829 %
0.8 80.402 % 88.361 % 80.415 %
0.9 76.572 % 85.476 % 76.583 %
Table 6.6: Chapter 6-Experiment 1b: Percentage of the maximum average revenue per












Table 6.7: Experiment 1b - p-values for ANOVA Single Value Test.
Results - Experiment 1b.
We repeated each experiment 100 times and we present the average results in Fig-
ures 6.11 and 6.12. In particular, Figure 6.11 depicts the average revenue a group accumu-
lates per epoch for the case where no trust model is used, the case where the promise-based
model is used, the case where the probabilistic model, and the average maximum revenue
which represents the maximum average revenue the group can achieve. As we can see, the
promise-based trust model outperforms the probabilistic which essentially converges to the
case where no trust model is applied. Figure 6.12 presents the percentage of the maximum
revenue each model achieves. Similar to Figure 6.11 we can see that the promise-based
model performs better than both the probabilistic model and the case where no trust model
is applied. Also, we can see that the difference between the percentage the promise-based
model achieves and the percentage the probabilistic and the no trust model case achieve
increases as the deviation ε increases.
Statistical Analysis - Experiment 1b.
For this experiment we validated the significance of the difference between the average
revenue for the case where no trust model was used, the case the promise-based was used,
the case of the probabilistic is used, and the average maximum revenue. First we executed
the ANOVA single value test [45] for the average revenue per epoch that was computed
for each of the 200 epochs for each of the 100 runs. The results are presented in Table 6.7.
Since for every ε the p − value is less than 0.05 there is a statistical significance of their
average values.
The next step was also to perform paired sample t-tests [82] for the following cases
• No Trust vs Probabilistic
• Promise-based vs Probabilistic
• Maximum vs Promise-based
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ε No Trust vs Promise-based Promise-based vs Probabilistic Maximum vs Promise-based
0.1 0.002392065 0 0
0.2 1.94E-08 0 0
0.3 8.33E-13 0 0
0.4 1.12E-16 0 0
0.5 4.40E-28 0 0
0.6 1.13E-24 0 0
0.7 5.32E-26 0 0
0.8 2.88934E-38 0 0
0.9 6.64E-32 0 0
Table 6.8: Experiment 1b -p-values for the one tailed paired t-test.
ε No Trust vs Promise-based Promise-based vs Probabilistic Maximum vs Promise-based
0.1 0.004784129 0 0
0.2 3.88E-08 0 0
0.3 1.66685E-12 0 0
0.4 2.23E-16 0 0
0.5 8.79E-28 0 0
0.6 2.2514E-24 0 0
0.7 1.06E-25 0 0
0.8 5.77867E-38 0 0
0.9 1.32834E-31 0 0
Table 6.9: Experiment 1b - p-values for two tailed paired t-test.
The p-values we received are presented in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. From the p-values for
∀ε ∈ {0.2, ..., 0.9} we can conclude that there is significant difference between the methods
we examine. For ε = 0.1 there is also significant difference, besides the comparison of the
case where no trust model is applied and the case the probabilistic model is applied. This
means the probabilistic case converges to the no-trust case.
Similar to Experiment 1a, we present a representative sample of the visualization of
the data. In particular, Figures 6.13 to 6.15 display the revenue per epoch for each epoch
of a run and for each of the 100 runs for ε ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}. We would like to note that
the straight line that we can notice in the above Figures falls on the curve y = x.
As we can see from the Figure 6.13 the probabilistic model converges to the case where
no trust model was used. Given now that from Figure 6.14 it is obvious that the promise-
based model performs better than the case where no trust model was used we can conclude
that the promise-based performs better than both the probabilistic model and the case
where no trust model was used.
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Figure 6.13: Experiment 1b. Data Distribution Diagrams - Probabilistic vs Probabilistic-
based
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Figure 6.14: Experiment 1b. Data Distribution Diagrams - No Trust vs Promise-based.
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Figure 6.15: Experiment 1b. Data Distribution Diagrams - Promise-based vs Maximum.
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Discussion - Experiment 1. Overall, experiment 1 shows that a simple deployment of
a trust model can significantly improve the revenue of the truthful group. In other words,
the experiment demonstrates that it is important to tackle the problem of over-delivering
and that the idea of “the more the better” is not always desirable.
From Experiment 1a our general observation is that the probabilistic model appears
to do marginally better. We believe the reason for this is that the instantiation of the
promise-based trust function we used appears to be very lenient. It was very interesting
to observe that even such a lenient instantiation of our proposed trust model can compete
with the probabilistic model. The more lenient a trust model is the more space it can give
for untruthful behaviour since by using it, it will take longer for deceptive behaviour to get
reflected on the overall trustworthiness.
Experiment 1b considers settings where the untruthful agents do not have information
about the trustworthiness of other agents and demonstrates the positive impact of Trust
Property 4. As we can see, our promise-based model outperforms both the probabilistic
model and the case where no trust model was applied. The reason we believe this happens
is because it penalizes agents that promise less since this decreases the probability the
group G can access the best possible plan. The higher the penalty in its trustworthiness
an agent receives the more likely it is to not get selected.
The main advantage of our promise-based function in contrast to the probabilistic
model is that it can be applied in settings where agents might not be able to provide exact
promises. There are two main reasons why the probabilistic model is not suitable for these
settings: i) for each deviation ε, no matter its value or in which range it occurs, the proba-
bilistic model assumes it has equal significance allowing, in this way, the strategic agents to
manipulate it (i.e., lie significantly and then be truthful in less important situations in order
to boost up their trustworthiness), and ii) the probabilistic model either assumes that the
truthful agents can always make an accurate promise or if a truthful agent deviates even
by a little due to uncontrollable situations it is treated equally with an agent that deviates
by a higher deviation. As we showed in section 6.2.3 our proposed properties take into con-
sideration both the deviation for a promise and a delivered contribution, in addition to the
range it occurs, while it incentivizes the agents to avoid strategic behaviour. Furthermore,
the fact that the probabilistic model treats equally a deviation irrespectively whether this
is the result of over-delivery or under-delivery results in Theorem 2 not being satisfied.
As we already discussed, Theorem 2 is important since in settings where there is high
uncertainty and truthful agents may unintentionally misreport their promises, risk-seeking
agent can hide behind these truthful agents and play strategically. Theorem 1 essentially
provides strong incentives to the risk-seeking agents to limit their strategic behaviour.
Concluding, we showed that i) the deployment of a trust model for settings where agents
over-deliver their anticipated contribution can limit the strategic behaviour of untruthful
agents and increase significantly the revenue of truthful agents, and ii) that our proposed
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model converges to the probabilistic model in a base-line scenario (experiment 1a) while
it performs clearly better in settings where the untruthful agents do not have information
about the behaviour of other untruthful agents (experiment 1b).
Since, to the best of our knowledge, there is no trust model that was designed to
consider simultaneously both under-delivery and over-delivery, the deviation between two
promises and the range it occurs, we cannot have a fair comparison that can demonstrate
empirically the value of our proposed approach with respect to other proposed models. For
this reason in the next experiment we try to examine if it would be possible to extend the
probabilistic model in order to deal with both over-delivery and under-delivery.
6.4.2 Experiment 2
In settings where each agent is requested to perform a task or to provide information
and there are only two possible scenarios (i.e., positive or negative completion) the most
dominant method in the literature to reason about the trustworthiness of the agent is to use
a probabilistic model [25, 76]. In particular, the trustworthiness of the agent is measured
as the probability that a positive interaction will occur given the number of positive and
negative interactions in the past. More specifically, the trustworthiness is measured as




where pos is the number of positive interactions and neg is the number of negative inter-
actions.4
Goal of Experiment 2: In settings where an interaction of an agent is characterized by
two continuous variables, for example, the promise p the agent gave and the delivery d it
end up providing, where p, d ∈ R, in order to use the models in [25, 76] we need to decide
based on the values of p and d, whether the interaction is successful or not. In cases where
p represents a promised contribution and d a delivered contribution, an obvious way to
do the conversion is to classify the interaction based on the percentage of the promised
contribution p the delivered contribution d is. However, the ratio of d over p is not enough.
If we would like, similar to our proposed model, to additionally consider the deviation of
p and d and the range it occurred we need to also take into consideration the value of p.
Overall, the goal of this experiment is to examine if there is any notable relation between
the percentage threshold for classifying a tuple (p, d) as a positive or a negative interaction,
the value of the promised contribution p and the deviation ε = (p − d) such that the
4Note that Laplace smoothing can be done to avoid cases where pos+ neg = 0.
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assignment of a trust rating based on the probability Prob(pos) follows the four trust
properties we defined in section 6.2.3. We would like to do this in order to examine if
there is a way to extend the probabilistic model to also consider settings like the ones our
promise-based model was designed for.
Recall, the probability Prob(pos) considers a set of interactions S in which every in-
teraction is either characterized as positive or negative. For this reason, in our experiment
we compare the Prob(pos) over a set of interactions S with the average trust score Tr per
interaction in S. We will say that Prob(pos) follows our four trust properties if each time
achieves a value equal to Tr. Our goal is to find how to translate each interaction in S
such that Prob(pos) = average(Tr).
Methodology: We will use our i-Functions as a guide to decide to which binary rating
(i.e., positive or negative) a tuple (p, d) should convert. More specifically, our ultimate goal
is to define a function ω(ε, p) such as for ∀ε ∈ [0, 1] and ∀p ∈ [0, 1] it will provide the per-
centage of the acceptable delivered contribution with respect to the promised contribution
that should result in a positive rating. In particular:
• Under-delivery: If the delivered contribution d is at least equal to the ω% of the
promised contribution p (i.e., 100 · d ≥ p · ω) the transaction is characterized as
positive and as negative otherwise.
• Over-delivery: If the delivered contribution d is at most equal to the ω% of the
promised contribution p (i.e., 100 · d ≤ p · ω) the transaction is characterized as
positive and as negative otherwise.
Setting: For our experiment we considered contributions in the interval [0, 1]. We divided
this interval to nine sub-intervals {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3], ..., [0.9, 1.0]}. For each of these inter-
vals we find the values for ω(ε, p) for every deviation ε = p−d ∈ {0.2 · i|i = −24, ..., 24}. In
each iteration we generated same number (=AggregationNum) of samples of tuples (p, d)
such that p ∈ [a, b] and d = p + ε by using the uniform distribution. We then computed
the average values d′ = average(d) and p′ = average(p) of d and p, respectively, and then
the trust Tr(p′, d′). The trust function Tr(p, d) we consider is:






The next goal was to find the value of the ω function that leads to a discretization of the
tuples (p, d) to positive or negative, which results in a probability Prob(pos) = pos
pos+neg
equal to Tr(p′, d′), where pos and neg is the number of positive and negative interactions,
respectively.
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The trust function Tr we used in our experiment is the one presented in equation 6.14
with n = 2. We repeated the latter procedure 1000 times and we calculated the average
ω value for each ε ∈ {0.2 · i|i = −24, ..., 24} and for each interval {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3], ...,
[0.9, 1.0]}. Here, we would like to note that an important parameter is the total number
of ratings (i.e., pos + neg) in order to calculate the probability Prob(pos). We will refer
to this number as the aggregation number and we will denote it by AggregationNum. We
repeated our experiment for AggregationNum = 10, 30 and 100.
In particular, the algorithm works as follows:
Experiment 2
for all ε in {−0.48,−0.46, ..., 0.48} do
for all [a, b] ∈ {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3], ..., [0.9, 0.1]} do
for all k from 1 to 1000 do
for all j from 1 to AggregationNum do
Assign p[j] a random value in [a, b]
d[j]← p[j] + ε
end for
Find p′ = avg(p) and d′ = avg(d)
TRUST = normalized(Tr(p′, d′))
Find the value of the function ω such that if we convert the tuples (p[], d[]) to
binary events the probability Prob a positive event to occur has the minimum
deviation from TRUST .
end for
Return average values for ω, d′/p′, Tr, and Prob
end for
end for
In order to convert a tuple (p,d) to a binary rating we used the following algorithm:
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Convert tuple (p,d) to a binary rating
Input: Promised contribution p, Delivered contribution d, Percentage ω
Output: Type of binary rating
if d < p then












Essentially, for the case of under-delivery a tuple (p, d) results in a positive rating if
100 · d
p
is greater or equal to the percentage ω and to a negative rating otherwise. In the
case of over-delivery a tuple results in a positive rating if 100 · d
p
is less or equal to the
percentage ω.
Assumptions: The promised contributions that are aggregated lie in the same interval
and they differ from the delivered contributions by ε.
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Figure 6.16: The diagrams of ω and d
p
for aggregation over 10 ratings for the intervals
{[0.1, 0.2], ..., [0.9, 1]}.
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Results & Conclusions: The results from our experiment are depicted in Figures 6.16
to 6.21.
In particular, in Figures 6.16 and 6.17 we present the value of ω and d
p
for every
ε ∈ [−0.48, 0.48] and for each interval in {[0.1, 0.2], ..., [0.9, 1.0]}, where d is the average
delivered contribution and p is the average promised contribution over the number of
ratings we aggregate. Our first observation from Figures 6.16 and 6.17 is that the ω
function appears to follow the same curve with the percentage of the average delivered
contribution divided by the average promised contribution (i.e., d
p
). If the curves of ω and
d
p
overlapped that would meant that “given a set S of tuples (p, d) in order to convert each







we just have to consider whether the value of d
p
for each rating is greater or less than
average(d)
average(p)
over the set S.”
However, if we compute the difference ω − d
p
for each interval and for each value of
ε we can observe that ω and d
p
deviate. This is presented in Figures 6.18 and 6.19. An
interesting observation is that the difference d
p
− ω (Figure 6.18) appears to follow the
same type of curves as the trust function (Figure 6.1). As we can see in Figure 6.1 the
Tr function for [0, p) is convex and for [p, d] is concave. Furthermore, the rate Tr first
increases in [0, p] is higher than the rate Tr decreases in [p, 1]. Similar, is the observation
about the ω. For example, as we can see in Figure 6.19 for ε in [−0.48, 0] the ω curve for
any of the intervals is convex while for ε in [0, 0.48] is ω curve concave. We believe this
behaviour of the curve ensures that over-delivering by a deviation ε′ > 0 should result in
a higher trust value (and thus more positive ratings) than under-delivering by the same
deviation (i.e., −ε′).
At this point we would like to note that the aggregation number, AggregationNum,
influences the precision of the ω curve. For example, for AggregationNum = 10 we can
only get a probability value in the {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1} the more we increase it the better we
could approximate the value Tr. This is depicted clearly in Figures 6.22 and 6.23. Note,




, and Tr & Prob diagrams for AggregationNum equal to 100 are also
depicted in the Appendix.
Use of the results: Given the data points of the ω(ε, p) function that our experiment
produced for each interval and for each ε ∈ [−0.48, 0.48] we might be able to find a
good approximation of the ω(ε, p) function for every ε ∈ [−0.48, 0.48]. For example, for
ε = 0.45 for the interval [0.6, 0.7] we know that ω(−0.24, p) is 62.95 while ω(−0.26, p) is
60.07. We can consider that ω(−0.265, p) lies on the straight line that connects the points
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Figure 6.17: The diagrams of ω and d
p
for aggregation over 30 ratings for the intervals
{[0.1, 0.2], ..., [0.9, 1]}.
(−0.24, 62.95) and (−0.26, 60.07) and thus calculate its value. Although the curves of ω in
Figures 6.18(a)and 6.19(a) are for p = {0.15, 0.25, ..., 0.95} given the pattern they follow,
we can approximate the curve for any p ∈ [0, 1].5 Furthermore, an observation that might
allow us to define more accurately the function ω is that the local minimum of ω − d
p
for
ε < 0 slightly increases as the interval increase (i.e., going from [0.4, 0.5] to [0.5, 0.6]).
In our current experiment we considered that the aggregated tuples (p, d) are such
that every p lies in the same interval. However, more experiments are needed in order
to determine how to aggregate tuples (p, d) such that the promised contributions p may
belong in different intervals.
5By considering the average of AggregationNum number of p given by the uniform distribution for
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Figure 6.18: The diagrams of ω − d
p
for aggregation number equal to 10 for each interval
in {[0.3, 0.4], ..., [0.9, 1]}.
each interval [α, β] the average value of p converges to α+ β+α2 .
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Figure 6.19: The diagrams of ω − d
p
for aggregation number equal to 30 for each interval
in {[0.3, 0.4], ..., [0.9, 1]}.
Figure 6.20: The diagrams of ω − d
p
for aggregation number equal to 10 for each interval
in {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3]}.
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Figure 6.21: The diagrams of ω − d
p
for aggregation number equal to 30 for each interval
in {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3]}.
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Figure 6.22: The average probability and average trust values for aggregation number equal
to 10.
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In this chapter, we proposed and formalized the minimum desirable properties a promise-
based trust model should exhibit for settings in which important decisions are made based
on the promised contributions of the participants. We showed that these properties en-
sure that an agent maximizes its trust-score by both delivering what it promised and by
promising what it can deliver and we provided functions which embody these principles.
Furthermore, we discussed how our model can be adapted to settings where, due to chang-
ing circumstances, an agent may be unsure when they make a promise that they will be
able to deliver as desired. Our proposed model discourages agents from both over-stating
and under-stating their potential contributions to the community. This is due to the fact
that we are interested in designing a model that can be also applied in settings where the
community might have to choose to follow a plan based on its current available resources,
and thus it is crucial both to know the exact services it has, and to provide strong incen-
tives to truthfully reveal the resources they can offer [4]. When the agents under-deliver on
their promise, the community might engage in a plan of lower significance, since based on
the reported resources the community has a false indication of its current resources. If the
agents over-deliver on their promise, then this might result in agents deviating from the
initial plan they committed to follow. Finally, our empirical evaluation showed that even
a simple deployment of a trust model improves significantly the utility of truthful agents
in settings where agents tend to under-declare their anticipated contributions. In settings
where the untruthful agents have accurate information about other untruthful agents de-
pending on the instantiation of the promise-based trust function we use, the probabilistic
can marginally outperform our promised-based trust function while in settings where no





In this thesis we focused on multiagent communities in which a significant portion of
the available services is determined by the contributions of their participants. Examples of
these communities include peer to peer systems, electronic markets, wikis, question/answer
sites, and recommendation systems. Our goal is to:
• assist communities to be more effective in providing a beneficial environment that
will be attractive to newcomers.
We achieve our goal by promoting the exchange of evaluation information between commu-
nities and by providing an explicit framework that enables the exchange to happen in a way
that promotes honest reporting. The success of information exchange strongly depends on
the quality of the exchanged data. Thus, we also proposed a model for communities to
evaluate the trustworthiness of their agents. More specifically, we:
• provided a two phase mechanism that facilitates the truthful exchange of information
between communities regarding their agents
1. First phase: Advisor selection.1
2. Second phase: Advisor payment distribution.
• presented an effective metric to depict the trustworthiness of an agent based on the
promises it honors.
In the first phase we determined the set of advisors to ask and in the second phase we
determined their compensation. More specifically, in the first phase our goal is to provide
1Recall, an advisor is a community that provides information about its agents.
131
Figure 7.1: Reasoning Procedure
additional incentives for an advisor community to truthfully report the evaluation of all
of its agents and in the second phase our goal is to compensate the advisors through a
payment that considers the usefulness of the information they provided.
At a first glance the problem of exchanging evaluation ratings appears to be the same
with the one of exchanging ratings between agents for settings where the agents are self-
interested and have strong incentives to play strategically and occasionally lie. Since com-
pletely preventing strategic behaviour (i.e., pretend to be trustworthy in order to build
reputation and then suddenly deceive other participants) is a challenging problem the ex-
tent it can be limited is important. This is the point where information exchange between
communities slightly differs from information exchange between agents. In the case of
communities, in order for a community to participate in the exchange it has to have guar-
antees that the other communities have strong incentives to be truthful in every step of
the exchange procedure. In our setting, these steps include the selection procedure of the
advisor, the distribution of the payments and the accurate evaluation of the agents.
In this thesis the biggest challenge with respect to deceptive behaviour ([9, 14, 38]) was
to prevent communities from building good reputation by truthfully exchanging informa-
tion about their mediocre agents and lying about their very best or their worst agents. For
example, consider an e-market community CA that until now is trustworthy and is about
to provide information for one of its very best sellers to another e-market community CB.
The community CA might choose to lie since it might be afraid that if it tells how won-
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derful the seller is, the community CB will accept it. Having community CB accept the
agent might not be always desirable to CA since the seller might have to share its limited
merchandize between CA and CB. Moreover, things get more complicated since besides
having communities play strategically and occasionally lie about certain types of agents,
there might be agents that deceive communities and although communities are truthful
about their agents, the agents change their behaviour. Determining whether the commu-
nity lied or the agent deceived the community is a challenging problem. Communities can
try to use the agents’ strategic behaviour to their advantage. In particular, they can “hide”
behind agents and pretend that it was not them who lied but the agent who was deceitful
to them.
An implicit assumption that characterizes exchange mechanisms is that the available
products are valuable to the recipient parties. In our setting the exchange product is the
evaluation of the behaviour of agents, and thus it is crucial the evaluation mechanism, that
each community implements, produces information that is valuable to the communities that
purchase it. The evaluation of an agent can be measured either by its reputation or its
trustworthiness. The reputation of an agent is a metric that depends mainly on the opinions
of others and can be influenced significantly by the current situation of a community [29].
However, since trust is mainly measured based on direct experience [27, 57, 76] it can be
more objective than reputation, and consequently more valuable. Due to this we suggest
the exchanged information should be the trustworthiness of the agents and we present a
trust model that can produce this type of data.
7.1 Advisor Selection and Payment Distribution
Advisor Selection
Restricting the set of advisors in a context where only the advisors consulted receive
a compensation (i.e., payment) can be the basis of an incentive mechanism in which the
advisors are motivated to behave in a desirable way. However, the way the set is determined
is critical for the success of the mechanism. A first approach is to select n advisors that
have the highest reputation or trustworthiness in providing advice. In our approach, we
considered a mechanism that decides which advisors to consult when their evaluation lies
in a range that does not clearly indicate which advisor is a better choice and thus the
ordering of the advisors with respect to their evaluation rating does not provide sufficient
information. For example, consider the existence of three advisors a, b and c with ratings
0.854, 0.850, and 0.848, respectively. Although the advisor a appears to be the best choice
in reality c might be the best to ask. For example, a might have had a very good reputation
or high trustworthiness but she might be inactive for quite a while, while c is now building
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his reputation and his rating is the result of recent interactions. In our work, we suggest a
method that exploits the consistency among past advice and we show that if this selection
takes place carefully, then strong incentives for advisors to be truthful are provided.
There is a number of different strategic behaviours the advisors can follow which es-
sentially result from deploying inaccurate evaluation models [9, 14, 38]. However even if
an accurate evaluation model is deployed, an advisor selection mechanism can be prone to
strategic behaviour as exemplified by the following case. A community might observe that
other communities provide truthful information with probability 0.8 due to model inaccu-
racy. If its agents are not malicious the community might translate the above probability
into assuming it can afford to lie a bit less than 20% of the time and still be considered
trustworthy. For example, consider five communities CA, CB, CC , CD and CE. Assume
that CE has noticed from its own experience that CA, CB, CC and CD provide truthful
information with probability 0.7, 0.75, 0.8 and 0.75, respectively. If CE knows that the
selection of the communities is based exclusively on the latter probabilities it can infer
that it does not have to be always truthful. In particular, it can afford to lie at least 19%
of the time. Thus, a new approach that will prevent a community from having sufficient
information to efficiently decide when to lie or not is needed. Our key idea towards the
solution of the problem is the exploitation of consistency among advice.
Our observation is that by exploiting the relation an information provider has with
other information providers, which are known to be truthful, we can significantly limit
strategic behaviour. In our approach, this is achieved through our selection algorithm,
which considers the consistency of a community with other truthful communities. So,
in simple words, a community must be consistent with as many truthful communities as
possible which also tend to be consistent with each other. Thus, a community is better off
by always being truthful.
Approaches like those proposed by Josang and Ismail [25], Teacy et al. [76] or Tran and
Cohen [77] assume that the exchange of ratings is free and mainly focus on aggregating the
exchanged rating and discarding or discounting the ratings that appear to be inaccurate.
These models focus on the reasoning and the decision part of the mechanism depicted
in Fig. 7.1 and essentially simply transfer the problem to the decision when to discard
or discount the ratings. Since determining whether some ratings should be discarded (or
discounted) is a very difficult problem we focused on incentivising the communities to
truthfully report these ratings. In other words, our aim is to eliminate the “Bad Scenario”
in Fig. 7.1 so the reasoning model has accurate data to process and does not significantly
count on deciding which data to discount or discard. Other researchers have looked at the
problems of providing incentives to models [31, 90]. However, their models appear to be
prone to strategic behaviours like the ones demonstrated in [9, 14].
Although we are not the first to incorporate a graph-based approach in the design
of incentive mechanisms, to the best of our knowledge our approach of exploiting the
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consistency of the nodes in a graph in order to promote honesty is novel. Our goal is to
identify the strongest node in such a way that provides strong incentives to the communities
(that are represented by the nodes) to truthfully report their information. With our
approach it is harder for a community to play strategically (i.e., determine successfully
when to lie and when not). It is important to note, however, that our focus is not only
to determine the most truthful communities to ask based on past experience but also to
provide them with strong incentives to continue being truthful in the future.
Hendrix et al. [22] propose an approach that exploits previous advice based on Bayesian
networks. The authors reason whether an information provider is either truthful or untruth-
ful by exploiting the correlation between current advice with previous advice. Although
the proposed model, which is based on the theory of Bayesian network, appears to be an
interesting approach that works very well for the ART testbed, its scalability is our main
concern. In settings where millions of agents exist, expanding the network every time a
new interaction between any of these agents occurs can result in a Bayesian network of
a very large size. In contrast, Peng et al. [51] demonstrate that carefully defining the
graph that depicts the interactions among autonomous parties can overcome significant
complexity problems without severely compromising the quality of the information that
is enclosed in the graph. In our approach we are interested in providing a model that
exploits the consistency among the advice in such a way that provides strong incentives
for the participant communities to be truthful while at the same time it can scale to the
number of agents and to the number of the interactions between the communities. Our
model encapsulates in a more sophisticated way characteristics similar to the one Hendrix
et al. use (i.e., correlation among advice) and to the one that Peng et al. [51] propose
(i.e., a more simplistic representation of the information that describes interactions that
can allow us to reduce the computational cost without compromising the quality of the
extracted information).
Last, we would like to note that as in many systems [22, 51, 76], which involves decisions
based on information which relys on prior actions, design decisions have to be made in
order to overcome the bootstrapping problem. For our selection mechanism, a simple way
to solve this problem would be for a community to initially set the probability p to a high
value and then slowly decrease p as the community gathers more information. Recall, the
probability p represents the likelihood of collaborating with another community without
using our selection mechanism.
Payment Distribution
Several payment or credit based approaches for motivating agents to behave well when
they provide goods have been proposed. Li et al. [41] address the problem of message
relaying in unstructured peer to peer networks. Each time a node relays a message and it
proves to be in the path between the sender of the message and the recipient, it receives a
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payment (reward). Although the aim of the authors is to provide incentives for the peers
to relay the messages, they do not tackle the problem of strategic relaying (i.e., dropping
certain messages from certain sources). Consequently, the proposed approach is prone
to a number of malicious behaviours that can range from isolating a node by selectively
dropping the messages that it should either relay or answer to relay the message to “friendly
nodes” instead to nodes that might create the shortest path to the final recipient.
Cheng and Vassileva [11] address the problem of overloading a peer-based article sharing
system with low quality contributions and also consider a micropayment based approach.
In their setting, each time a user uploads a link, it is awarded a number of c-points based
on its reputability for giving high quality postings. The evaluation of the links is strongly
related both to their quality and also to the number of users they have been seen by. In
order to increase the visibility of a link, the users can use their c-points to sponsor it and
thus to improve its ranking in the search engine. However, the authors do not address
the problem of users strategically reporting their evaluations for other users’ links in order
to increase the ranking of their own results, and assume that all the users are truthful in
providing their evaluations.
Golle et al. [20] propose an incentive-based model for peer to peer networks. The main
idea is based on the principle to charge the agents for every download and reward them
for every upload. An approach similar to this latter approach was proposed by Ma et
al. [42, 43]. In this case their incentive based mechanism determines the proper transfer
bandwidth allocation for a peer that requests a file, based on its connection type, its utility
function and its contribution. Unlike the mechanism proposed by Golle et al. [20], where
the utility is directly decreased each time the agent consumes the resources of the P2P
network, in the mechanism proposed by Ma et al. [42, 43] the utility is only influenced
indirectly by the decrement of the download bandwidth the next time the agent requests
a file. Yu et al. [84] suggest a payment-based approach for addressing the problem of
finding a node that can answer a query. In this approach each node a accumulates credits
(payments) each time either answers a query or provides a referral to a node that will
either answer the query or it will provide a referral. The latter credits are used when a
node b is interested in querying other nodes.
One common characteristic of the latter three approaches is that they consider as input
objectively countable data that occur from direct experience (e.g. Golle et al. [20] consider
the size of the files downloaded, the disk space used etc, Ma et al. [42, 43] consider the
amount of upload time, Yu et al. [84] consider the number of nodes that answered the query
or provided a referral). As we discussed in Chapter 2, none of these approaches considers
the quality of the exchanged data. Thus, their information comes from simply observing
objectively countable information. In our setting the information that is being evaluated
is subjective (since different communities might assign a different rating for an agent with
a common behaviour based on the model they deploy), while it might also be the result of
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strategic reporting. The exchange of information takes place between self-interested com-
munities that have strong incentives to lie, thus a more sophisticated payment approach is
needed. For this reason, we proposed a payment function that considers the interpretation
of a rating and distributes the payments based both on the accuracy of the rating and
subjective differences between different evaluation models. We argue that our proposed
approach also achieves a level of fairness since it distinguishes to a certain extent, potential
efforts from malicious communities to manipulate the payment distribution.
Regan et al. [59] present a Bayesian-based approach to learn the evaluation function of
an agent providing a rating, in order to make use of the information received. In our work
we focused on determining the rewards that each community should receive with respect to
the quality of the information it provided rather than learning the evaluation model each
community deploys. A key contribution of our work, therefore, is that it promotes truthful
reports, distributes the payments in a fair manner and provides incentive to communities
to improve their evaluation model.
The payment function we proposed is motivated by the work on scoring rules [67].
Scoring rules are a framework for eliciting probabilistic information from agents. We
differ from the formal definition of scoring rules in that we determine a value based on
the community’s declarations, whether the information was judged to be good or not (a
binary event) and how it relates to the judging agent’s valuation (a continuous variable).
In other words, we consider both a continuous rating a community provided but also the
binary interpretation of that rating inside the community. Scoring rules typically are either
concerned with discrete events [92] or continuous settings [67], but not both. In our case,
the information that is being scored represents an evaluation and not a probability of an
event to happen. Probabilities convey a common knowledge information. For instance, a
probability 0.5 of a binary event that a red or blue card will appear is commonly translated
as: half the time a blue card will appear and half the time a red will appear. In contrast
two communities that observed the same behaviour of an agent might assign two different
ratings based on how strict or lenient the evaluation model they deploy is.
Strictly Properness is main property of scoring rules that we were interested in main-
taining. The reason is that a mechanism which is based on a strictly proper scoring rule
is incentive compatible. Our i-Function is strictly proper since it is uniquely maximized
when a community reports a rating equal to the one the recipient community experiences.
Thus, our payment mechanism is incentive compatible. Since the truthfulness of a rating
depends both on the evaluation model a community follows and its strategy, we treat a de-
viation differently with respect to which decision it influences in the recipient community.
For instance, consider:
• a community CA that provided a rating rA = 0.7 with a type equal to Good, and
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• a community CB that provided a rating equal to rB = 0.5 with a type equal also to
Good.
Assume that the recipient community C experiences a rating equal to 0.6 and the agent’s
type is Good. It is less likely that the community CA intentionally deviated from the actual
rating 0.6 than the community CB. This is because a rating equal to 0.5 might be more
likely to mislead the community C from accepting a good agent than a rating equal to 0.7.
The community CB might tried to misinform the community C because the agent might
have limited resources, and thus if it joins the community C the communities CB and C
may have to share the resources of the agent.
Moreover, given that the rating the recipient community experiences (1st dimension)
and the rating an advisor community can provide (2nd dimension) can take any value
in the interval [α, β], and that the type of an agent can be either Poor or Good (3rd
dimension), it was crucial to clearly articulate the properties the i-Function, I : R × R ×
{good, poor} 7→ R, should follow in these three dimensions. Thus, in our work we carefully
studied and suggested the properties the i-Function I(x, r̂, θ) should follow in all of these
three dimensions and we demonstrate that there is indeed a family of functions that satisfy
these properties.
In the last few years scoring rules have started to become popular in the multiagent
system literature. Zohar and Rosenschein [92] tackle the problem of information elicitation
through the use of scoring rules. The first main difference of our approaches is that Zohar
and Rosenschein propose a mechanism that relies on the assumption that the sellers do
not intentionally try to sabotage the buyer. In our setting, this assumption does not hold
since the selling agents (i.e., advisors) have strong incentives to lie. This is especially true
for cases where the information that was requested refers to either a very reputable and
trustworthy agent or to an agent with poor contributions. In the first case, as we have
discussed earlier, communities can badmouth a good agent in order to prevent another
competitor community from acquiring their good agent and in the latter case they can
oversell an agent in order to get rid of it. Zohar and Rosenschein’s proposed approach
is also built on proper scoring rules. However, the authors do not aim to provide a new
category of scoring rules but they rather prove that a robust incentive mechanism can be
built by using scoring rules.
Furthermore, we differ from the above approach in the type of data that is being
exchanged. Zohar and Rosenschein consider the exchange of probabilistic information.
Thus, they assume a common interpretation of the exchanged information. As we discussed
earlier, in our case we consider the exchange of information that represents the evaluation
of an agent by a community. Given that each community might have a different evaluation
model, communities may interpret the same rating differently. Consequently, the way
a rating is interpreted by the provider community plays a crucial role in determining the
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payment the community should receive. Similar is the comparison with the work presented
by Papakonstantinou et al. [50], since they also consider the exchange of probabilistic
information whose interpretation appears to be common knowledge. Regarding the scoring
rule part, Papakonstantinou et al. [50] focus on exploiting existing families of scoring rules
rather than extending them. However, we do agree with the idea of a two phase incentive
mechanism.
Jurca and Faltings [33] offer a side payment incentive compatible mechanism and prove
that rational software agents under this mechanism will truthfully share their reputation
information. As we discussed in the Chapter 2, Jurca and Faltings provide a payment
mechanism that exploits an approach built on proper scoring rules. Their approach differs
from ours since they consider that the probability distribution of the expected quality of
the product Pr(θ) (where θ is the type that represents the quality of a product) is known
while the real quality of the product a buyer experiences is unknown. Furthermore, they
assume also that the probability distribution of the real quality given the answer of the
buyer (i.e., Pr(1|θ) and Pr(0|θ) for all possible θ) is known. In our case, the expected
quality of the agent is unknown while the real quality of the agent is considered known
at the time the payment decision and distribution takes place. Recall, when a recipient
community C∗ experiences an agent and posts its rating about the agent on E’s selling
board, any community that buys this information will receive the latter information. If the
community C∗ tried to manipulate the payment distribution by reporting on E’s selling
board a rating different from the one it should, each time another community C ′ buys
it, it will receive an inaccurate rating, and thus both the payment C ′ will receive and
the probability that C ′ will ask it again in the future decrease. Furthermore, Jurca and
Faltings consider the quality of a product but they do not consider towards which direction
the latter quality influenced the buyer (i.e., to buy a product or not to buy). Moreover,
in our approach we require both the type and the rating in order to cope with subjective
differences which are the result of different evaluation models.
Miller et al. [46] address the problem of feedback elicitation and they also provide an
incentive mechanism based on scoring rules. In their settings the decision of the score each
peer will receive is defined based on the probability a rating reported is the actual rating
other raters observed. In our case the rating, based on which the prediction is scored, is
known.
Last, incentive compatibility for transactions that include purchase of items could be
achieved through auction or auction-based mechanisms. However, the limitation that make
auctions not applicable in our setting is the assumption that the auctioneer really wants to
sell an item. In our case, if we consider a community that sells information about its agents
as the auctioneer, this community might try to overprice its very good agents hoping that
no other community will bid so high.
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7.2 Trust and Reputation Modeling
Trust and reputation modeling along with the exploitation of trust and reputation informa-
tion have been the subject of a wide area of applications in multiagent systems. Examples
of these applications include:
• the evaluation of users in peer to peer networks [87],
• the evaluation of online feedback reporting [74],
• the monitoring of nodes in sensor networks [47] or in mobile ad hoc networks [8],
• task allocation [72],
• the decision of groups of agents that can collaborate to achieve common goals [66, 71],
• the evaluation of sellers and buyers in e-market places [77].
A limitation with reputation ratings is that they are highly related to the particular needs
of a community. For example, a trustworthy agent might have low reputation (inside
a community) because although it is willing to contribute there is no current interest
in the services it offers. On the other hand a malicious agent can temporarily create a
good reputation and once it has been accepted in another community become deceptive.
A reliable reputation system should be able to ensure minimal impact when the second
problem occurs. However, it is very difficult to cope with the case of a low reputation simply
due to current lack of demand or due to incompatibility of services. For this reason, we
argue that trust is a more comprehensive and objective metric for evaluating an agent, and
consequently is a better evaluation metric for being exchanged between communities.
As Binmore and Dasgupta stated [6], we have significantly limited knowledge on how
people acquire trust. Thus, we argue that trying to provide a general model of trust is
very ambitious. For this reason, our trust model focuses on modeling trust in terms of
promises. This follows the observation that in a number of cases people tend to reason
about other people based on the extent they have honored a promise [13, 55]. In addition,
we target communities where precise knowledge of the capabilities of an agent is crucial.
Thus, we need to provide strong incentives to agents to truthfully report their promises
and discourage them both from getting tempted to over-state or under-state them.
We are interested in designing a model that can be also applied in settings where the
community might have to choose to follow a plan based on its current available resources,
and thus is crucial both to know the exact services it has, and to provide strong incentives
to agents to truthfully reveal the resources they can offer [4]. Thus, the trustworthiness
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of an agent should be only maximized when the agent delivers a contribution equal to its
promise.
Furthermore, we argue that this is an important element since in any case where the
available resources are used as an input in computationally intensive tasks, it is crucial
to know a value as precisely as possible from the beginning. For instance, if the available
resources are used in order for a community to decide to which task (or coalition) each agent
will be better off assigned, the community has to know the exact amount of each of the
services the agent can provide.2 Since, task allocation [73] (or determining the structure of
the coalitions among agents) is NP-Complete [65], re-computing the task allocation (or a
coalition structure) each time an agent changes its behaviour might not be always feasible.
Furthermore, another dimension is that frequent changes may lead to the creation of a
feeling of instability among the rest of the users and thus discourage them from extending
their participation.
In order to evaluate a promise we consider two factors. The first is how stable some
agent is in keeping its promise (i.e., reliability) and the second is how good its contribution
is (i.e., quality of delivered contribution). Our goal is to capture the behaviour of agents
that can be either truthful or conservative or periodically overly optimistic or generally
unstable. For example, consider a case where there are two agents a and b that are
interested to purchase access to a webpage from a community. Assume that the community
can only provide one access. The agent a promises to contribute $5 dollars and agent b
promises $8. Assume now that:
• agent a has high reliability since it always delivers what it promises but in general
its contributions are low, and
• agent b has low reliability, since it occasionally delivers less than it promised, however
its contributions are in general high.
If the community grants access to the agent a, it will acquire $5 but if it grants access to
the agent b, and b does deliver its promise, then it will receive $8. The community knows
that a will honor its promise for sure but it also knows that the agent b might end up
delivering even less than a. In order for the community to reason about which of these
agents is a better choice, it has to consider a number of factors (e.g. if it is in an immediate
need of the extra $3 that a possible truthful report from b would result in). Thus, in some
cases it might be a better choice to select agent a than to take the risk and select agent b
and vice versa.
Summarizing, the key ideas around which we developed our model are:
2By the term “coalition” we refer to a group of agents that act in an coordinated manner in order to
achieve a common goal.
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1. measure the degree an agent honored its promises,
2. articulate the principles that a promise-based trust function should follow,
3. define the components a promised based trust model should include,
4. consider communities in which the exact knowledge of the resources their members
contribute is crucial.
As we explained earlier in this chapter, we chose to develop a trust model that results in
continuous instead of discete ratings, since we argue that this provides a more accurate and
flexible tool to depict the trustworthiness of an agent. However, our model also considers
continuous events as input (i.e., the agents have to declare their exact promise within a
predefined range [α, β]). This might raise the following question: “What if the agents
are not requested to provide the exact promise, but an interval within the [α, β] range in
which their promise will lie?” We argue that our proposed model can easily deal with this
situation. This can be done by considering that an interaction is successful when an agent
fullfills its promise (i.e., it delivers within the interval it promised). In this case, we can
compute its score by using our trust function, by considering that the agent delivered the
highest promise in the interval it declared.
Talwar et al. [74] also state the need for understanding a user’s behaviour when eval-
uating the ratings or the information the user provides. However, they mainly focus on
“exploring the factors that drive a user to submit a particular rating”. Falcone and Castel-
franchi [16] focus on understanding how trust functions for human users, as a motivation
for designing a trust model. Our research differs, however, as our focus is in articulating
the properties of contribution-based trust rather than the relationships between the parties
that are trying to trust each other. Associating trust with reliability has been examined
by other researchers [16, 44, 3], while considering the difference between what is expected
(e.g. promised) and what is experienced (e.g. delivered) has been used in a number of
other models [76, 77, 87]. Our model explicitly attempts to incorporate both the concepts
of trust and of reliability.
Josang and Ismail [25] proposed the Beta Reputation System (also known as BRS) that
exploits the beta function. The authors consider the number of cases an agent proved to be
trustworthy and the number of cases it proved to be untrustworthy. Thus, they are focused
on binary ratings. Similarly, Sen and Sajja [72] propose a trust model that evaluates the
trustworthiness of agents that are requested to execute tasks on behalf of other agents
by considering the number of times their performance was high and the number of times
their performance was low. In contrast, we are interested in not only measuring whether
an agent honored its promise but to what extent it did, and thus we consider continuous
ratings. Teacy et al. [76] provide a model that essentially extends the Beta Reputation
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System in coping with unfair ratings and thus it also considers binary ratings. Moreover,
although the authors propose an approach that can protect their model from becoming
unstable in terms of getting influenced by ratings that highly deviate by each other, it is
still not clear to what extent it can prevent strategic behaviour.
Yu et al. [87] measured trust based on whether the reputation of an agent that encapsu-
lates both direct experience and peer experience (when direct experience is not sufficient)
exceeds a threshold. They consider continuous ratings but in their case they assume that
each rating is assigned by the user. In contrast, in our work we provide a model that cal-
culates this rating by comparing the promise an agent made with the action it delivered.
Furthermore, Yu et al. provide a method for interpreting a set of trust ratings an agent
was assigned to a general trust value while in our case we provide a method for determining
the value of a trust rating. Regan et al. [58] focus on providing a model that evaluates
the way advisors tend to provide advice. The authors are interested in developing a model
that interprets the ratings different advisors provide with respect to the evaluation model
they are using. In our case, we focus on direct experience in evaluating the trustworthiness
of an agent rather than considering advice. Tran and Cohen [77] provide a reinforcement
learning based technique for updating the reputation of a seller. Our first observation is
that the authors essentially compute the trustworthiness a buyer assigns to a seller rather
than its reputation since they only consider the direct interaction between the buyer and
the seller. Furthermore, the proposed approach does not provide any incentives to prevent
the sellers from following strategic behaviour and the principles of the proposed model are
not stated. Finally, Kamvar et al. [34] suggested a solution for the problem of the pollution
of a P2P network with inauthentic files, which results in reducing the performance and re-
liability of the network. However, the proposed approach does not take into consideration
neither the information related to the size of the inauthentic files a peer downloads was not
taken into consideration (e.g. downloading a big unauthentic file can be more annoying
than downloading a small one, since in the first case the agent has to spend more resources)
nor the case of an honest problem that resulted in providing an unauthentic file.
Clearly defining the principles that a trust model follows is crucial. This is because
experimental evaluations are not always sufficient to clearly demonstrate the limitations of
a trust model or the extent it can deal with strategic behaviour. Designing a generic trust
model which is not prone to any strategic behaviour is challenging [38]. This is due to the
fact that to this date, there is no model that can describe accurately how the humans reason
about trustworthiness in every situation [52]. Thus, given that trust modeling in multiagent
systems (where the agents represent the users) is essentially an effort to simulate humans’
trust reasoning, is not clear how a general trust model for multiagent systems could be
developed [16]. However, there are some patterns that can be identified in human trust
decisions and that appear to be frequently in use. This has led to a perspective of trust
that defines as trustworthiness the degree someone honors its promises or its commitments
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[13]. However, when designing a promised-based trust model as well as any trust model for
settings, where agents represent users, it is important to clearly articulate the principles
the trust model follows since these principles provide the users with an important tool for
interpreting the ratings they produce. For instance, knowing how a trust rating changes
with respect to slight deviations of the behaviour an agent can provide useful information
in interpreting a trust rating that was assigned to an agent.
Many trust models are based on probabilistic methods [22, 25, 31, 76, 87]. In our case,
we agree with Schillo et al. [69] that “trust is not an event in the sense of probability theory
but rather a degree of how high some peer’s honesty is estimated”. Although probabilistic
trust models can provide an important monitoring tool in applications where the results are
exploited by experts we agree with Josang [30, 29] that “a reputation system works when
people can relate to it” and we claim that this also holds for trust systems. Furthermore,
Miller and Resnick [46] clearly state that a limitation of their proposed scoring model,
which could be also used for reputation modeling, is “Few raters will be willing or able
to verify the mathematical properties of the scoring system proven in this paper, so it will
be necessary to rely on outside attestations to ensure public confidence”. Essentially they
acknowledge the need for models that can be easily understood by the users. This is
the main reason why e-market places are currently reluctant to implement complicated
probabilistic models and simply report the number of positive and negative ratings a seller
or a buyer receives. An average user lacks of deep knowledge in probability theory and
thus, might not be able to understand a probabilistic model. Thus, an average user might
not be able to relate to a probabilistic model since in order to relate to a model, he/she
has first to understand it. On the other hand a more sophisticated model than simple
summations (e.g. e-bay) is needed since these models are very susceptive to deception.
For these reasons we argue that our non-probabilistic model, which is based on a set of




Conclusions & Future Work
In this thesis we focused on peer-based communities. These are communities in which the
services offered are provided by their participants. Our goals were:
1. to design a mechanism that can lead to the improvement of the services agents enjoy
in these communities and,
2. to design a model to depict the trustworthiness of the agents within these communi-
ties.
In order to improve the services an agent enjoys in peer-based communities we need
to improve the services other agents offer. Towards this goal we proposed a novel solution
which allows communities to share the experience of their members with other communities.
The experience of a community with an agent is captured in the evaluation rating of
the agent within the community which can either represent the trustworthiness or the
reputation of the agent. We argue that exchanging an agent’s behaviour is the right way
to improve the services the agent offers since it:
1. exploits the information that each community accumulates to allow other communi-
ties to decide whether to accept the agent while it also puts pressure on the agent to
behave well since it is aware that any misbehaviour will be spread to the communities
it might wish to join in the future.
2. can prevent the agent from overstretching itself among many communities, since this
may lead the agent to provide very limited services to each of these communities
due to its limited resources, and thus its trustworthiness and reputation might be
compromised.
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Allowing the communities to exchange information about the behaviour of their agents
is a very challenging problem. The communities are self-interested and thus have strong
incentives to play strategically. In order to prevent communities from manipulating the
latter exchange, we considered a model in which each community requests information
only from a subset of other communities and compensates them based on the quality of
the information they provided. The compensation takes place through the use of a payment
function which mainly considers the accuracy of the provided information but also treats
inaccuracies differently when they appear to be the result of an inaccurate evaluation model
and not the result of a strategic play.
The problems we addressed for facilitating the exchange of information between com-
munities are:
1. Advisor Selection Problem: Select the set of advisor communities to consult.
2. Payment Decision Problem: Determine the payment a community should receive
with respect to the quality of the information it provided.
The aim is to strengthen each community i) by encouraging the agents to be good con-
tributors, since they can exploit good behaviour by carrying their reputation when joining
new communities, and ii) by improving the quality of the information each community
receives for deciding more carefully and accurately whether to accept an agent.
More specifically, our proposed solution for the Advisor Selection Problem allows the
exchange of information between communities in such a way that the participant com-
munities have strong incentives to provide truthful reports. In particular, we proposed
a graph-based approach which focused on the exploitation of the consistency among the
advice different advisors provide and in which honesty is a Bayes Nash Equilibruim. Al-
though the idea of exploiting consistency appears to be an effective way to promote honesty,
determining the maximum clique in a graph in addition to finding a subgraph of a graph
G that is isomorphic to a graph H (known as the “subgraph isomorphism problem”) are
NP-Complete problems. At first glance this might appear to pose restrictions on the size
of the graph that our approach can be applied. However, in a number of practical appli-
cations we expect the size of the consistency subgraph to be manageable either directly
or through heuristics, since it is not unreasonable to assume an agent will be a member
of only a few communities, thus limiting the size of the consistency subgraph. We would
also like to note that there is work in the area of Constraint Satisfaction that can solve the
subgraph isomorphism and maximal clique problem efficiently for satisfactory large order
of graphs [60, 89].
Furthermore, for the Payment Decision Problem we proposed a novel scoring function
which we used to determine the compensations the participant communities should receive
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with respect to both the accuracy and the interpretation of the information they provided.
We presented the properties the scoring function should satisfy and then we provided
examples of families of functions that could be used. Finally, we gave specific directions of
possible criteria in selecting a specific instance of the latter families.
With respect to the Trust Modeling Problem, we agree that designing a generic trust
model that can be applied to any environment is not feasible. Thus, we focus on providing
a trust model and the principles it should follow for environments where communities
request their agents to declare their anticipated contribution and for which the exact
knowledge of the contribution of each agent is crucial. Although our model employs detailed
mathematics, its concept can be intuitively explained to users (e.g. QoC Property 1 : “The
more you contribute, the more your contribution will be appreciated”). We feel this is
valuable since, as we discussed, users of systems should be able to understand how their
trust is modeled. In fact many companies are interested in having the users understand the
limitations of the model in order to avoid the blame if the users get deceived [62] and is one
reason, we believe, many companies only use very simple trust models like, for example,
counting the number of positive and negative ratings. Moreover, in this work we provided
a family of functions that satisfy these principles, we proved that our model is incentive
compatible, and our empirical evaluation showed that our proposed model may provide
an important improvement in the utility the agents enjoys with respect to other proposed
models.
Concluding, the key contributions of this thesis are that we :
1. suggested addressing the problem of improving the services peer-based communities
offer through the exchange of evaluation information of their agents,
2. suggested and proved that consistency exploitation can create strong incentives for
promoting honesty in information exchange among self-interested participants,
3. provided an extension of the scoring rules to consider both a continuous rating and
its binary interpretation,
4. suggested the principles a trust model that evaluates promises should follow and
presented a mathematical model that satisfies them.
8.1 Future Work




Although in a number of practical applications we expect the size of the consistency
subgraph to be manageable either directly or through heuristics [89, 60], it would be still
valuable to explore possible ways of replacing the cliques with other structures that will
allow us to develop efficient algorithms for any order of graphs. Furthermore, it would be
interesting to study to what extent our approach could address certain types of collusion
since the colluding communities cannot have a clear view of the type of ties (i.e., edges in the
Consistency Graph) the other members of the colluding group create. Collusion is a very
challenging problem that emerges when different parties play strategically in collaborative
or competitive environments. Our intuition is that under some circumstances, by using our
proposed advisor selection mechanism, a strategic coordination of the colluding members
is compromised even if at least one community has secretly built ties with communities
outside this group.
Another interesting direction for future work is the area of privacy preservation. In our
setting we have agents revealing private information about themselves to the new commu-
nities that they wish to join, and have communities sharing this information. We will need
to decide what information should be kept public and what should be private and how to
guard against inadvertently revealing information that should be kept private. In addition
communities might be reluctant to reveal information about their agents. Furthermore, a
major challenge in privacy preservation is to ensure that there is no unintentional leak of
private information. For example, consider an agent that belongs to several communities
and is going to reveal this information to a new community. Assume now that one of these
communities is related to patients with chronic diseases, and the other is specialized in low
sugar products. The knowledge of the participation of the agent in both of the communi-
ties can lead to the inference that the agent represents a diabetic user, information that
the user might not wish to freely share with others.
An environment that is very similar to ours in regards to unintentionally revealing
information is the ubiquitous computing environment. In a ubiquitous computing en-
vironment sensitive information can be revealed by considering the services a user has
utilized. Hengartner and Steenkiste [23, 24] present a description of the main challenges in
privacy preservation in ubiquitous computing environments. They identify the principles
which should be taken into consideration when designing an access control mechanism for
ubiquitous computing environments, and propose an architecture for allowing the flow of
information among different nodes and entities that have access to information at different
levels of granularity. Jiang and Landay [26] also discuss the different level of information
granularity that different devices in a ubiquitous computing environment produce. In par-
ticular, they consider the problem of designing a privacy control system that can handle
access to sensitive information which can be produced by a vast number of sensors in a
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ubiquitous computing environment.
The Payment Distribution Problem
Regarding the Payment Distribution Problem, we considered that the communities
exchange the information they experience. It would be valuable to examine whether a
community is better off reporting its real rating or a rating equal to the one other commu-
nities will experience. More specifically, our next step is to study such methods as those
proposed by Regan et al. [59] as part of our effort to learn the way the selling communi-
ties model the ratings of their agents in order to both interpret the information that they
provide but also to determine the ratings the buyer community should post on E’s selling
board. This is valuable since it might be more beneficial for a community to post on the
trusted entity’s E selling board a rating equal to the one that it believes other communities
will experience rather than its real rating, given that the latter rating might provide more
useful information to the recipient communities.
We believe that an important side effect of selling an estimate of the information that
other communities will experience is that it will provide strong incentives towards the use of
commonly acceptable evaluation models and thus might encourage a stronger collaboration
in addressing the trust and reputation modeling problem. Furthermore, we would like to
expand our proposed families of i-Functions in order to facilitate the selection of the most
appropriate i-Function with respect to the particular requirements of the problem to which
it is applied.
The Trust Modeling Problem
Regarding the Trust Modeling Problem, we are interested in extending the family of
the QoC and RL functions in order to give communities the flexibility to find the optimal
pair of functions along with the relation between them (i.e., multiplication, summations
etc) that satisfies the properties of QoC, RL and Tr. In addition, we are interested in
extending our empirical evaluation to more complex scenarios and study the performance
of other instantiations of our proposed trust function.
Currently, we assumed that the significance of each service is fixed and predetermined
by the community. In the future we plan to explore ways of using evaluation models in
order to decide the significance of the combination of services an agent offers in conjunction
with the amount of the contribution it is willing to provide for each service. For example
an agent might be willing to provide 1 Gigabyte of disc space for other peer communities to
store files and a download bandwidth of 512bkps, a second agent might provide 1 Gigabyte
of disc space and 1gbps, while a third might be willing to provide 2 Gigabyte disc space and
2gbps of bandwidth but it can only be online 3 hours per day. Obviously, the significance
of the bundle of the services each of the above three agents offers is different. Our vision
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is that a promising direction for determining the significance of the latter bundles is the
area of combinatorial auctions.
Furthermore, it would be valuable to explore whether our trust function can be extended
to environments in which the trustworthiness of an agent should be maximized in every
case where the agent delivers at least what it promised. This can be done by slightly
changing our trust function to get its maximum value if the delivered contribution is equal
or more than the promised contribution. We can still retain the same QoC function to
indicate the quality of the delivered contribution. Furthermore, the trust properties that
refer to the interval (promised contribution, 1] can be ignored and we can simply treat the
case of under-stating as equal to the case of truthfully reporting a promise. As we discussed
in Chapter 6, a continuous rating can be easily converted to a discrete rating without loss
of information by defining the intervals that correspond to each discrete value the rating
can receive. An interesting direction for future research would be to design a model that
defines the latter intervals.
Finally, an interesting dimension of trust is provided by Gambetta [19]. More specif-
ically, Gambetta presents an analysis, from a sociological point of view, on the desirable
amount of trust and he concludes that in some cases it is more desirable to “find the optimal
mixture of cooperation and competition rather than decide at which extreme to converge”.
This observation might provide interesting insights on the set of parameters that should be
taken into consideration for determining trustworthiness. For example, some interesting
questions are:
• should the trustworthiness of an agent take into consideration the level of social
interactions it has with other agents, and how?
• should the trustworthiness of an agent consider the level the agent contributes to or




A.1 Diagrams for Chapter 6 Experiment 2
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Figure A.1: Chapter 6-Experiment 2: The diagrams of ω− d
p
for aggregation number equal
to 100 for each interval in {[0.3, 0.4], ..., [0.9, 1]}
Figure A.2: Chapter 6-Experiment 2: The diagrams of ω− d
p
for aggregation number equal
to 100 for each interval in {[0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3]}
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Figure A.3: Chapter 6-Experiment 2: The diagrams of ω and d
p
for aggregation number
equal to 100 for each interval in {[0.1, 0.2], ..., [0.9, 1]}
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